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Abstract

Third parties are very common in modern cryptography, both in symmetric cryptographic applications (e.g., a key distribution protocol and a non-repudiation protocol) and public key cryptographic systems (e.g., the certificate authority and the
private key generator in identity-based cryptography). A widely used approach is
to assume that a third party has a certain level of trust, but is not fully trusted. In
this thesis, we present several new results about cryptosystems, which do not require
any fully trusted third party. We provide detailed schemes and security analysis on
server-aided verification signatures, certificate-based signatures and encryption, and
optimistic fair exchange.
The computational cost required by cryptographic protocols is a significant burden to power-constrained devices such as smart cards and mobile terminals. Serveraided computation is a promising solution to mitigate this issue by employing a
powerful server to carry out costly cryptographic computation. Such techniques
require an additional care since servers cannot be fully trusted. In this thesis, we
investigate the issues of server-aided verification signatures, i.e., using server(s) to
assist signature verification. Several notions in digital signatures with server-aided
verification are formally defined, based on different trust levels of the server. As
instances, we provide server-aided verification protocols for Boneh-Lynn-Shacham
(BLS) signature (with the random oracle assumption) and Waters signature (without the random oracle assumption).
As cryptographic primitives, certificate-based public key cryptography (CB-PKC)
and certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) are used to ease certificate
management and solve key escrow problems due to the trust third party in identitybased public key cryptography. As one of features, the signature verification (resp.
encryption) does not require public key authenticity check. In this thesis, we take a
closer look at the relationship between certificateless cryptosystem and certificatebased cryptosystem, present the security definitions of certificate-based signatures
v

and certificate-based encryption, and provide generic constructions of certificatebased signatures from certificateless signatures and certificate-based encryption from
certificateless encryption, respectively. The proposed generic constructions are proven
to be secure in the random oracle model.
An off-line trusted third party (arbitrator) plays an important role in optimistic
fair exchange (OFE), which allows two parties to exchange their digital items in
a fair way. As one of the fundamental problems in secure electronic business and
digital rights management, OFE has been studied intensively since its introduction.
This thesis introduces and defines a new property for OFE: Strong ResolutionAmbiguity. We show that many existing OFE protocols have the new property,
but its formal investigation has been missing in those protocols. We prove that
in the certified-key model, an OFE protocol is secure in the multi-user setting if
it is secure in the single-user setting and has the property of strong resolutionambiguity. An OFE protocol has the property of strong resolution-ambiguity if one
can transform a partial signature σ 0 into a full signature σ using signer’s private key
or arbitrator’s private key, and given such a pair (σ 0 , σ), it is infeasible to tell which
key is used in the conversion. Our result not only simplifies the security analysis of
OFE protocols in the multi-user setting but also provides a new approach for the
design of multi-user secure OFE protocols. In addition, a new OFE protocol with
strong resolution-ambiguity is proposed. Our analysis shows that the protocol is
setup-free, stand-alone and multi-user secure without the random oracle assumption.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Third parties, like judges in the court and referees in sports games, play an important
role in our daily life. In public key cryptography, third parties are important for
protecting information and communications in digital world and essential in many
public key cryptographic systems. A good example is identity-based public key
cryptography (or, ID-PKC for short). The concept of ID-PKC was introduced by
Shamir in [Sha84], where the user’s public key is his/her identity information (e.g.,
email address) and the associated private key is generated by a third party called
Private Key Generator (PKG). Since PKG has all users’ private keys, it is able to
carry out all cryptographic operations (e.g., decryption and signing) on behalf of any
user. Thus, a necessary assumption in ID-PKC is that the third party must be fully
trusted. This assumption, from a practical point of view, does not easily hold in
applications with a large number of users: It is hard to find a third party who is fully
trusted by all users. For this reason, some public key cryptographic protocols make
use of the third party in a different way, namely only assuming a certain level of trust
(rather than the full trust) on the third party. This is a weaker and more practical
assumption compared with the assumption of a fully trusted third party. As shown
in the literature, similar approaches have led to the introduction of several new
cryptographic primitives, such as server-aided verification signatures, certificateless
public key cryptography, certificate-based public key cryptography and optimistic
fair exchange. These are also the focus of this thesis.

1.1

Background

Cryptographic protocols with untrusted third parties have been investigated intensively in the literature. In this section, we describe the notions on which our thesis is
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focused, namely server-aided verification signatures, certificateless public key cryptography, certificate-based public key cryptography and optimistic fair exchange.

1.1.1

Server-aided Verification Signatures

In public key cryptography [DH76], a user is equipped with a pair of cryptographic
keys: a public key and a private key. The private key is kept secret, but the public
key can be widely distributed and published. One of the most important applications
of public key cryptography is digital signatures. Digital signatures are equivalent
to traditional handwritten signatures in many aspects, such as integrity check, nonrepudiation evidence, and authenticity purpose, etc. In particular, a digital signature
generated by a user on a message guarantees that it was indeed the user who signed
the message and the message cannot be altered. A digital signature scheme typically
consists of three algorithms: a Key-Generation algorithm that outputs a private
key and the associated public key; a Signature-Generation algorithm that, taking
as input a message and a private key, produces a signature on that message; and
a Signature-Verification algorithm that verifies the validity of a message-signature
pair under a given public key.
As an advantage over a symmetric key cryptography, communication using public
key cryptography does not need any secure channels for key sharing. However,
public key cryptography has introduced more computational overheads to computer
systems. This is a burden to computer systems, especially for low-power devices such
as smart cards and mobile terminals. Several techniques (e.g., pre-computation and
off-line computation) have therefore been introduced and adopted to improve the
efficiency of those protocols. While such techniques can reduce the computational
load, the computational requirement of many public key cryptographic algorithms
and protocols, especially those with excellent security features, still remains too
heavy for power-constrained devices.
A promising solution is to employ a powerful server to assist power-constrained
devices to carry out cryptographic computations. This is known as “server-aided
computation”. If the server can be fully-trusted, computations can be easily conducted between client and server. As an example, the client can send his/her private
key to the server, who then acts on behalf of the client to decrypt ciphertexts or
sign messages, and returns the result to the client. However, the assumption of a
fully-trusted server seems too strong to be practical, since most likely clients will
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face an untrusted server which may be interested in extracting the secret of the
client (in decryption or signing) or responding with a false result (in encryption
or signature verification). In the scenario of digital signatures, the motivation of
server-aided verification is to use a powerful server to alleviate the computation
load on the verifier who does not fully trust the server. The notion of server-aided
verification was introduced by Quisquater and De Soete [QS89] in order to speed
up RSA verification with a small exponent, while Giraul and Lefrance [GL05] made
the first attempt to define the security of server-aided verification signatures. This
thesis will investigate the formal security definitions and concrete protocols of digital
signatures with server-aided verification.

1.1.2

Certificateless PKC and Certificate-based PKC

The central problem in a public key system is to prove that a public key is genuine
and authentic, and has not been tampered with or replaced by a malicious third
party. The usual approach to ensure the authenticity of a public key is to use a
certificate. A (digital) certificate is a signature of a certificate authority (CA) that
binds together the identity of a user, its public key and other information. This
kind of systems is referred to as traditional public key infrastructure (PKI), which
is generally considered to be costly to use and manage.
The original motivation of identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) introduced by Shamir [Sha84] is to ease certificate management in the e-mail system.
A user’s public key in ID-PKC is some unique information about the identity of the
user (e.g., email address). The private key in ID-PKC is generated by a trusted
third party called Private Key Generator (PKG) who holds a master key. Although
certificate is eliminated, ID-PKC within the structure of [Sha84] has an inherent
problem, i.e., key escrow, since PKG has any user’s private key and must be fully
trusted by all users. The key escrow problem can be partially solved by the introduction of multiple PKGs and the use of threshold techniques, but this is at the
cost of extra communications and infrastructures.
Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a new paradigm called certificateless public
key cryptography [ARP03] (or, CL-PKC for short). The original motivation of CLPKC is to find a public key system that does not require the use of certificates and
does not have the key escrow problem. Each user in CL-PKC holds two secrets: a
secret value and a partial private key. The secret value SV is generated by the user,
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and a third party Key Generating Center (KGC), holding a master key, generates
the partial private key P P K from the user’s identity information. The user’s actual
private key is the output of some function with the input SV and P P K. In this way,
the key escrow problem is eliminated and KGC does not need to be fully trusted.
The user can use the actual private key to generate the public key, which can be
available to other entities by transmitting it along with messages or by placing it in
a public directory. However, there is no public key certificate in CL-PKC.
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry [Gen03] introduced the notion of certificate-based
encryption. As in the traditional PKI, each client generates its own public/private
key pair and requests a certificate from the CA. The difference is that, a certificate
in certificate-based encryption, or more generally, a signature from the third party
acts not only as a certificate (as in the traditional PKI) but also as a decryption key
(as in ID-PKC and CL-PKC). The sender can encrypt a message without obtaining
explicit information other than the recipient’s public key and the parameters of
CA. To decrypt a message, a keyholder needs both its secret key and an up-todate certificate from its CA (or a signature from an authority). Therefore, CA
does not need to make the certificate status information available among the whole
system, and only needs to contact the certificate holder for revocation and update.
A similar idea was latter used to design other cryptographic protocols within the
same infrastructure of [Gen03]. In this thesis, we will investigate two fundamental
notions-encryption and signatures-in certificate-based public key cryptography, and
demonstrate the relationship with their counterparts in certificateless public key
cryptography.

1.1.3

Optimistic Fair Exchange

The objective of a fair exchange protocol is to allow two parties to fairly exchange
their items so that no one can gain any advantage. A straightforward solution is to
introduce a fully trusted third party as a mediator: each party sends the item to
the trusted third party, who upon verifying the correctness of both items, forwards
each item to the other party. Such protocols require that the third party be always
online, as each exchange needs the assistance from the third party. In order to
alleviate the requirement of an always-online third party, Asokan, Schunter and
Waidner [ASW97] introduced the notion of Optimistic Fair Exchange (hereinafter
referred to as “OFE”). OFE also makes use of a third party called arbitrator, but
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it does not need to be always online; instead, the arbitrator only gets involved if
something goes wrong (e.g., one party attempts to cheat or other faults occur).
A typical example of OFE is as follows: Two participants (say, Alice and Bob)
first agree on the items to be exchanged: Alice’s item is a valid full signature (e.g.,
signature on a credit card purchase) and Bob’s item is denoted by itemB (e.g., a
book). At the end of the exchange, Alice should have itemB and Bob should have
the full signature.
Step 1. Alice starts the exchange by generating a partial signature and sending it to
Bob. The partial signature only shows Alice’s willingness to send her full signature
to Bob if Bob sends her itemB .
Step 2. Bob verifies the partial signature and sends itemB to Alice if the partial
signature is valid.
Step 3. Upon receiving itemB , Alice generates a full signature and sends it to Bob.
Step 4. If Bob does not receive the full signature, he can obtain it from the arbitrator
who is able to convert the partial signature to the full signature. This property
guarantees that Bob will obtain the full signature if Alice refuses to send it after
Step 2.
In the above scenario, Alice is usually called as “signer” and Bob is called as
“verifier”. The exchange between the signer and the verifier has attracted many
attentions from researchers on OFE, and it is also the case which OFE refers to in
the remainder of this thesis. (But readers should bear in mind that OFE is a broad
notion and includes many other types of exchanges.) It has been widely accepted
that an OFE protocol must satisfy the following security requirements:
Security against Signers: The signer should not be able to produce a valid partial
signature which cannot be transformed into a valid full signature by an honest
arbitrator.
Security against Verifiers: The verifier should not be able to transform a valid partial
signature into a valid full signature, without explicitly asking the arbitrator to do
so.
Security against the Arbitrator: The arbitrator should not be able to produce a valid
full signature on message m without explicitly asking the signer to produce a partial
signature on m.

1.2. Aims and Objectives

1.2
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Aims and Objectives

This thesis is focused on the design of aforementioned cryptographic protocols with
untrusted third parties. The aim of this thesis is to address three aspects defined as
follows.
1. Several server-aided verification protocols have been proposed but the notion
has never been formally investigated. Giraul and Lefrance [GL05] had made
the first attempt to define the security of server-aided verification in digital
signatures. Their definition however is only heuristic, and it is still worthwhile
to provide more elaborated models for the further research on server-aided
verification signatures. The first aim of this thesis is to formally define serveraided verification in digital signatures based on different trust levels assumed
on the third party, and design concrete server-aided verification protocols in
different settings.
2. As mentioned in [ARP03], certificate-based public cryptography and certificateless public cryptography share some commonalities. In both systems, message signing (resp. decryption) requires two pieces of information: one is generated by the third party and the other one is generated by the public key
owner. In addition, explicit verification of the authenticity of a public key is
not required in signature verification (resp. encryption). Motivated by those
similarities, we believe it is worthwhile to investigate the relationship of digital
signatures (resp. encryption) between certificateless public cryptography and
certificate-based public key cryptography. This is the second aim of our thesis.
3. Most OFE protocols are designed only in the single-user setting, namely there
is only one signer. However, OFE protocols are most likely used in the multiuser setting where there are two or more signers in the system (but items
are still exchanged between two parties). In [DLY07], Dodis, Lee and Yum
pointed out that the single-user security of OFE cannot guarantee the multiuser security. A similar result was also discovered independently by Zhu, Susilo
and Mu [ZSM07]. On the other hand, it is known that several single-user
secure OFE protocols can be proven secure in the multi-user setting [DLY07].
However, it remains unknown under which conditions single-user secure OFE
protocols will be secure in the multi-user setting? We believe the investigation
of this question not only will provide a further understanding on the security
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of OFE in the multi-user setting, but also can introduce new constructions of
multi-user secure optimistic fair exchange.

1.3

Structure of This Thesis and Contributions

Chapter 1 briefly describes the background of this thesis and gives a short introduction of each chapter and its contribution. The basic cryptographic notions,
mathematical tools and complexity assumptions required in this thesis are reviewed
in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 is focused on digital signatures with server-aided verification (SAV).
We first introduce and define the existential unforgeability of server-aided verification signatures. We prove that the new notion includes the existential unforgeability
of digital signature schemes and the soundness of server-aided verification protocols
under the same assumption in [GL05]. We then introduce the server-aided verification to BLS signature [BLS01] and Waters signature [Wat05], by providing the first
constructions of existentially unforgeable SAV-BLS and SAV-Waters. Additionally,
we investigate the collusion between the signer and the server, and define the security models to capture the collusion attack and its stronger version on server-aided
verification signatures. Concrete server-aided verification signature schemes secure
against collusion attacks are also proposed. The result described in Chapter 3 was
presented at Provable Security 2008, Second International Conference [WMSH08].
Chapter 4 presents several new results of digital signatures and encryption in
certificate-based public key cryptography. We first provide new definitions of the
potential adversaries in certificate-based public key cryptography, which we believe
will establish a systematic approach for constructing and proving secure cryptographic protocols in certificate-based public key cryptography. After that, we show
how to, in a generic way, build a certificate-based signature scheme from a certificateless signature scheme and a certificate-based encryption scheme from a certificateless
encryption scheme, respectively. The security of our generic constructions is proven
in the random oracle model. Concrete protocols are also provided to demonstrate
the application of our generic constructions. Part of this chapter was published in
the Journal of Universal Computer Science [WMSH09].
Chapter 5 gives a sufficient condition for single-user secure OFE protocols remaining secure in the multi-user setting. We first introduce and define a new property of OFE called Strong Resolution-Ambiguity. This property requires that one
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can transform a partial signature σ 0 into a full signature σ using signer’s private key
or arbitrator’s private key, and given such a pair (σ 0 , σ), it is infeasible to tell which
key is used in the conversion. For an OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity,
we prove that its security in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user
setting. More precisely, we show that: (1) the security against the signer and the
security against the verifier in the single-user setting are preserved in the multi-user
setting for OFE protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity, and (2) the security
against the arbitrator in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user setting
(for OFE protocols either with or without strong resolution-ambiguity). Additionally, we provide a new construction of OFE with strong resolution-ambiguity, which
possesses several desirable properties and is multi-user secure without the random
oracle assumption. The result of this chapter was presented at PKC 2010 [HMS+ 10].
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis.

Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we review some fundamental backgrounds required in the thesis.

2.1

Complexity Assumptions on Bilinear Group

Bilinear Map. Let G1 and GT be two groups of prime order p and let g be a
generator of G1 . The map e : G1 × G1 → GT is said to be an admissible bilinear
map if the following three conditions hold true:
• e is bilinear, i.e., e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g)ab for all a, b ∈ ZZp .
• e is non-degenerate, i.e., e(g, g) 6= 1GT .
• e is efficiently computable.
Definition 2.1 We say that (G1 , GT ) are bilinear groups if there exists a nondegenerate bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → GT , such that the group order p = |G1 | = |GT |
is prime, and the pairing e and the group operations in G1 and GT are all efficiently
computable.
Bilinear maps can be constructed from modified Weil pairing [Lan73] and Tate
pairing [FMR99] on suitable elliptic curves. Weil and Tate pairings were first used
to break cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MOV reduction [MOV93]) and later on used
to design cryptographic protocols, such as one-round 3-party Diffie-Hellman [Jou04],
practical identity-based encryption [BF03], etc.
Remark 2.1 A more general form of bilinear map is
e : G1 × G2 → GT ,
where G1 , G2 and GT are groups of the same prime order p. There are three basic
types:
9
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Type 1: G1 = G2 ;
Type 2: G1 6= G2 but there is an efficiently computable homomorphism φ : G1 →
G2 ; and
Type 3: G1 6= G2 and there are no efficiently computable homomorphisms between
G1 and G2 .
The Type I bilinear map provides advantages in protocol design, but Type III has
the most flexible options (in the sense of suitable elliptic curves satisfying various
security levels) [GPS08]. As one can see, the bilinear map we will use in this thesis
is Type I.
Discrete Logarithm (DL) on G1 . Given g, g a ∈ G1 , compute a ∈ ZZp .
An algorithm B solves the DL problem on G1 with advantage ε if Adv DLB =
Pr[B(G1 , GT , e, g, g a ) = a : a ∈R ZZp ] ≥ ε. The probability is over the uniform
random choice of a from ZZp , and over the coin tosses of B. We say that an algorithm
B (t, ε)-solves DL on G1 if B runs in time at most t, and Adv DLB is at least ε.
Definition 2.2 The Discrete Logarithm problem on G1 is said to be (t, ε)-hard if
there exists no algorithm that (t, ε)-solves it.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) on G1 [BLS01]. Given g, g a , g b ∈ G1 ,
compute g ab ∈ G1 .
An algorithm B solves the CDH problem on G1 with advantage ε if Adv CDHB =
Pr[B(G1 , GT , e, g, g a , g b ) = g ab : a, b ∈R ZZp ] ≥ ε. The probability is over the
uniform random choice of a, b from ZZp , and over the coin tosses of B. We say that
an algorithm B (t, ε)-solves CDH on G1 if B runs in time at most t, and Adv CDHB
is at least ε.
Definition 2.3 The Computational Diffie-Hellman problem on G1 is said to be
(t, ε)-hard if there exists no algorithm that (t, ε)-solves it.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDH) on (G1 , GT ) [BF01]. Given (g, g a ,
g b , g c ) ∈ G1 , compute e(g, g)abc ∈ GT .
An algorithm B solves the BDH problem on (G1 , GT ) with advantage ε if
Adv BDHB = Pr[B(g, g a , g b , g c ) = e(g, g)abc ] ≥ ε.
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The probability is over the uniform random choice of a, b, c from ZZp , and over the
coin tosses of B. We say that an algorithm B (t, ε)-solves BDH on (G1 , GT ) if B
runs in time at most t, and Adv BDHB is at least ε.
Definition 2.4 The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem on (G1 , GT ) is said to be (t, ε)hard if there exists no algorithm that (t, ε)-solves it.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Oracle ODBDH on (G1 , GT ) [MW96]. Given
(g, g a , g b , g c ) ∈ G1 and h ∈ GT , this oracle outputs “1” if h = e(g, g)abc or “0” otherwise.
Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (GBDH) on (G1 , GT ). Given (g, g a , g b ,
g c ) ∈ G1 , compute e(g, g)abc with the help of Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Oracle ODBDH .
An algorithm B solves the GBDH on (G1 , GT ) with advantage ε if
Adv GBDHB = Pr[B(g, g a , g b , g c , ODBDH ) = e(g, g)abc : a, b, c ∈R ZZp ] ≥ ε.
The probability is over the uniform random choice of a, b, c from ZZp , and over the
coin tosses of B. We say that an algorithm B (t, ε)-solves GBDH on (G1 , GT ) if B
runs in time at most t, and Adv GBDHB is at least ε.
Definition 2.5 The Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem on (G1 , GT ) is
said to be (t, ε)-hard if there exists no algorithm that (t, ε)-solves it.

2.2

Digital Signatures

The notion of digital signatures was first proposed by Diffie and Hellman [DH76] in
1976. A digital signature scheme Σ considered in this thesis consists of the following
algorithms:
Parameter-Generation: ParamGen(1k ) → param.
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter k and returns a string
param which denotes the common scheme parameters, including the description of the message space M and the signature space Ω, etc. param is shared
among all the users in the system.
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Key-Generation: KeyGen(param) → (sk, pk).
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param and returns a
private/public key-pair (sk, pk) for a user in the system.
Signature-Generation: Sign(param, m, sk, pk) = σ.
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param, the message m
and the key pair (sk, pk), and returns a signature σ.
Signature-Verification: Verify(param, m, σ, pk) → {Valid, Invalid}.
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param, a pair (m, σ)
and the public key pk, and returns Valid or Invalid. σ is said to be a valid
signature of m under pk if Verify(param, m, σ, pk) outputs Valid. Otherwise,
σ is said to be invalid.
Completeness. Any signature properly generated by Sign can always pass through
the verification in Verify. That is, Verify(param, m, Sign(param, m, sk, pk), pk) =
Valid.
Existential unforgeability of Σ. The standard notion of security for a signature scheme is called existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks [GMR88], which is defined using the following game between a challenger C
and an adversary A.
Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithm ParamGen and KeyGen to obtain
system parameter param and one key pair (sk, pk). The adversary A is given
param and pk.
Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A can request signatures of at most
qs messages. For each sign query mi ∈ {m1 , · · · , mqs }, the challenger C returns
σi = Sign(param, mi , sk, pk) as the response.
Output. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) and wins the game
if:
1. m∗ ∈
/ {m1 , · · · , mqs }; and
2. Verify(param, m∗ , σ ∗ , pk) = Valid.
We define Σ-AdvA to be the probability that the adversary A wins in the above
game, taken over the coin tosses made by A and the challenger.

2.3. Public Key Encryption

13

Definition 2.6 A forger A is said to (t, qs , ε)-break a signature scheme Σ if A runs
in time at most t, A makes at most qs signature queries, and Σ-AdvA is at least ε. σ
is (t, qs , ε)-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks if there
exists no forger that (t, qs , ε)-breaks it.

2.3

Public Key Encryption

A public key encryption scheme, first introduced in [DH76], is made up of the
following algorithms:
Parameter-Generation: ParamGen(1k ) → param.
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter k and returns a string
param which denotes the common scheme parameters, including the description of the message space M and the ciphertext space C, etc. param is shared
among all the users in the system.
Key-Generation: KeyGen(param) → (sk, pk).
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param and returns a
private/public key-pair (sk, pk) for a user in the system.
Encrypt: Encrypt(param, pk, m) → cipher.
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param, a public key pk
and a message m ∈ M, and returns a ciphertext cipher.
Decrypt: Decrypt(param, sk, cipher) → {m, ⊥}.
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param, a private key sk
and a ciphertext cipher, and returns a message m or the symbol “⊥” indicating
a decryption failure.
Correctness. Ciphertexts generated by the algorithm Encrypt can be successfully
decrypted by Decrypt: Decrypt(param, sk, Encrypt(param, pk, m)) = m.
IND-CCA. The commonly accepted security notion for a public key encryption
scheme is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (known as
IND-CCA), which is defined using the following game between a challenger C and
an adversary A.
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Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithm ParamGen and KeyGen to obtain
system parameter param and one key pair (sk, pk). The adversary A is given
param and pk.
Queries-I. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A can make decryption queries.
For each query cipheri , the challenger C responds with the output of Decrypt
(param, sk, cipheri ).
Challenge. The adversary A submits two (equal length) messages m0 , m1 . The
challenger selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, sets C ∗ = Encrypt(param, pk, mb )
and sends C ∗ to the adversary as its challenge ciphertext.
Queries-II. The adversary continues to adaptively issue decryption queries as in
Queries-I, but with the constraint that the adversary does not request the
decryption of C ∗ .
Output: After all queries, the adversary outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1} and wins the
game if b = b0 .
The success probability that an adaptive chosen ciphertext adversary has in the
above game is Pr[b = b0 ].
Definition 2.7 A public key encryption scheme is (t, q, )-indistinguishable against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks if no adversary, making at most q decryption
queries in time t, can have success probability at least  + 1/2 in the above game.

2.4

Proofs of Knowledge

An NP-relation R is a subset of {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ for which there exists a polynomial
f such that |y| ≤ f (|x|) for all (x, y) ∈ R, and there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm for deciding membership in R. Let R(x) = {y : (x, y) ∈ R} and LR =
{x : ∃y such that (x, y) ∈ R}. A proof of knowledge [BG92] for an NP-relation
R is a protocol whereby there is a common input x to the prover and the verifier,
and a private input y to the prover. The prover tries to convince the verifier that
(x, y) ∈ R.
Definition 2.8 (Systems of proofs of knowledge) [BG92] Let R be a binary
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relation, and κ : {0, 1}∗ → [0, 1]. Let V be an interactive function which is computable in probabilistic polynomial time. We say that a V is a knowledge verifier for
the relation R with knowledge error κ if the following two conditions hold.
• Non-triviality: There exists an interactive function P ∗ so that for all x ∈ LR ,
all possible interactions of V with P ∗ on common input x are accepting.
• Validity (with error κ): There exists a constant c > 0 and a probabilistic oracle
machine K such that for every interaction function P and every x ∈ LR ,
machine K satisfies the following condition: let p(x) > κ(x) be the probability
that the interaction of V with P on common input x are accepting, then on
input x and access to oracle Px , machine K outputs a string from the set R(x)
within an expected number of steps bounded by

|x|c
.
p(x)−κ(x)

The oracle machine

K is called a universal knowledge extractor, and κ is called the knowledge error
function.

Chapter 3
Digital Signatures with Server-aided
Verification
This chapter investigates digital signatures with server-aided verification, namely a
third party called server is employed to assist signature verification. According to
different trust levels assumed on the server, we provide formal definitions and concrete constructions of server-aided verification signatures. Part of this work will be
published in Journal of Computers and Mathematics with Applications [WMSH11].

3.1

Introduction

Cryptographic protocols introduce extra computational costs to computer systems.
Although it is not a significant burden to normal computer systems, low power
devices such as smart cards and mobile terminals require an additional care when
using cryptographic protocols. Several techniques, e.g., pre-computation and off-line
computation, have been introduced and adopted in order to improve the efficiency of
cryptographic protocols. While such techniques can reduce the computational load,
the computational requirement of many cryptographic systems (especially those with
excellent security features) still remains too heavy for low-power devices. Pairing
computation on elliptic curves is an example. Due to its elegant properties, pairing
has been widely employed as building blocks for lots of cryptographic schemes, in
particular in the design of identity-based encryption and short signatures. However,
a pairing operation on elliptic curve requires much more computational cost than
carrying out a modular exponentiation. How to reduce the computational cost of
pairing-based cryptography is a challenging task.
A promising solution is to employ a powerful server assisting the low-power
device (we refer it to as client) to carry out costly cryptographic operations. This
is known as “server-aided computation”. If the server is fully-trusted, computations
16
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can be easily done through a secure channel between the client and the server. As
an example, the client can send his/her private key to the server, who then can act
on behalf of the client to decrypt ciphertexts or sign messages, and return the result
to the client. However, the assumption of a fully-trusted server seems too strong to
be practical, since more likely clients will face an untrusted server which could try
to extract the secret of the client (in decryption or signing) or respond with a false
result (in encryption or signature verification).
Many server-aided computation schemes [And92, BM94, BQ95, GP03, GRK00,
iKS93, MILY92, MKI88, NS98, PW92, YL92, YL93] have been proposed in the literature. The first server-aided computation scheme was proposed by Matsumoto,
Kato and Imai [MKI88] in the scenario of RSA signature. However, Phitzmann
and Waidner [PW92] showed that all protocols in [MKI88] are insecure due to several passive attacks. Béguin and Quisquater’s protocol [BQ95] was based on the
fast exponentiation algorithm [BGMW92], which does not require expensive precomputations. Unfortunately, an effective lattice-based passive attack against their
protocol was proposed in [NS98]. The focus of this chapter is on the server-aided verification signature SAV-Σ. In general, SAV-Σ consists of a digital signature scheme
and a server-aided verification protocol. The purpose of SAV-Σ is to enable signature
verifier to perform signature verification with less computational cost, by executing
the server-aided verification protocol with the server. The notion of server-aided
verification was introduced by Quisquater and De Soete [QS89] in order to speed up
RSA verification with a small exponent. In Eurocrypt 1995, Lim and Lee proposed
efficient protocols for speeding up the verification of identity proofs and signatures
in discrete-logarithm-based identification schemes, based on the “randomization” of
the verification equation [LL95]. Girault and Quisquater [GQ02] proposed another
different approach, which does not require pre-computation or randomization. Their
server-aided verification protocol is computationally secure based on the hardness
of a sub-problem of the initial underlying problem of the signature scheme. Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya considered the sever-aided verification under the situation
that the server is made of two untrusted software packages, which are assumed not
to communicate with each other [LL95]. Under this assumption, it allows a very
light public computation task (typically one modular multiplication in the Schnorr
scheme). Girault and Lefranc [GL05] proposed a more generalized model of serveraided verification without the assumption in [LL95]. A generic server-aided verification protocol for digital signatures from bilinear maps was also proposed in [GL05].
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Their protocol can be applied to signature schemes with similar constructions to the
BB signature [BB04] and the ZSS signature [ZSNS04].
The purposes of this chapter are to formally define the security of server-aided
verification signatures and construct new schemes that are secure under realistic
security models. Giraul and Lefrance [GL05] had made the first attempt to define
the security of server-aided verification signatures. Their definition consists of two
aspects, namely the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme and the soundness of server-aided verification protocol. The former notion is the same as that in
digital signatures, and the latter requires that the server be unable to prove an invalid signature as valid using the server-aided verification protocol. Although their
definition captures the essence of server-aided verification signatures, the adaptive
attacks on server-aided verification are not clearly described and it is still worthwhile
to define more elaborated models for the further research on server-aided verification
signatures. The main results of this chapter are summarized as follows.
First, we introduce and define the existential unforgeability of server-aided verification signatures (or, EUF-SAV-Σ for short). For server-aided verification signatures,
we prove that EUF-SAV-Σ includes the existential unforgeability of signature schemes
and the soundness of server-aided verification protocols under the same assumption
in [GL05], i.e., the server does not have any valid signature of the message when
it tries to prove a signature of that message as valid. An existentially unforgeable
server-aided verification signature scheme ensures that even the server (without colluding the signer) is not able to forge a signature which can be proven to be valid
using the server-aided verification protocol.
Second, we analyze the existential unforgeability of ZSS signature [ZSNS04] with
the server-aided verification protocol proposed in [GL05]. The analysis shows that
the server-aided verification ZSS in [GL05] can be made secure in our model, but
requires more computational cost than that claimed in [GL05]. This is due to the
difference between the security model defined in this chapter and that in [GL05].
In our model, before proving an invalid signature as valid, the server is allowed to
execute the server-aided verification protocol with the verifier before proving to the
verifier that an invalid signature is valid. This, however, is not allowed in [GL05]
when making the security analysis of server-aided verification ZSS. We believe that
our model reflects a realistic case in real life.
Third, we introduce the server-aided verification to BLS signature [BLS01] and
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Waters signature [Wat05], respectively. We provide the first constructions of existentially unforgeable SAV-BLS and SAV-Waters. The existential unforgeability
of SAV-BLS can be reduced to the hardness of BDH problem in the random oracle model. SAV-Waters inherits the desirable property of Waters signature, which
can be proven to be existentially unforgeable without random oracles under GBDH
assumption.
Last, we investigate the collusion between the signer and the server in serveraided verification signatures, who collaboratively prove an invalid signature to be
valid. Such attacks were first sketched in [GL05] in the definition of “auxiliary nonrepudiation”. Previous definitions (including EUF-SAV-Σ) are all based on the assumption that the malicious server does not have any valid signature of the message
when it tries to prove an invalid signature of that message to be valid. We formally
define the security models to capture the collusion attack and its stronger version
in server-aided verification signatures, and provide concrete server-aided verification
signature schemes secure against collusion attacks.
Organization of the Chapter
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we define the notion of server-aided verification signature scheme (SAV-Σ). We then analyze the
existential unforgeability of a previously proposed SAV-Σ in Section 3.3.3. New constructions of existentially unforgeable SAV-Σ and their security proofs are given in
Section 3.4. The security of server-aided verification signatures under collusion attacks is investigated in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6. Finally, we conclude this chapter
in Section 3.7.

3.2

Server-Aided Verification Signatures

In this section, we provide the definition of server-aided verification signatures.
A server-aided verification signature scheme SAV-Σ consists of six algorithms:
ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, SA-Verifier-Setup, and SA-Verify. The
first four algorithms are the same as those in an ordinary signature scheme Σ defined
in Section 2.2, and the last two are defined as follows:
Server-Aided-Verifier-Setup: SA-Verifier-Setup(param) → VString.
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param and returns the
bit string VString, which contains the information that can be pre-computed
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by the verifier. Note that VString might be the same as param if no precomputation is required.
Server-Aided Verification:
SA-Verify(Server(param) , Verifier(m,σ,pk,VString) ) → {Valid, Invalid}.
SA-Verify is an interactive protocol between Server and Verifier, who only
has a limited computational ability and is not able to perform all computations
in Verify alone. Given the message/signatrue pair (m, σ), as well as the public
key pk and the inner information VString, Verifier checks the validity of σ
with the help of Server by running SA-Verify. SA-Verify returns Valid
if Server can convince Verifier that σ is valid. Otherwise, σ is said to be
invalid.
Completeness. There are two types of completeness in SAV-Σ:
1. Completeness of Σ. Any signature properly generated by Sign can always
pass through the verification in Verify. That is,
Verify(param, m, Sign(param, m, sk, pk), pk) = Valid.
2. Completeness of SA-Verify. An honest server can correctly convince the
verifier about the validity of a signature. That is,
SA-Verify(Server(param) , Verifier(m,σ,pk,VString) )
= Verify(param, m, σ, pk).

3.3

Existentially Unforgeable SAV-Σ

The security of SAV-Σ must include two security notions: existential unforgeability of
Σ (EUF-Σ) and the soundness of SA-Verify (Soundness-SA-Verify). The former
is the same as that in Definition 2.6, while the latter is a new notion and only
appears in the scenario of SAV-Σ. As usual, the soundness notion requires that the
server should not be able to use SA-Verify to convince the verifier that an invalid
signature is valid. The formal definition of the soundness depends on the assumption
about the server. We will give the first security model of SAV-Σ under the same
assumption in [GL05]. We will define security models under different assumptions
in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6.
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Definition of Existential Unforgeability of SAV-Σ

Our first model follows the assumption in [GL05], namely, the server does not have
the valid signature of the message when it tries to use SA-Verify to convince the
verifier that an invalid signature of that message is valid. Under this assumption, it
is not necessary to consider EUF-Σ and Soundness-SA-Verify separately. Instead,
we will give a unified notion, called the existential unforgeability of SAV-Σ (or, EUFSAV-Σ for short), which implies EUF-Σ and Soundness-SA-Verify.
Briefly speaking, EUF-SAV-Σ requires that the adversary should not be (computationally) capable of producing a signature of a new message which can be proven
as Valid by SA-Verify, even the adversary acts as Server. A formal game-based
definition is described as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithm ParamGen, KeyGen and SAVerifier-Setup to obtain system parameter param, one key pair (sk, pk) and
VString. The adversary A is given param and pk.
Queries. The adversary A can make the following queries:
Signature Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A can request signatures of at most qs messages. For each sign query mi ∈ {m1 , · · · , mqs },
the challenger C returns σi = Sign(param, mi , sk, pk) as response.
Server-Aided Verification Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary
A can make at most qv server-aided verification queries. For each query
(m, σ), the challenger C responds by executing SA-Verify with the adversary A, where the adversary A acts as Server and the challenger C
acts as Verifier. At the end of each execution, the challenger returns
the output of SA-Verify to the adversary A.
Output. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) and wins the game
if:
1. m∗ ∈
/ {m1 , · · · , mqs }; and
∗ ,σ ∗ ,pk,VString)

2. SA-Verify(A(param,InnerInfo) , C (m

) = Valid, where

InnerInfo refers to the inner information of A (e.g., the random element)
in the generation of σ ∗ .
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We define SAV-Σ-AdvA to be the probability that the adversary A wins in the above
game, taken over the coin tosses made by A and the challenger.
Definition 3.1 A forger A is said to (t, qs , qv , ε)-break a SAV-Σ, if A runs in time
at most t, makes at most qs signature queries, qv server-aided verification queries,
and SAV-Σ-AdvA is at least ε. A SAV-Σ is (t, qs , qv , ε)-existentially unforgeable under
adaptive chosen message attacks if there exists no forger that (t, qs , qv , ε)-breaks it.
When discussing security in the random oracle model, we add a fifth parameter qh
to denote an upper bound on the number of queries that the adversary makes to
the random oracle.
Remark 3.1 (EUF-SAV-Σ.) We note that in Setup, VString is not provided to
the adversary who now is acting as Server. This is due to the concern that VString
might contain some private information of the verifier, which must be kept as secret
in server-aided verification signatures. We can see that in the definition, adversary
A acts as the server and the challenger C acts as the verifier. It simulates a practical
attack where the adversary might be able to extract some information of VString
during the interactions with the verifier. There is no need to consider the other case
where A acts as the verifier and C acts as the (honest) server, respectively, as A can
perform all of the computations of an honest server.
We will show in Section 3.3.3 that the adversary defined in the above model is
stronger than that in [GL05].

3.3.2

Further Observations on EUF-SAV-Σ

We will show the relationship among EUF-SAV-Σ, EUF-Σ and Soundness-SA-Verify.
It is self-evident that EUF-SAV-Σ guarantees Soundness-SA-Verify. Otherwise,
if there is an adversary who can prove an invalid signature is valid by SA-Verify
with success probability ε, then it can also break the existential unforgeability of
SAV-Σ with the same probability. We now prove that EUF-SAV-Σ also implies EUFΣ.
Theorem 3.1 If SAV-Σ is (t, qs , qv , ε)-existentially unforgeable, then Σ is (t, qs , ε)existentially unforgeable.
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Proof: Let the ordinary signature scheme Σ =(ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify), and its server-aided verification counterpart SAV-Σ=(Σ, SA-Verifier-Setup,
SA-Verify). We prove the correctness of this theorem by converting a (t, qs , ε)
forger ΣA to a (t, qs , 0, ε) forger SAV-ΣA .
As defined in the game in Section 3.3.1, SAV-ΣA will obtain (param, pk) from
its challenger of SAV-Σ. Then, SAV-ΣA acts as the challenger of ΣA as follows.
Setup. (param, pk) is given to ΣA .
Queries. For each signature query mi from ΣA , SAV-ΣA forwards mi to its challenger as a signature query of SAV-Σ. As defined, σi = Sign(param, m, sk, pk)
will be returned as the answer. SAV-ΣA then forwards σi to ΣA . It is clear
that each signature query from ΣA can be correctly answered.
Output. After making queries, ΣA will output a pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ). SAV-ΣA sets
(m∗ , σ ∗ ) as its own output.
If ΣA (t, qs , ε)-breaks the signature scheme Σ, then m∗ is not one of the signature
queries and Pr[Verify(param, m∗ , σ ∗ , pk) = Valid] ≥ ε. Due to the completeness of
SAV-Σ, if Verify( param, m∗ , σ ∗ , pk) = Valid, then SA-Verify will return Valid
as well. Therefore, SAV-ΣA wins the game with the same probability ε, without
making any server-aided verification queries. This completes the proof.

3.3.3



Analysis of the SAV-Σ in Asiacrypt’05

In this section, we consider the existential unforgeability of the generic SAV-Σ
proposed by Girault and Lefranc [GL05]. Their server-aided verification protocol
applies to signature schemes whose verification algorithms are similar to those in
ZSS [ZSNS04] and BB [BB04] signatures.
The Description of SAV-ZSS [GL05]
1. ParamGen: Let (G1 , GT ) be bilinear groups described in Section 2.1, where
|G1 | = |GT | = p, for some prime number p ≥ 2k , k be the system security
number and g1 be the generator of G1 . e denotes the bilinear map G1 × G1 →
GT . There is one cryptographic hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → ZZp . The system
parameter param = (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e, h).
2. KeyGen: The signer picks a random number x ∈ ZZ∗p and keeps it as the
secret key. The public key is set as pk = g1x .
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Figure 3.1: SA-Verify in SAV-ZSS [GL05]

Verifier (VString: (t, K1 ))

Server (param)

Input:
h(m)

R = (g1

· pk)t

σ,R

−→
K2
←−

K2 = e(σ, R)

Output:
Valid, if K1 = K2
Invalid, otherwise.

3. Sign: For a message m to be signed, the signer uses its secret key to generate
1

the signature σ = g1h(m)+x .
4. Verify: For a message/signature pair (m, σ), everyone can check whether
h(m)

e(σ, g1

?

· pk) = e(g1 , g1 ). If the equation holds, output Valid. Otherwise,

output Invalid.
5. SA-Verifier-Setup: Given the system parameter param = (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e,
h), the verifier picks a random integer t in ZZp and computes K1 = e(g1 , g1 )t .
The VString is (t, K1 ).
6. SA-Verify: The verifier and the server interact with each other using the
protocol described in Figure 3.1.
Security of SAV-ZSS [GL05]. We now show that SAV-ZSS [GL05] is insecure in
the model defined in Section 3.3.1, if the same (t, K1 ) is used in each execution of
SA-Verify described in Figure 3.1.
We first briefly review the security conclusion of SAV-ZSS proven in [GL05]:
1. A malicious server is not able to convice a verifier that an invalid signature of
a message m is valid by using SA-Verify in Figure 3.1, if
2. The server does not know the ZSS signature of m and k-BCAA problem is
hard (Please refer to [GL05] for the definition of k-BCAA).
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However, the malicious server considered in [GL05] is not allowed to execute SAVerify with the verifier, before it tries to prove the verifier that an invalid signature
is valid. We believe this restriction is not reasonable as the verifier in the real
world would execute SA-Verify with the server for several times. In the model
defined in Section 3.3.1, we allow the adversary (acting as the server) to choose any
message-signature pair, and execute SA-Verify with the challenger (acting as the
verifier). This is analogous to the definition of existentially unforgeablity, where the
forger is allowed to obtain valid signatures of messages chosen by itself. Under this
model, SAV-ZSS [GL05] will be insecure1 if the same (t, K1 ) is used in SA-Verify
in Figure 3.1. The following shows how the adversary in our model can break the
existential unforgeability of SAV-ZSS [GL05]:
1. The adversary A first issues a signature query on a message m. Let the
response from the challenger be σ.
2. A makes a server-aided verification request (m, σ). As shown in SA-Verify
h(m)

in Figure 3.1, the challenger will send the adversary R = (g1

· pk)t .

3. A computes K2 = e(σ, R). As σ is a valid ZSS signature of m, K1 = K2 =
e(g1 , g1 )t .
4. With the knowledge of K1 , A is able to prove that any invalid signature is
valid if the same (t, K1 ) is used in SA-Verify. To do that, A just sends K1
to the challenger in every execution of SA-Verify. Thus, A can always win
the game defined in Section 3.3.1.
The above attack will not work if the verifier pre-computes qv + 1 pairs (t, K1 ) in
SAV-ZSS [GL05] and the adversary is allowed to make at most qv server-aided verification queries. This will require more storage space for the verifier. Alternatively,
H(m)

the verifier can choose different t, and compute (g1

· pk)t and e(g1 , g1 )t in each

execution of SA-Verify. This will however lead to one more exponentiation in GT
than the computational cost of the verifier claimed in [GL05].
1

SAV-ZSS in [GL05] is still secure against the adversary defined in [GL05]. However, the
adversary in [GL05] is weaker than the one defined in this chapter.
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Existentially Unforgeable SAV-BLS and SAVWaters

This section describes new server-aided verification signature schemes: SAV-BLS
and SAV-Waters, respectively.

3.4.1

Existentially Unforgeable SAV-BLS

Our first protocol is based on the BLS signature [BLS01]. The description of our
protocol is as following.
1. ParamGen: Let (G1 , GT ) be bilinear groups described in Section 2.1, where
|G1 | = |GT | = p, for some prime number p ≥ 2k , k be the system security
number and g1 be the generator of G1 . e denotes the bilinear map G1 × G1 →
GT . There is one cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 . The system
parameter param = (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e, H).
2. KeyGen: The signer picks a random number x ∈ ZZ∗p and keeps it as the
secret key. The public key is set as pk = g1x .
3. Sign: For a message m to be signed, the signer uses its secret key to generate
the signature σ = H(m)x .
4. Verify: For a message/signature pair (m, σ), everyone can check whether
?

e(σ, g1 ) = e(H(m), pk). If the equation holds, output Valid. Otherwise,
output Invalid.
5. SA-Verifier-Setup: Given the system parameter (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e, H), the
verifier V randomly chooses r ∈ ZZp and sets R = g1r . The VString is (r, R).
6. SA-Verify: The verifier V and the server S interact with each other using
the protocol described in Figure 3.2.
Computational-Saving. The verifier in SAV-BLS described above needs to compute one pairing, one exponentiation on GT , and one map-to-point hash. It is
obvious that Φ- SA-Verify< Φ-Verify.
Security Proof of Existentially Unforgeable SAV-BLS
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Figure 3.2: SA-Verify in SAV-BLS with EUF

Verifier (VString: (r, R))

Server (param)

Input:
(m, σ), pk, param

σ,R

−→
K1
←−

K1 = e(σ, R)

Compute:
K2 = e(H(m), pk)r
Output:
Valid, if K1 = K2 ;
Invalid, otherwise.
Note that R is precomputed and the verifier sends the same R to the server in
server-aided verification of different message-signature pairs.
Theorem 3.2 The SAV-BLS signature scheme is (t, qs , qv , qh , ε)-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks, if the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
problem is (t + c(G1 ,GT ) (qh + 2qs + 2qv + 1), eqv (qεs +1) )-hard on (G1 , GT ). Here, c(G1 ,GT )
is a constant that depends on (G1 , GT ) and e is the base of natural logarithm.
Proof: We will prove if there is a (t, qs , qv , qh ) adaptively chosen message adversary
A wins the game defined in Section 3.3.1 with probability ε, then there exists another
algorithm B which can solve a random instance of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
problem in time t0 = t + c(G1 ,GT ) (qh + 2qs + 2qv + 1) with success probability

ε
.
eqv (qs +1)

This contradicts the assumption that the BDH problem is (t0 , eqv (qεs +1) )-hard on
(G1 , GT ).
We employ a similar technique in [BLS01] and regard the hash functions H
as the random oracle. In the game, A can adaptively make H queries, Signature Queries and Server-Aided Verification Queries. To make the proof more
clearly, we introduce the notion of “special pair”. Let Mv be the set of A’s serveraided verification queries in the game. A message-signature pair (m, σ) ∈ Mv is a
special pair if
1. By running SA-Verify A can convince the challenger that (m, σ) is a valid
message-signature pair; and
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2. m has not appeared as one of the signature queries when A makes the serveraided verification query (m, σ).
We now define the following two events:
• E1: There is a special pair in Mv .
• E2: There is no special pair in Mv .
It is clear that either E1 or E2 happens in the game, and thus Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] = 1.
Let (G1 , GT ) be bilinear groups of prime order p. Algorithm B is given g1 , g1a , g1b ,
g1c ∈ G1 which is a random instance of the BDH problem. Its goal is to compute
e(g1 , g1 )abc . Algorithm B will simulate the challenger and interact with the adversary
A as described below. Let Succ be the event that B solves the given instance of the
BDH problem, then we have
Pr[Succ] = Pr[Succ ∧ E1] + Pr[Succ ∧ E2] = Pr[Succ|E1] Pr[E1] + Pr[Succ|E2] Pr[E2].
We now consider each probability individually.
The Event Succ|E1: If the event E1 happens, then there is a special pair in A’s
server-aided verification queries. At the beginning of the simulation, B picks a
random integer j in {1, 2, · · · , qv }, and lets j be its guess of the index of the first
special pair.
1. Setup: B starts by setting pk = g1a and R = g1c , where g1a , g1c are the inputs
of the BDH problem and returns (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e, pk) to A.
2. H queries: At any time the adversary A can request the hash function H
of the input mi . To respond to these queries, algorithm B will maintain an
H-List which consists of tuple (mi , H(mi ), αi , coini ) as explained later. For a
query mi , B responds as follows.
(a) If there exists a tuple (mi , H(mi ), αi , coini ) on the H-List, B will return
H(mi ) to A.
(b) Otherwise, B will generate a random coin coini ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[coini
= 1] =

1
.
qs +1

(c) If coini = 1, B chooses αi ∈R ZZp and computes H(mi ) = g1b · g1αi where
g1b is the input of the BDH problem.
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(d) Otherwise, coini = 0 and B chooses αi ∈R ZZp and computes H(mi ) = g1αi .
(e) At last B returns H(mi ) to A and adds (mi , H(mi ), αi , coini ) to the list
H-List.

3. Signature Queries: At any time the adversary A can request the signature
of the message mi . We assume that mi already appears on the H-List in a
tuple (mi , H(mi ), αi , coini ). Otherwise, B makes an H query itself to ensure
such tuple exists on the H-List.
(a) If coini = 0, then B responds A with the signature σi = pk αi . Note that
σi is a valid signature as e(σi , g1 ) = e(pk αi , g1 ) = e(pk, H(mi )).
(b) Otherwise, coini = 1, B terminates the simulation and reports failure.
4. Server-Aided Verification Queries: At any time the adversary A can make
the server-aided verification of a message-signature pair (mi , σi ). We assume
that mi already appears on the H-List. Otherwise, B makes an H query itself
to ensure such tuple exists on the H-List. Recall that B has made a guess
at the beginning of the game that the first special pair is the j th server-aided
verification query.
(a) For the ith query (mi , σi ) where i < j,
• If mi has never appeared as one of signature queries before this serveraided verification query, then B will execute the server-aided verification protocol with A but output Invalid at the end of the protocol,
no matter what A’s response is in the protocol. If B’s guess of the
first special pair is correct, then B’s output will be correct as well.
• Otherwise, A has issued mi as one of signature queries and B answered with a valid signature which is denoted as σi0 . In this case, B
will execute the protocol with A. First, B sends (σi , R) to A. Then,
A responds with K1 . At last, B will output Valid if K1 = e(σi0 , R).
Otherwise, output Invalid.
(b) Otherwise, i = j and (mj , σj ) is a special pair. Let the corresponding
tuple on the H-List be (mj , H(mj ), αj , coinj ). If coinj = 0, B reports
α

failure and aborts. Otherwise, coinj = 1 and H(mj ) = g1b · g1 j . B
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executes the server-aided verification protocol with A, by sending (σj , R)
to A. As response, A will send K1 to B. As (mj , σj ) is a special pair, the
server-aided verification protocol SA-Verify will output Valid. We have
α

K1 = e(g1 , g1 )abc · e(g1a , g1c )αj as pk = g1a , H(mj ) = g1b · g1 j and R = g1c . B
terminates the simulation and outputs K1 · e(g1a , g1c )−αj as the solution to
the given instance of the BDH problem.
We now compute the probability that B solves the BDH problem if E1 happens. All
the following events are required for B’s success.
1. B does not abort as the result of A’s signature queries. This happens with
probability (1 − 1/(qs + 1))qs ≥ 1/e. Here, e is the base of natural logarithm.
2. B makes a correct guess of special pair, which happens with probability 1/qv .
This also guarantees that before B terminates the simulation, all server-aided
verification queries from A can be correctly answered.
3. The above two events happens and coinj = 1 for the special pair (mj , σj ).
This happens with probability at least 1/(qs + 1).
Therefore, if the event E1 happens, the probability that B can solve the random
instance of BDH problem is Pr[Succ|E1] ≥

1
.
eqv (qs +1)

The Event Succ|E2: If the event E2 happens, then there is no special pair in A’s
server-aided verification queries. B responds A’s queries as following.
1. Setup, H queries, Signature Queries. B responds to these queries in the
same way as described in the case Succ|E1.
2. Server-Aided Verification Queries: At any time the adversary A can make
a server-aided verification query of (mi , σi ).
(a) If mi has never appeared as one of signature queries before this query,
then B will execute the server-aided verification protocol with A but
output Invalid at the end of the protocol, no matter what A’s response
is in the protocol. It is clear that if E2 happens, then B’s output will be
correct as well.
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(b) Otherwise, A has issued mi as one of signature queries and B answered
with a valid signature which is denoted as σi0 . In this case, B will execute
the protocol with A. First, B sends (σi , R) to A. Then, A responds with
K1 . At last, B will output Valid if K1 = e(σi0 , R). Otherwise, output
Invalid.
If B does not abort the simulation, A will output a message-signature pair
(m∗ , σ ∗ ) with the restriction described in Section 3.3.1 and convince B that
σ ∗ is valid by SA-Verify.
∗

∗

∗

Let the corresponding tuple on the H-List be

∗

(m , H(m ), α , coin ). If coin∗ = 0, B reports failure and aborts. Other∗

wise, coin∗ = 1 and H(m∗ ) = g1b · g1α . B then executes the server-aided
verification protocol SA-Verify with A. Let K1∗ be the response of A in
SA-Verify. If A can successfully prove that σ ∗ is a valid signature, then
∗

∗

K1∗ = e(g1 , g1 )abc · e(g1a , g1c )α as pk = g1a , H(m∗ ) = g1b · g1α and R = g1c . B thus
∗

can output K1∗ · e(g1a , g1c )−α as the solution to the given instance of the BDH
problem.
We now compute the probability that B solves the BDH problem if E2 happens. All
the following events are required for B’s success.
1. B does not abort as the result of A’s signature queries. This happens with
probability (1 − 1/(qs + 1))qs ≥ 1/e. Here, e is the base of natural logarithm.
2. B correctly answers all server-aided verification queries from A. This happens
with probability 1 if E2 happens.
3. A can successfully prove the validity of σ ∗ by SA-Verify. This happens with
the probability ε if B’s simulation does not fail.
4. The above three events happen and coin∗ = 1 for the pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ). This
happens with probability at least 1/(qs + 1).
Therefore, if the event E2 happens, the probability that B can solve the given instance of BDH problem is
Pr[Succ|E2] ≥

ε
.
e(qs + 1)
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and Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] = 1, then the probability

that B can solve the given instance of BDH problem is
Pr[Succ] = Pr[Succ|E1] Pr[E1] + Pr[Succ|E2] Pr[E2]
1
ε
=
Pr[E1] +
Pr[E2]
eqv (qs + 1)
e(qs + 1)
ε
≥
(Pr[E1] + Pr[E2])
eqv (qs + 1)
ε
=
.
eqv (qs + 1)
Algorithm B’s running time is the same as A’s running time plus the time it takes to
respond to (qh + qs + qv ) random oracle queries, qs signature queries, qv verification
queries and compute e(g1 , g1 )abc from A’s output. Each requires at most one pairing
operation and one exponentiation which we assume takes time c(G1 ,GT ) . Hence, the
total running time is at most t + c(G1 ,GT ) (qh + 2qs + 2qv + 1). This completes the
proof of Theorem 3.2.

3.4.2



Existentially Unforgeable SAV-Waters

This subsection provides a server-aided verification protocol for Waters signature [Wat05].
The details are given as follows.
1. ParamGen: Let (G1 , GT ) be bilinear groups described in Section 2.1, where
|G1 | = |GT | = p, for some prime number p ≥ 2k , k be the system security
number and g1 be the generator of G1 . e denotes the bilinear mapping G1 ×
G1 → GT . The system parameter param = (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e). The message
space M = {0, 1}n .
2. KeyGen: Given the system parameter (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e), the signer generates the public key pk as (~v , P K) and sk = x, here ~v is a vector consisting of
n + 1 elements V0 , V1 , V2 , · · · , Vn randomly selected in G1 and P K = e(g1 , g1 )x ,
where x is a random element in ZZp .
3. Sign: For an n-bit message m in {0, 1}n , let M ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set
of all i for which the ith bit of m is 1. The signature σ is constructed as:
Q
σ = (σ1 , σ2 ) = (g1x (V0 i∈M Vi )r , g1r ), where r ∈R ZZp .
4. Verify: For a claimed signature σ = (σ1 , σ2 ) of a message m, this algorithm
Q
outputs Valid if and only if e(σ1 , g1 ) = P K · e(V0 i∈M Vi , σ2 ). Otherwise,
output Invalid.
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Figure 3.3: The SAV Protocol For Waters Signature

Verifier (VString: (d, D))

Server

Input:
(m, σ = (σ1 , σ2 )), pk, param

σ1 ,D

−→
K1
←−

K1 = e(σ1 , D)

Q
K2 = e(σ2 , V0 i∈M Vi )
Output:
Valid, if K1 = (P K · K2 )d
Invalid, otherwise.
Note that the value D is precomputed, at each execution of SV-Verify, verifier
sends the same D to the server.
5. SA-Verifier-Setup: Given the system parameter (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e), the verifier randomly chooses d ∈ ZZ∗p , then calculates D = g1d . The VString is (d, D).
6. SA-Verify: The verifier and the server interact with each other using the
protocol described in Figure 3.3.
Computational-Saving. We replace the pairing operation e(σ1 , g1 ) in the Verify
algorithm with one exponentiation on GT . Thus, we have Φ- SA-Verify< Φ-Verify.
Theorem 3.3 The SAV-Waters described above is (t, qs , qv , ε)-existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks, if the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
is (t + c(G1 ,GT ) (qs + qv + 1), 8qs qvε(n+1) )-hard on (G1 , GT ). Here, c(G1 ,GT ) is a constant
that depends on (G1 , GT ).
Proof: We prove that if there is a (t, qs , qv ) adaptively chosen message adversary A
wins the game defined in Section 3.3.1 with probability ε, then there exists another
algorithm B which can solve a random instance of Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
ε
.
8qs qv (n+1)
ε
)8qs qv (n+1)

(GBDH) problem in time t + c(G1 ,GT ) (qs + qv + 1) with success probability
This contradicts the assumption that GBDH is (t + c(G1 ,GT ) (qs + qv + 1),
hard on (G1 , GT ).

Let (G1 , GT ) be bilinear groups of prime order p. Algorithm B is given g1 , g1a , g1b ,
g1c ∈ G1 which is a random instance of the GBDH problem. Its goal is to compute
e(g1 , g1 )abc . Algorithm B will simulate the challenger and interact with the adversary

3.4. Existentially Unforgeable SAV-BLS and SAV-Waters

34

A as described below. A can adaptively make Signature Queries and ServerAided-Verification Queries. To make the proof more clearly, we introduce the
notion of “special pair”. Let Mv be the set of A’s server-aided verification queries
in the game. A message-signature pair (m, σ) ∈ Mv is a special pair if
1. By running SA-Verify A can convince the challenger that (m, σ) is a valid
message-signature pair; and
2. m has not appeared as one of the signature queries when A makes the serveraided verification query (m, σ).
We now define the following two events:
• E1: There is a special pair in Mv .
• E2: There is no special pair in Mv .
Either E1 or E2 happens in the game, and thus Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] = 1.
The Event Succ|E1: If the event E1 happens, then there is a special pair in A’s
server-aided-verification queries. B picks a random integer j in {1, 2, · · · , qv }, and
guesses this is the index of the first special pair.
1. Setup: B first sets an integer z = 4qs , and chooses an integer k, where
k ∈R {0, 1, · · · , n}. Then B chooses random (n + 1)-length vectors α
~ = (αi )
and β~ = (βi ), where αi ∈R {0, 1, · · · , z} and βi ∈R ZZp , respectively.
Meanwhile, for a message m ∈ {0, 1}n , we set M ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of
all i for which the ith bit of m is 1. Then we define three functions.
P
F (m) = (p − zk) + α0 + i∈M αi ;
P
J(m) = β0 + i∈M βi ;

0, if α0 + P
i∈M αi ≡ 0
K(m) =
1, otherwise.

(mod z),

B sets g 0 = g1a , g 00 = g1b and D = g1c where g1a , g1b and g1c are the inputs
of the GBDH problem. B then calculates V0 = g 0p−kz+α0 g1β0 , Vi = g 0αi g1βi ,
i = 1, 2, · · · , n, P K = e(g 0 , g 00 ), and sets ~v = (Vi ), the public key pk = (~v , P K).
2. Signature Queries: At any time, the adversary A can request the signature
of the input m.
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(a) If K(m) = 0, B terminates the simulation and reports failure.
(b) Otherwise, K(m) 6= 0 which implies F (m) 6= 0, B chooses r ∈R ZZp , and
generates the signature as
σ = (σ1 , σ2 ) = (g 00

−J(m)
F (m)

(V0

Y

−1

Vi )r , g 00 F (m) g r ).

i∈M

σ is a valid signature as shown below.
Let r̃ = r −

b
,
F (m)

we have

σ1 = g 00

−J(m)
F (m)

00

−J(m)
F (m)

(V0

Y

Vi )r

i∈M

= g

J(m)
(g 0F (m) g1 )r

= g1ab g1−ab g 00

−J(m)
F (m)

J(m)

= g1ab (g 0F (m) g1

J(m) r

(g 0F (m) g1
)

−b
F (m)

)

J(m) r

(g 0F (m) g1

)

b
J(m)
g1ab (g 0F (m) g1 )r− F (m)

=

= g1ab (V0

Y

Vi )r̃ .

i∈M
−1

b
r− F (m)

And σ2 = g 00 F (m) g1r = g1

= g1r̃ .

3. Server-Aided-Verification Queries: At any time, the adversary A can
make a Server-Aided-Verification query of (ml , σl ), where σl = (σl1 , σl2 ).
(a) For l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , qv } and l < j,
• If ml has not appeared as one of Signature Queries, B will execute
the server-aided-verification protocol with A but output Invalid at
the end of the protocol, no matter A’s response in the protocol. It is
clear that if B’s guess of special pair is correct, then B’s output will
be correct as well.
• Otherwise, A has made a signature query of ml and let B’s answer
0
0
be σl0 = (σl1
, σl2
). In this case, B will execute the protocol with A.

First, B sends (σl1 , D) to A. Then, A responds with K1l . After that
Q
B computes θ = σσl20 , ϑ = V0 i∈M Vi , λ = e(σK0 1l,D) , and issues the
l2

l1

query (g, θ, ϑ, D, λ) to OGBDH . At last, B will output Valid if OGBDH
returns 1. Otherwise, the output is Invalid.
Note that if OGBDH returns 1, i.e. λ = e(θ, ϑ)c , then we have
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Y
K1l
σl2
=
e(
,
V
Vi )c
0
0
0
e(σl1 , D)
σl2
i∈M
Y
σl2
0
Vi )c
K1l = e(σl1
, D) · e( 0 , V0
σl2
i∈M
Y
Y
σl2
0
= e(g1 , g1 )abc · e(σl2
, V0
Vi )c · e( 0 , V0
Vi )c
σ
l2
i∈M
i∈M
Y
abc
c
= e(g1 , g1 ) · e(σl2 , V0
Vi )
i∈M

= [P K · e(σl2 , V0

Y

Vi )]c ,

i∈M

which means σl is valid according to the protocol described in Figure 3.3. Otherwise OGBDH returns 0, σl is invalid.
(b) For l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , qv } and l = j, let (m∗ , σ ∗ ) be the lth query where
σ ∗ = (σ1∗ , σ2∗ ). After receiving D from B, A will send K1∗ to B. As
(m∗ , σ ∗ ) is a special pair, A can prove it as valid by using the protocol
SA-Verify described in Figure 3.3. B will receive K1∗ such that
Y
K1∗ = (P K · K2∗ )c = e(g1 , g1 )abc e(σl2 , V0
Vi )c
i∈M
abc

= e(g1 , g1 )
If α0 +

P

∗
J(m∗ ) r∗
e((g 0F (m ) g1
) , D).
∗

i∈M∗

αi = kz, then K1∗ = e(g1 , g1 )abc e((σ2∗ )J(m ) , D). B can solve
∗

the GBDH problem by computing e(g1 , g1 )abc = K1∗ /e((σ2∗ )J(m ) , D) and
terminate the simulation.
B can output e(g1 , g1 )abc if and only if
(a) B does not abort during Signature Queries, the probability that this
Vs
event happens is Pr[ qi=1
K(mi ) = 1].
(b) B makes a correct guess of special pair, which happens with the probability

1
.
qv

This also guarantees that before B terminates the simulation,

all server-aided-verification queries from A can be correctly answered.
P
(c) The above two events happen and α0 + i∈M∗ αi = kz in the special pair
(m∗ , σ ∗ ).
Therefore, the probability that B can successfully output e(g1 , g1 )abc is
qs
^
X
1
Pr[ K(mi ) = 1 ∧ α0 +
αi = kz].
qv i=1
∗
i∈M
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We have
Pr[

qs
^

X

K(mi ) = 1 ∧ α0 +

i=1

= (1 − Pr[

qs
_

qs
X

X

K(mi ) = 0])Pr[α0 +

αi = kz|

i∈M∗

i=1

≥ (1 −

αi = kz]

i∈M∗

Pr[K(mi ) = 0])Pr[α0 +

X

qs
^

αi = kz|

i∈M∗

i=1

K(mi ) = 1]

i=1
qs

^

K(mi ) = 1]

i=1

qs
^
X
qs
= (1 − )Pr[α0 +
αi = kz| K(mi ) = 1]
z
i=1
i∈M∗
qs
^
qs
1
∗
= (1 − )
Pr[K(m ) = 0| K(mi ) = 1]
z (n + 1)
i=1
qs
^
qs
1
Pr[K(m∗ ) = 0]
V
= (1 − )
Pr[ K(mi ) = 1|K(m∗ ) = 0]
qs
z (n + 1) Pr[ i=1 K(mi ) = 1] i=1

≥ (1 −

qs
qs
1 1 ^
)
Pr[ K(mi ) = 1|K(m∗ ) = 0]
z (n + 1) z i=1

qs
_
1
qs
(1 − Pr[ K(mi ) = 0|K(m∗ ) = 0])
= (1 − )
z z(n + 1)
i=1
qs

X
qs
1
≥ (1 − )
(1 −
Pr[K(mi ) = 0|K(m∗ ) = 0])
z z(n + 1)
i=1
1
qs
qs
)
(1 − )
z z(n + 1)
z
1
qs
≥
(1 − 2 )
z(n + 1)
z
1
=
.
8qs (n + 1)
= (1 −

Therefore, Pr[Succ|E1] ≥

1
.
8qs qv (n+1)

The Event Succ|E2: If the event E2 happens, then there is no special pair in A’s
server-aided-verification queries.
1. Setup, Signature Queries. B responds to these queries in the same way as
described in the case Succ|E1.
2. Server-Aided-Verification Queries: At any time, the adversary A can
make a Server-Aided-Verification query of the input (ml , σl ), B answers the
query in the same way described in the 3a of the first event E1.
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If B does not abort during the simulation, A will output a message/signature
pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) where σ ∗ = (σ1∗ , σ2∗ ) with the restriction described in Section 3.3.1.
If A can prove σ ∗ as a valid signature by SA-Verify protocol described in FigQ
ure 3.3. Then A will return D∗ to B such that K1∗ = e(g1 , g1 )abc e(σ2∗ , V0 i∈M Vi )c .
Q
B can calculate e(g1 , g1 )abc = K1∗ /e(σ2∗ , V0 i∈M Vi )c .
B can calculate e(g1 , g1 )abc if and only if
(a) B does not abort during Signature Queries, the probability that this
Vs
event happens is Pr[ qi=1
K(mi ) = 1].
(b) B makes a correct guess of special pair, which happens with the probability

1
.
qv

This also guarantees that before B terminates the simulation,

all server-aided-verification queries from A can be correctly answered.
P
(c) The above two events happen and α0 + i∈M∗ αi = kz in the pair
(m∗ , σ ∗ ).
Therefore, in this event, the probability that B can successfully output e(g1 , g1 )abc
is
Pr[Succ|E2] = Pr[

qs
^

K(mi ) = 1 ∧ α0 +

i=1

≥

X

αi = kz] · ε

i∈M∗

1
· ε.
8qs (n + 1)

Above all, B can solve the GBDH problem with the probability
Pr[Succ] = Pr[Succ|E1]Pr[E1] + Pr[Succ|E2]Pr[E2]
1
1
1
≥
· Pr[E1] +
· ε · Pr[E2]
qv 8qs (n + 1)
8qs (n + 1)
1
1
≥
· ε · (Pr[E1] + Pr[E2])
qv 8qs (n + 1)
ε
=
.
8qs qv (n + 1)
Algorithm B’s running time is the same as A’s running time plus the time it takes
to respond to qs signature queries, qv verification queries and compute e(g1 , g1 )abc
from A’s output. Assume each takes time c(G1 ,GT ) . Hence, the total running time is
at most t + c(G1 ,GT ) (qs + qv + 1). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
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SAV-Σ Secure Against Collusion and Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks

We pay our attention on investigating the security of SAV-Σ against the collusion
between the server and the signer in this section, and propose server-aided verification protocols secure against this attack. The definition of SAV-Σ and all the
notation used in this chapter are the same as what we have described previously.

3.5.1

Security of SAV-Σ Against Collusion and Adaptive
Chosen Message Attacks

If we allow the server and the signer to collude, the server will have valid signatures
of any messages. Thus, it is impossible to give a unified security notion to capture
both EUF-Σ and Soundness-SA-Verify simultaneously. With this in mind, we now
define the soundness of the server-aided verification protocol SA-Verify against
collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks. In the game, the adversary is given
the secret key of the signer.
Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithm ParamGen, KeyGen and SAVerifier-Setup to obtain system parameter param, one key pair (sk, pk) and
VString. The adversary A is given param and (sk, pk).
Queries. The adversary A only needs to make Server-Aided Verification
Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A can make at most qv such
queries. The challenger C responds each query in the same way as described
in Definition 3.1.
Output. The adversary A will output a message m∗ . We denote Ωm∗ as the set
of valid signatures of m∗ . The challenger C chooses a random element σ ∗ in
Ω \ Ωm∗ . That is, σ ∗ is a random invalid signature of m∗ . We say A wins the
game if
∗ ,σ ∗ ,pk,VString)

SA-Verify(A, C (m

) = Valid.

Note that the challenge signature is chosen by the challenger, and is not given to the
adversary. This is different from the collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks
defined in [WMSH08]. Our definition ensures that even the server has the knowledge
of user’s private key, it cannot prove an invalid signature to be valid.
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We define Soundness-SA-Verify-AdvA to be the probability that the adversary A
wins in the above game, taken over the coin tosses made by A and the challenger.
Definition 3.2 An adversary A is said to (t, qv , ε)-break the soundness of SAVerify in a SAV-Σ if A runs in time at most t, makes at most qv server-aided
verification queries, and Soundness-SA-Verify-AdvA is at least ε. The SA-Verify
in a SAV-Σ is (t, qv , ε)-sound against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks
if there exists no adversary that (t, qv , ε)-breaks it.
Definition 3.3 SAV-Σ is (t, qs , qv , ε)-secure against collusion and adaptive chosen
message attacks if Σ is (t, qs , ε)-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen
message attacks and its server-aided verification protocol SA-Verify is (t, qv , ε)sound against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.

3.5.2

SAV-BLS Secure Against Collusion and Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks

We now give a server-aided verification protocol for the BLS signature [BLS01],
which is secure against the collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
1. ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify: these algorithms are the same as defined in Section 3.4.1.
2. SA-Verifier-Setup: Given the system parameter (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e, H), the
verifier V computes K1 = e(g1 , g1 ). The VString is K1 .
3. SA-Verify: The verifier V and the server S interact with each other using
the protocol described in Figure 3.4.
Computational-Saving. The verifier in SAV-BLS described above only needs
to compute one multiplication on G1 , one (fixed-base) exponentiation on G1 , one
multiplication on GT and one (fixed-based) exponentiation on GT . In particular,
there is no pairing or map-to-point operation. Thus, Φ- SA-Verify< Φ-Verify.
Security Proof of SAV-BLS Against Collusion and Chosen Message Attacks
We only need to show that the server-aided verification protocol in Figure 3.4 is
sound against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
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Figure 3.4: SA-Verify in SAV-BLS with Soundness I

Verifier (VString: K1 )

Server (param)

Input:
(m, σ), pk, param
Compute:
r ∈R ZZp , σ 0 = σ · g1r

m,σ 0 ,pk

−→

K2 = e(σ 0 , g1 )
K2 ,K3

←−

K3 = e(H(m), pk)

Output:
Valid, if K2 = K3 · K1r
Invalid, otherwise.

Theorem 3.4 The server-aided verification protocol described in Figure 3.4 is (t, qv ,
1
)-sound
p−1

against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.

Proof: We prove that the adversary’s probability to prove an invalid signature as
valid is

1
,
p−1

without any complexity assumption.

1. Setup: The challenger starts by choosing the secret key sk = x ∈R ZZp ,
sets the public key as pk = g1x and computes K1 = e(g1 , g1 ), then returns
(G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e, H) and (sk, pk) to A.
2. Server-Aided Verification Queries: At any time the adversary A can
make the server-aided verification query (mi , σi ). The challenger executes the
protocol SA-Verify with A as described in Figure 3.4.
3. Output: After all the queries, A will output a message m∗ . As response, the
challenger will choose a random element σ ∗ in G1 \ {H(m∗ )sk }, that is, σ ∗ is
a random element in invalid signature space of m∗ .
The challenger then executes SA-Verify with A as described in Figure 3.4.
∗

The challenger selects r∗ ∈R ZZp and computes σ 0∗ = σ ∗ · g1r . After that, σ 0∗
is sent to A, who will return K2∗ and K3∗ as the response. We now show that
∗

K2∗ = K3∗ · K1r happens with probability

1
.
p−1

The following analysis use the

similar technique in the proof of Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98].
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(a) The element σ 0∗ sent to A does not constrain the distribution of (σ ∗ , r∗ ).
This is due to the reason that given σ 0∗ , there are (p − 1) pairs (σi , ri )
satisfy the equation σ 0∗ = σi · g1ri and (σ ∗ , r∗ ) chosen by the challenger
is just a random one among these p − 1 pairs. In other words, from the
adversary’s view, each (σi , ri ) has the equal probability to be (σ ∗ , r∗ ). To
make our analysis more clear, we rewrite the the equation σ 0∗ = σ ∗ · g1r

∗

as
DLg1 σ 0∗ = DLg1 σ ∗ + r∗

(1)
∗

(b) Suppose A returns K2∗ and K3∗ such that K2∗ = K3∗ · K1r . We rewrite this
equation as
DLe(g1 ,g1 ) K2∗ = DLe(g1 ,g1 ) K3∗ + r∗

(2)

If DLg σ ∗ 6= DLe(g1 ,g1 ) K3∗ , then Equations (1) and (2) are linearly independent. It follows that r∗ satisfies Equation (2) with probability

1
,
p−1

as

(σ ∗ , r∗ ) is randomly chosen from p−1 pairs from the view of the adversary.
Otherwise, DLg1 σ ∗ = DLe(g1 ,g1 ) K3∗ , that is, e(σ ∗ , g1 ) = K3∗ . This means
that σ ∗ is uniquely determined by K3∗ . As σ 0∗ sent to A does not constrain
the distribution of σ ∗ , this happens also with probability

1
.
p−1

Therefore, the probability that SA-Verify will output Valid is
completes the proof of this theorem.

1
.
p−1

This


Remark 3.2 Recently, a new type of “collusion attackers” was defined in [WWYH10].
In the new definition, an attacker is given a key pair (skf , pkf ) and a public key
pk, while the challenger keeps the corresponding private key sk as secret. The attacker is said to break the soundness of the SAV protocol if he/she can find a message/signature pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) which is valid under the public key pkf and can be
proven as valid under pk via SAV protocol. As one can see, the adversary defined
in [WWYH10] actually belongs to those defined in Section 3.3.1, i.e., adversary does
not have the private key but can choose the challenge message/signature pair. (Also
notice that the key pair (skf , pkf ) can also be generated by the adversaries defined in
Section 3.5.1.) This is different from the collusion attacks defined in Section 3.5.1,
where the adversary is given the private sk but is not allowed to choose the challenge
signature σ ∗ . As shown in [WWYH10], SAV protocols secure against collusion attacks defined in this section might be existentially forgeable, since adversaries in these
two notions are different. It is certainly more desirable if SAV protocols are secure
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Figure 3.5: SA-Verify in SAV-Waters with Soundness

Verifier (VString: K1 )

Server

Input:
(m, σ = (σ1 , σ2 )), pk, param
d ∈R ZZp , σ10 = σ1 · g1d

m,σ10 ,σ2

−→

K2 ,K3

←−

K2 = e(σ10 , g1 )
Q
K3 = e(V0 i∈M Vi , σ2 )

Output:
Valid, if K2 = P K · K3 · K1d
Invalid, otherwise.

against collusion attacks where adversaries are also allowed to choose the challenge
message/signature pair. These protocols will be investigated in Section 3.6.

3.5.3

SAV-Waters Secure Against Collusion and Adaptive
Chosen Message Attacks

In this section, we provide another server-aided verification protocol, which is based
on Waters signature [Wat05] and secure against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
1. ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify: these algorithms are the same as defined in Section 3.4.2.
2. SA-Verifier-Setup: Given the system parameter (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e), V computes K1 = e(g1 , g1 ). Then set D = g1d . The VString is K1 .
3. SA-Verify: The verifier V and the server S interact with each other using
the protocol described in Figure 3.5.
The verifier in SAV-Waters described above only needs to compute one multiplication on G1 , one (fixed-base) exponentiation on G1 , two multiplications on GT and
one (fixed-based) exponentiation on GT . In particular, there is no pairing operation.
Thus, Φ- SA-Verify< Φ-Verify.
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Security Proof of SAV-Waters Against Collusion and Chosen Message
Attacks
We will show that the server-aided-verification protocol is sound against collusion
and adaptive chosen message attacks.
Theorem 3.5 The server-aided-verification protocol described in Figure 3.5 is (t, qv ,
1
)-sound
p−1

against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.

Proof: We will prove that the adversary’s probability to prove an invalid signature
as valid is

1
.
p−1

1. Setup: The challenger starts by choosing the secret key sk = x ∈R ZZp , sets
the public key as pk = (~v , P K) where ~v = (Vi ), i = 0, 1, · · · , n and Vi ∈R G1 .
The challenger also computes K1 = e(g1 , g1 ), then returns (G1 , GT , e, p, sk, pk)
to A.
2. Server-Aided-Verification Queries: At any time the adversary A can make
the server-aided-verification query (mi , σi ). The challenger executes the protocol SA-Verify with A as described in Figure 3.5.
3. Output: After all queries, A will output a message m∗ . Let Ωm∗ be the valid
signature of m∗ . As response, the challenger will choose a random element
σ ∗ = (σ1∗ , σ2∗ ) in G21 \ Ωm∗ , that is, σ ∗ is a random element in the invalid
signature space of m∗ .
The challenger then executes SA-Verify with A as described in Figure 3.5.
∗

The challenger selects d∗ ∈R ZZp and computes σ10∗ = σ1∗ · g1d . After that, σ10∗
and σ2∗ are sent to A, who will return K2∗ and K3∗ as the response. We now show
∗

that K2∗ = P K · K3∗ · K1d happens with probability

1
.
p−1

The following analysis

has the similar idea in the proof of Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98].
(a) The element σ10∗ sent to A does not constrain (σ1∗ , d∗ ). This is due to the
reason that given σ10∗ , there are (p − 1) pairs (σ1i , di ) satisfy the equation
σ10∗ = σ1i · g1di and (σ ∗ , d∗ ) chosen by the challenger is just a random one
among these p − 1 pairs. In other words, from the adversary’s view, each
(σ1i , di ) has the equal probability to be (σ ∗ , d∗ ). To make our analysis
∗

more clear, we rewrite the the equation σ10∗ = σ1∗ · g1d as
DLg1 σ10∗ = DLg1 σ1∗ + d∗

(1)
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(b) Suppose A returns K2∗ and K3∗ such that K2∗ = P K · K3∗ · K1d . We rewrite
this equation as
DLe(g1 ,g1 ) K2∗ = DLe(g1 ,g1 ) (P K · K3∗ ) + d∗

(2)

If Equations (1) and (2) are linearly independent, then (σ1∗ , d∗ ) will be
uniquely determined, which happens with probability

1
p−1

as (σ1∗ , d∗ ) is

randomly chosen from p − 1 pairs from the view of the adversary .
Otherwise, Equations (1) and (2) are linearly dependent. This requires
that DLg1 σ1∗ = DLe(g1 ,g1 ) (P K · K3∗ ), that is, e(σ1∗ , g1 ) = P K · K3∗ . This
means that σ1∗ is uniquely determined by K3∗ . As σ10∗ sent to A does not
constrain σ1∗ , this happens also with probability

1
.
p−1

Therefore, the probability that SA-Verify will output Valid is
completes the proof of this theorem.

3.6

1
.
p−1

This


SAV-Σ Secure Against Strong Collusion and
Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks

As we can see in Section 3.5.1, it is the challenger who chooses an invalid signature
of the message m∗ (where m∗ is chosen by the adversary). This section considers
strong collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks, where the adversary has the
ability to choose the invalid signature under the message m∗ . The concrete game is
defined as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithm ParamGen, KeyGen and SAVerifier-Setup to obtain system parameter param, one key pair (sk, pk) and
VString. The adversary A is given param and (sk, pk).
Queries. The adversary A only needs to make Server-Aided Verification
Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A can make at most qv such
queries. The challenger C responds each query in the same way as described
in Definition 3.1.
Output. The adversary A will output a message m∗ and choose a random element
σ ∗ in Ω \ Ωm∗ , where Ωm∗ denotes the set of valid signatures of m∗ . We say A
wins the game if SA-Verify(A, C (m

∗ ,σ ∗ ,pk,VString)

) = Valid.
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We define Strong-Soundness-SA-Verify-AdvA to be the probability that the adversary A wins in the above game, taken over the coin tosses made by A and the
challenger.
Definition 3.4 An adversary A is said to (t, qv , ε)-strongly-break the soundness of
SA-Verify in a SAV-Σ if A runs in time at most t, makes at most qv server-aided
verification queries, and Strong-Soundness-SA-Verify-AdvA is at least ε. The SAVerify in a SAV-Σ is (t, qv , ε)-sound against strong collusion and adaptive chosen
message attacks if there exists no adversary that (t, qv , ε)-breaks it.
Definition 3.5 SAV-Σ is (t, qs , qv , ε)-secure against strong collusion and adaptive
chosen message attacks if Σ is (t, qs , ε)-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks and its server-aided verification protocol SA-Verify is (t, qv , ε)sound against strong collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
Remark 3.3 Like the collusion and chosen messages attacks, the game defined in
this section simulates a malicious signer acting as the server. It is called strong
collusion and chosen message attacks since the adversary is allowed to choose the
challenging message.

3.6.1

SAV-BLS Secure Against Strong Collusion and Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks

We now give a server-aided verification protocol for BLS signature [BLS01], which
is secure against the strong collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
1. ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify: these algorithms are the same as defined in Section 3.4.1.
2. SA-Verifier-Setup: Given the system parameter (G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e, H), the
verifier V computes K1 = e(g1 , g1 ). The VString is K1 .
3. SA-Verify: The verifier V and the server S interact with each other using
the protocol described in Figure 3.4.
The verifier in SAV-BLS described above needs to compute one multiplication
on G1 , one (fixed-base) exponentiation on G1 , one exponentiation on G1 , one multiplication on GT , one (fixed-based) exponentiation on GT , one exponentiation on
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Figure 3.6: SA-Verify in SAV-BLS with Soundness II

Verifier (VString: K1 )

Server (param)

Input:
(m, σ), pk, param
Compute:
r1 , r2 ∈R ZZp , σ 0 = σ r1 · g1r2

m,σ 0 ,pk

−−−−→
K2 = e(σ 0 , g1 )
K

2
←−

K3 = e(H(m), pk)
Output:
Valid, if K2 = K3r1 · K1r2
Invalid, otherwise.

GT and one pairing. This is also less than the computational cost required in the
original verify algorithm.
Theorem 3.6 The server-aided verification protocol described in Figure 3.6 is (t, qv ,
1
)-strong-sound
p

against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.

Proof: We prove that the adversary’s probability to prove an invalid signature as
valid is p1 , without any complexity assumption.
1. Setup: The challenger starts by choosing the secret key sk = x ∈R ZZp ,
sets the public key as pk = g1x and computes K1 = e(g1 , g1 ), then returns
(G1 , GT , k, g1 , p, e, H) and (sk, pk) to A.
2. Server-Aided Verification Queries: At any time the adversary A can
make the server-aided verification query (mi , σi ). The challenger executes the
protocol SA-Verify with A as described in Figure 3.6.
3. Output: After all queries, A will output a message m∗ along with a random
element σ ∗ in G1 \ {H(m∗ )sk }, that is, σ ∗ is a random element in the invalid
signature space of m∗ .
The challenger then executes SA-Verify with A as described in Figure 3.6.
∗

r∗

The challenger selects r1∗ , r2∗ ∈R ZZp and computes σ 0∗ = σ ∗r1 · g12 . After that,
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σ 0∗ is sent to A, who will return K2∗ as the response. We now show that
∗r1∗

K2∗ = K3

∗

· K1r happens with probability p1 . The following analysis uses the

similar technique in the proof of Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98].
(a) The element σ 0∗ sent to A does not constrain the distribution of (r1∗ , r2∗ ).
This is due to the reason that given σ 0∗ , there are p pairs (r1i , r2i ) satisfy
the equation σ 0∗ = σir1i · g1r2i and (r1∗ , r2∗ ) chosen by the challenger is just
a random one among these p pairs. In other words, from the adversary’s
view, each (r1i , r2i ) has the equal probability to be (r1∗ , r2∗ ). To make our
∗

r∗

analysis more clear, we rewrite the the equation σ 0∗ = σ ∗r1 · g12 as
DLg1 σ 0∗ = r1∗ · DLg1 σ ∗ + r2∗
∗r1∗

(b) Suppose A returns K2∗ such that K2∗ = K3

(1)
r∗

· K1 2 . We rewrite this

equation as
DLe(g1 ,g1 ) K2∗ = r1∗ · DLe(g1 ,g1 ) K3∗ + r2∗

(2)

As required, σ ∗ is an invalid signature of m∗ , i.e. DLg1 σ ∗ 6= DLe(g1 ,g1 ) K3∗ .
It follows that Equations (1) and (2) are linearly independent and (r1∗ , r2∗ )
will be uniquely determined. This happens with probability

1
p

as (r1∗ , r2∗ )

is randomly chosen from p pairs from the view of the adversary.
Therefore, the probability that SA-Verify will output Valid is p1 . This completes the proof of this theorem.

3.7



Conclusion

We formally defined the existential unforgeability of server-aided verification signatures and generalized the existing security requirements in server-aided verification signatures. We analyzed the Girault-Lefranc scheme from Asiacrypt 2005
and proposed the first server-aided verification BLS signature (whose existential
unforgeability is proven in the random oracle model) and server-aided verification
Waters signature (whose existential unforgeability does not rely on the random oracle model). Another contribution of this chapter is the formal security definition
of server-aided verification signatures under collusion attacks and strong collusion
attacks. Concrete constructions secure against those attacks were also presented.
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Signature schemes with the server-aided verification protocols proposed in this chapter reduce the computational cost at the verifier side and can be applied to situations
with power-constrained devices.

Chapter 4
Generic Constructions of Signatures and
Encryption in Certificate-based PKC
Certificate-based public key cryptography is proposed to ease the certificate management problem in traditional PKI. The essential idea is to use a third party to
generate a certificate, which not only ensures the public key authenticity but is also
necessary for signature signing and decryption. This chapter presents several new
results of digital signatures and encryption in certificate-based public key cryptography. Part of this chapter was published in the Journal of Universal Computer
Science [WMSH09].

4.1

Introduction

In a public-key cryptosystem, each user has a pair of keys: public key and private
key. The public key is usually published and publicly accessible, while the private
key is kept secret by the owner. The central problem in a public key system is to
prove that a public key is genuine and authentic, and has not been tampered with or
replaced by a malicious third party. The usual approach to ensure the authenticity
of a public key is to use a certificate. A (digital) certificate is a signature of a trusted
certificate authority (CA) that binds together the identity of an entity A, its public
key P K and other information. This kind of systems is referred to as public key
infrastructure (PKI). The PKI however is generally considered to be costly to use
and manage.
Shamir [Sha84] introduced the concept of identity-based public key cryptography (or, ID-PKC for short), where the original motivation is to ease certificate
management in the e-mail system. A user’s public key in ID-PKC is some unique
information about the identity of the user (e.g., email address). The private key in
ID-PKC is generated by a trusted third party called Private Key Generator (PKG)
50
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who holds a master key. Thus, key escrow is an inherent problem in this kind of IDPKC (e.g., [Sha84, BF01]), as the PKG has any user’s private key. The key escrow
problem can be partially solved by the introduction of multiple PKGs and the use
of threshold techniques, which requires extra communications and infrastructures.
Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a new paradigm called certificateless public
key cryptography [ARP03] (or, CL-PKC for short), where the original motivation
is to find a public key system that does not require the use of certificates and does
not have the key escrow problem. Each entity in CL-PKC holds two secrets: a
secret value and a partial private key. The secret value SV is generated by the
entity itself, while a third party Key Generating Center (KGC), holding a master
key, generates the partial private key P P K from the user’s identity information 1 .
The entity’s actual private key is the output of some function with the input SV
and P P K. In this way, KGC does not know the actual private key and the key
escrow problem is eliminated. The entity can use the actual private key to generate
the public key, which is no longer only computed from the identity. This makes the
certificateless system non-identity-based. The entity’s public key could be available
to other entities by transmitting it along with messages (for example, in a signing
application) or by placing it in a public directory (this would be more appropriate
for an encryption setting). However, there is no certificate to ensure the authenticity
of the entity’s public key in CL-PKC. Therefore, it is necessary to assume that an
adversary is able to replace the entity’s public key with a false key of its choice,
which is also known as key replacement attack [HSMZ05]. One assumption in CLPKC is that KGC never mounts the key replacement attack. In the traditional PKI,
however, one does not need to make the same assumption on the third party CA,
who if replaces the entity’s public key with a false key of its choice, can be implicitly
proven due to the existence of the certificate for that false key.
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry [Gen03] introduced the notion of certificate-based encryption. As in the traditional PKI, each client generates its own public/private key
pair and requests a certificate from the CA. The difference is that, a certificate in the
certificate-based cryptography, or more generally, a signature from the third party
acts not only as a certificate (as in the traditional PKI) but also as a decryption key
1

In Section 5.1 of [ARP03], the authors sketched an alternative partial private key generation
technique. In this chapter, when we mention a cryptographic protocol in CL-PKC, we mean it is
a protocol with the classic private key generation technique used in Section 4.1 of [ARP03], which
has been adopted by most researchers in CL-PKC.
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(as in ID-PKC and CL-PKC). The sender can encrypt a message without obtaining explicit information other than the recipient’s public key and the parameters of
CA. To decrypt a message, a keyholder needs both its secret key and an up-to-date
certificate from its CA (or a signature from an authority). Therefore, CA does not
need to make the certificate status information available among the whole system,
and only needs to contact the certificate holder for revocation and update. As the
sender is not required to verify the certificate of the recipient’s public key, the sender
could be duped to encrypt messages with an uncertified public key. This could be
due to the recipient has not yet had his/her public key certified, or the encryption
key that the sender holds is not the recipient’s authentic public key. In this sense,
certificate-based encryption works in a similar way to certificateless encryption, but
the difference is that certificates do exist in certificate-based encryption.
Certificate-based cryptography was introduced to solve the certificate management problem in the traditional PKI, but only in the scenario of encryption. The
notion of certificate-based encryption was extended to certificate-based signature
in [KPH04, LHM+ 07]. However, as mentioned in [Gen03], if we only consider signing and verification signatures in a public key cryptosystem, then the certificate
management problem is not as challenging as in the scenario of encryption and decryption. For example, the signer can send its public key and the proof of certificate
status to the verifier simultaneously with its signature, thus the verifier can obtain
the certificate without referring to a public directory or issuing a third-party query to
CA. This, however, will require more bandwidth for signature transmitting. Public
key cryptosystems like ID-PKC [Sha84, BF01] and CL-PKC [ARP03] can eliminate
the certificate management problem as one can directly use the entity A’s public
key to verify signatures, without checking the certificate of A’s public key. However, this is achieved at the cost of assuming certain trust on the authority, who
is able to impersonate any user in an undetectable way. In certificate-based cryptosystem, the certificate management problem can be eased in a different way. To
generate valid certificate-based signatures of a user with the identity information ID
and the public key P K, one needs two pieces of secret information, namely a valid
certificate of (ID, P K) and the secret key of P K. In other words, a valid certificatebased signature ensures the existence of a valid certificate. Thus, the signer does
not need to send the certificate along with the message and the signature. This is
achieved with the cost of more computational operations in signature verification,
which implies the verification of the certificate. If one replaces P K with P K 0 and
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Table 4.1: Comparison of CL Cryptography and CB Cryptography
Certificate
Certificate manage problem
Trust Level [Gir91]

CL Cryptography
No
No
2

CB Cryptography
Yes
Yes
3

generates a valid signature under ID and P K 0 , he/she must have a certificate of
(ID, P K 0 ). This can prove that the third party CA is dishonest, as there is only
one party with the ability to generate certificates. Therefore, the third party in
certificate-based signatures has the Trust Level 3 in the definition in [Gir91], which
is similar as CA in the traditional PKI and a few constructions of identity-based
signatures [BNN04, GHK06]. To summarize, (1) The authority in certificate-based
signatures and traditional PKI-based signatures is at Trust Level 3 in the definition
given in [Gir91], which is higher than the authority in the ID-PKC and the CL-PKC,
and (2) To ease the problem of certificate management, certificate-based signatures
consume (in general) less bandwidth in signature transmitting but might require
more computational cost than traditional-PKI-based signatures. The table 4.1 below gives a brief comparison of certificateless Cryptography and certificate-based
Cryptography.

4.1.1

Related Work

Kang, Park and Hahn proposed the notion and the first construction of certificatebased signatures in [KPH04], by extending the idea of certificate-based encryption
in [Gen03]. That is, to generate a valid signature under the public key P K, the
entity needs to know both the corresponding private key SK and the up-to-date
certificate of P K. To verify a claimed signature, one only needs the signer’s public
key and the parameter of CA (particularly, no need to check the certificate of that
public key). As the verifier is not required to check the certificate about a claimed
public key, key replacement attacks also exist in certificate-based cryptography. Key
replacement attacks in certificate-based signatures were first addressed in [KPH04]
and formally defined in [LHM+ 07]. As introduced in [LHM+ 07], adversaries in
certificate-based signatures can be divided into two types: CB-AI and CB-AII .
CB-AI can replace any entity’s public key P K with a new public key P K 0 chosen
by itself, and is trying to forge a valid signature under P K 0 whose certificate is not
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available to CB-AI . CB-AII has the knowledge of CA’s master key and thus can
generate the certificate for any user. CB-AII is trying to forge a valid signature
under an entity’s authentic public key P K (that is, P K is chosen by that entity),
whose private key is not available to CB-AII . In addition to the security models, a
certificate-based signature scheme secure against key replacement attacks was also
proposed in [LHM+ 07]. Very recently, Liu, Baek, Susilo and Zhou proposed two
new certificate-based signature schemes [LBSZ08]. The first one does not require
any pairing operation and the security of their second scheme can be proven without
random oracles. Some variants of certificate-based signatures (e.g., certificate-based
proxy signature [KPH04] and certificate-based linkable ring signature [ALSY07])
have also been proposed.
Since its seminal introduction in [Gen03], several concrete certificate-based encryption schemes have been proposed (e.g., [LZ08, MR06]). The relationship between certificate-based encryption and certificateless encryption has been investigated in [ARP05], where a generic construction of certificate-based encryption from
certificateless encryption was introduced. But Kang and Park [KP05] pointed out a
flaw in the security proof of [ARP05], and this leaves the security of the construction
in [ARP05] questionable.

4.1.2

Motivations and Contributions

As mentioned in [ARP03], certificate-based cryptography and certificateless cryptography are quite similar and there could be a possible method to convert a certificateless cryptographical protocol to a certificate-based cryptographical protocol. In
particular, there are four similarities in certificateless public key cryptography and
certificate-based public key cryptography.
1. In both public key cryptosystems, signature signing (or, decryption) requires
two pieces of information. In certificateless cryptography, one needs a partial
private key and a secret value of a public key to produce a valid signature
or perform a correct decryption. Similarly, in certificate-based cryptography,
one needs the certificate and the private key of a public key to generate valid
signatures or decrypt ciphertexts.
2. The partial private key is generated by KGC in certificateless cryptography,
and the certificate is generated by Certifier in certificate-based cryptography.
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3. The secret value is chosen by the user in certificateless cryptography, and the
private key in certificate-based cryptography is also chosen by the user.
4. In both notions, explicit verification of the authenticity of a public key is not
required when one verifies signatures or encrypts messages.
Motivated by those similarities, we believe that certificate-based signatures and
certificateless signatures (resp. certificate-based encryption and certificateless encryption) are closely related, and the investigation of the relationship between those
two notions is worthwhile. The contributions of this chapter are threefold.
1. New Security Models of Certificate-based Signatures
A reasonable and elaborated security model is necessary for constructing provably secure cryptographic protocols. For example, although the key replacement
attack has been widely accepted in certificateless cryptography, there is no consensus on the precise meaning of that term in the early research of certificateless cryptography and several certificateless signature schemes have been broken
[ARP03, GS05, HWZD06, HSMZ05, Par06, YL04, ZF06].

Although some secu-

rity models [KPH04, LHM+ 07] have been proposed so far, the security definition
of certificate-based signatures is not satisfactory, especially in the exact meaning
of key replacement attacks. In this chapter, we provide elaborated definitions of
certificate-based signatures, which will allow us to establish a systematic approach
for constructing and proving secure certificate-based signature schemes. Our definitions are inspired by and modified from the security notions in certificateless
signatures. This is not only because certificateless signatures and certificate-based
signatures are analogous in many ways, but also due to the fact that security definitions of certificateless signatures have been formalized recently.
2. A Generic Construction of Certificate-based Signatures from Certificateless Signatures
After giving new security models of certificate-based signatures, we describe a generic
construction of certificate-based signatures which is secure in the proposed models.
We show how to design a certificate-based signature scheme from a certificateless
signature scheme, by treating partial private keys in certificateless signatures as certificates in certificate-based signatures. Our method can be used to build certificatebased signature schemes secure (in the random oracle model) against any type of
adversaries defined in this chapter, assuming that the underlying certificateless signature schemes satisfy certain security notions. We also give two concrete instances
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of our generic construction and compare them with other existing ones.
3. A Generic Construction of Certificate-based Encryption from Certificateless Encryption
We extend the generic construction of certificate-based signatures to certificatebased encryption. In order to further classify the potential attacks on certificatebased encryption, we provide an elaborate security model for certificate-based encryption. The security model is inspired by and modified from the security notions
of both certificateless public key encryption [Den08] and certificate-based encryption [Gen03]. Under the new security model, we provide a new generic construction
of certificate-based encryption from certificateless encryption, which can be viewed
as an analogue of our generic construction of certificate-based signatures. Assuming that the underlying certificateless encryption schemes satisfy certain security
notions, our method can be applied to build certificate-based encryption schemes
secure (in the random oracle model) against any type of adversaries defined in this
chapter.
Organization of this Chapter
The outline of a certificate-based signature (CBS) scheme is presented in the next
section, and the description of the oracles accessible by the adversaries is given
in Section 4.3. We then redefine the security of CBS against different types of
attacks in Section 4.4. The generic construction of certificate-based signatures from
certificateless signatures is proposed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 demonstrates the
application of our generic construction by showing two concrete certificate-based
signature schemes.
The outline of a certificate-based encryption (CBE) scheme is given in Section 4.7. After that, we define the security of CBE against different types of attacks in Section 4.8. This is followed by a generic construction of certificate-based
encryption from certificateless encryption in Section 4.9. Section 4.10 describes a
concrete instance of our generic construction of certificate-based encryption. Finally,
Section 4.11 concludes this chapter.

4.2

Certificate-based Signatures

In this section, we will first review the definitions of certificate-based signatures.
After that, we will describe oracles used in our security model.
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Syntax of Certificate-Based Signatures

In a certificate-based cryptosystem, a certificate generator, which is called as the
“certifier”, will first generate the system parameter and a master public/private key
pair. The certifier will use that key pair to generate certificates for users in the
system. Users then will generate their own public/secret key pairs and contact the
certifier to obtain the corresponding certificates. A user can use the secret key and
the certificate to generate a signature on a message. In this case, that user is also
called as the signer. A signature recipient is called as the verifier if he/she performs
the signature verification.
A certificate-based signature (CBS) scheme consists of the following five algorithms:
1. CB-Setup(1k ) → (CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params). By taking as input a
security parameter 1k , the certifier runs the algorithm CB-Setup to generate
the certifier’s master secret key CB-msk, master public key CB-mpk and
the system parameter CB-params. CB-params includes the description of a
string space Γ, which can be any subset of {0, 1}∗ .
2. CB-UserKeyGen(CB-mpk, CB-params, ID) → (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ). The
user with the identity information ID runs the algorithm CB-UserKeyGen to
generate the user ID’s secret/public key pair (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) ∈ SKCB ×
PKCB , by taking as input CB-mpk and CB-params. Here, SKCB denotes the
set of valid secret key values and PKCB denotes the set of valid public key
values.
3. CB-CertGen(CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID ) → CertID . The
certifier runs the algorithm CB-CertGen to generate the certificate CertID , by
taking as input CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params, ID and its public key CBP KID .
4. CB-Sign(m, CB-params, CB-mpk, ID, CertID , CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) → CBσ. The prospective signer runs the algorithm CB-Sign to generate the signature
CB-σ, by taking as input a message m, CB-params, CB-mpk, the user’s
identity ID, its CertID and key pair (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ).
5. CB-Verify(m, CB-σ, CB-mpk, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID ) → {true, f alse}.
Anyone can run the algorithm CB-Verify to check the validity of the signature.
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By taking as input a message/signature pair (m, CB-σ), ID, CB-P KID , CBmpk, CB-params, this algorithm outputs true if CB-σ is ID’s valid signature
on m. Otherwise, this algorithm outputs f alse.
Correctness. Signatures generated by the algorithm CB-Sign can pass through the
verification in CB-Verify. That is,
CB-Verify(m, CB-Sign(m, CB-params, CB-mpk, ID, CertID , CB-SKID , CB-P KID ),
CB-mpk, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID ) = true.
Remark 4.1 A certificate-based signature proves that one has a valid certificate
(certifier’s signature) of a public key and the associated private key. In this sense,
certificate-based signatures are similar to aggregate signatures [BGLS03].

4.3

Adversaries and Oracles

We now describe the oracles which will be used in the security model of certificatebased signatures in this chapter. We first give a brief description of adversaries in
certificate-based signatures. Formal definitions of these adversaries will be given in
Section 4.4.
The essential security of a certificate-based signature scheme requires that one
can generate a valid signature under the public key CB-P KID if and only if having
the knowledge of both CertID and CB-SKID . In other words, one cannot generate a valid signature with only CertID or CB-SKID . As introduced in [LHM+ 07],
adversaries in certificate-based signatures can be divided into two types: CB-AI
and CB-AII . Type I adversary CB-AI simulates the scenario where the adversary
(anyone except the certifier) is allowed to replace public keys of any entities, but is
not allowed to obtain the target user’s certificate CertID . Type II adversary CB-AII
simulates a malicious certifier who is able to produce certificates but is assumed not
to replace the target user’s public key. We will use the following oracles to simulate
potential attacking scenarios. In the remainder of this chapter, we write α ← β to
denote the algorithmic action of assigning the value β to α.
1. OCB−UserCreate : This oracle receives an input ID ∈ Γ and outputs the public key
of user ID. It maintains two lists L1P K and L2P K , which are initially empty and
are used to record the information for each user ID. L1P K ={(ID, CB-SKID ,
CB-P KID )} provides the information about user ID’s secret key and public
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key when it is created. L2P K ={(ID, CB-P K ID )} provides the information of
ID’s current public key, which is denoted as CB-P K ID .
(a) For a fresh input ID, the oracle runs the algorithms CB-UserKeyGen to
obtain the secret key CB-SKID and public key CB-P KID . It then adds
(ID, CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) to L1P K and (ID, CB-P K ID ) to L2P K where
CB-P K ID ← CB-P KID . After that, it outputs CB-P KID . In this case,
ID is said to be created. Here we assume that other oracles (which will
be defined later) only respond to the identity which has been created.
(b) Otherwise, ID has already been created. The oracle will search ID in
L1P K and return CB-P KID as the output.
2. OCB−PKReplace : For a public key replacement query (ID, CB-PK) ∈ Γ × PKCB ,
this oracle finds the user ID in the list L2P K , sets CB-P K ID ← CB-PK and
updates the corresponding pair with (ID, CB-P K ID ).
3. OCB−Corruption : This oracle takes as input a query ID. It browses the list L1P K
and outputs the secret key CB-SKID .
4. OCB−CertGen : For a certificate request for (ID, CB-PK) ∈ Γ × PKCB , this oracle
runs the algorithm CB-CertGen and returns the certificate for (ID, CB-PK).
5. OCB−Sign : Considering different levels of the signing power the challenger may
have, this oracle can be further divided into following three types:
(a) OCB−NormalSign : This oracle takes as input a query (ID, m), and outputs a
signature CB-σ such that true = CB−Verify(m, CB-σ, CB-params, ID,
CB-P KID , CB-mpk). Here CB-P KID is ID’s public key in the list L1P K .
(b) OCB−StrongSign : This oracle takes as input a query (ID, m, coin), where m
denotes the message to be signed, and coin ∈ {1, 2}. It acts differently
according to the value of coin. If coin = 1, this oracle works the same as
OCB−NormalSign . Otherwise coin = 2, this oracle first checks the list L1P K
and L2P K to obtain ID’s original public key CB-P KID and ID’s current
public key CB-P K ID . If CB-P K ID =CB-P KID , this oracle works as
same as OCB−NormalSign . Otherwise, OCB−StrongSign will ask the adversary
to supply the secret key CB-SK ID corresponding to CB-P K ID . After

4.4. Security Models of Certificate-based Signatures

60

Table 4.2: Sign Oracles
Public Keys
Original public keys
Replaced public keys

Normal Sign
√
×

Strong Sign
√
√

with conditions 4.2

Super Sign
√
√

that, this oracle uses CB-SK ID and the certificate for (ID,CB-P K ID ) to
generate the signature CB-σ, which will be returned as the answer.
(c) OCB−SuperSign : For a query (ID, m), this oracle first finds ID’s current public
key CB-P K ID in L2P K . This oracle then outputs a signature σ such that
true = CB−Verify(m, σ, CB-params, ID, CB-P K ID , CB-mpk).

Remark 4.2 The adversary must provide the corresponding secret key when issuing
queries to OCB−StrongSign .
Table 4.2 shows the differences among the three sign oracles. The power of
adversaries can be easily classified by observing which sign oracle they can issue
queries to. Clearly, adversaries who can request OCB−SuperSign are the most powerful
ones, while the weakest ones are those who can only request OCB−NormalSign .
Remark 4.3 A Type II adversary CB-AII , who simulates the malicious certifier,
is not allowed to make any requests to OCB−CertGen .

4.4

Security Models of Certificate-based Signatures

In this section, we will define security models of certificate-based signatures. Our
models follow the standard methods: each security notion is defined by the game
between the adversary and the challenger, which consists of several oracles defined in
Section 4.3. In our definition, the notation {Q1 , Q2 , · · · , Qn } 9 {O1 , O2 , · · · , On }
denotes that “No query Q ∈ {Q1 , Q2 , · · · , Qn } can be submitted to any oracle O ∈
{O1 , O2 , · · · , On }”. A (t, qU C , qP KR , qC , qCG , qS ) adversary refers to the adversary
who runs in polynomial time t, makes at most qU C queries to OCB−UserCreate , qP KR
queries to OCB−PKReplace , qC queries to OCB−Corruption , qCG queries to OCB−CertGen , qS
queries to OCB−Sign ∈ {OCB−NormalSign , OCB−StrongSign , OCB−SuperSign }.
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The definition in this section is inspired by [HMS+ 07], which provides a new
classification of potential adversaries against certificateless signatures. The security
models in [HMS+ 07] not only include previous security definitions of certificateless
signatures, but also introduce new types of adversaries. Following the definitions
in [HMS+ 07], we classify the potential adversaries in certificate-based signatures
according to their attack power. They are Normal Adversary, Strong Adversary
and Super Adversary. Combined with the known type I adversary and type II
adversary in certificate-based signatures, we now define the security of certificatebased signatures in different attack scenarios and relate them to prior definitions.

4.4.1

Security Against Normal Type I Adversary

We first define the Normal Type I adversary in certificate-based signatures, which is
denoted as Normal-CB-AI . The essential attacking scenario of Normal-CB-AI is
that the adversary can obtain some message/signature pairs (mi , CB-σi ) which are
generated by the target user using its own secret key and certificate. Our definition
described below is inspired by and modified from the definition of Normal Type I
adversary against certificateless signatures in [HMS+ 07].
Initial: The challenger runs the algorithm CB-Setup, returns CB-params and CBmpk to AI .
Queries: In this phase, AI can adaptively make requests to OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PKReplace ,
OCB−Corruption , OCB−CertGen , OCB−NormalSign .
Output: After all queries, AI outputs a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ). Let CB-P K ID∗
be the current public key of ID∗ in L2P K .
Restrictions: We say AI wins the game if the forgery satisfies the following requirements:
1. true = CB−Verify(m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ , CB-mpk);
2. (ID∗ , m∗ ) 9 OCB−NormalSign ;
3. (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen ; and
4. ID∗ 9 OCB−Corruption .
The success probability that an adaptive chosen message and chosen identity adversary Normal-CB-AI wins the above game is denoted as Succcma,cida
AI ,normal . We say
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a certificate-based signature scheme is secure against a (t, qU C , qP KR , qC , qCG , qS )
Normal-CB-AI if Succcma,cida
AI ,normal is negligible.
Remark 4.4 Our definition is similar to that in [LHM+ 07], but with two improvements. Firstly, we allow the adversary to replace any user’s public key, while the
adversary in [LHM+ 07] can only replace the target user’s public key. The other
improvement is that the adversary in our model is allowed to obtain certificates of
(ID, CB-P K)s chosen by itself. This is different from the adversary in [LHM+ 07]
who can only obtain certificates of original public keys generated by the challenger.

4.4.2

Security Against Strong Type I Adversary

In this section, we boost the attack power of Normal Type I adversary and define
the Strong Type I adversary: Strong-CB-AI . Strong-CB-AI is more powerful than
Normal-CB-AI in the sense that Strong-CB-AI can access the oracle OCB−StrongSign .
Apart from that, Strong-CB-AI is allowed to corrupt the target user ID∗ ’s original
secret key. The attacking scenario is similar to those in certificateless signatures
defined in [HWZD06, ZWXF06], and is formally defined as below.
The game between the challenger and a Strong-CB-AI is very similar to that
defined in Section 4.4.1, but with two differences:
In the phase Queries, Strong-CB-AI have access to OCB−StrongSign rather than
OCB−NormalSign ;
In Restrictions, (ID∗ , m∗ ) 9 OCB−StrongSign and ID∗ can appear as a query to
OCB−Corruption .
The success probability that an adaptive chosen message and chosen identity
adversary Strong-CB-AI wins the above game is denoted as Succcma,cida
AI ,strong . We say
a certificate-based signature scheme is secure against a (t, qU C , qP KR , qC , qCG , qS )
Strong-CB-AI if Succcma,cida
AI ,strong is negligible.

4.4.3

Security Against Super Type I Adversary

In this section, we will define the Super Type I adversary, which is denoted as
Super-CB-AI . Super-CB-AI is more powerful than Strong-CB-AI (and hence,
more powerful than Normal-CB-AI ) in the sense that Super-CB-AI has access to
OCB−SuperSign . That is, Super-CB-AI is allowed to obtain a valid signature under the
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public key chosen by itself without providing the corresponding secret key, which
makes it the strongest Type I adversary. This is similar to the Super Type I adversary in certificateless signatures defined in [HMS+ 07].
The game between the challenger and a Super-CB-AI is very similar to that
defined in Section 4.4.2, but with two differences:
In the phase Queries, Super-CB-AI is allowed to have access to OCB−SuperSign rather
than OCB−StrongSign ;
In Restrictions, (ID∗ , m∗ ) 9 OCB−SuperSign .
The success probability of an adaptively chosen message and chosen identity
adversary Super-CB-AI wins the above game is denoted as Succcma,cida
AI ,super . We say
a certificate-based signature scheme is secure against a (t, qU C , qP KR , qC , qCG , qS )
Super-CB-AI if Succcma,cida
AI ,super is negligible.

4.4.4

Security Against Type II Adversary

In certificate-based signatures, a type II adversary CB-AII simulates the certifier who is equipped with the master secret key and might engage in adversarial
activities like eavesdropping on signatures and making signing queries. Similar
to the type I adversary, CB-AII could be also classified into Normal-CB-AII ,
Strong-CB-AII , Super-CB-AII , which has access to OCB−NormalSign , OCB−StrongSign ,
OCB−SuperSign , respectively. However, there is no need to particularly define StrongCB-AII .

OCB−StrongSign can answer queries either by using OCB−NormalSign (then

OCB−StrongSign is the same as OCB−NormalSign ), or signing the message with the corresponding secret key provided by the adversary. Note that, CB-AII has the master
secret key, and thus can calculate any user’s certificate. If he has the secret key
as well, CB-AII can generate the signature by himself and OCB−StrongSign becomes
useless. Therefore, for a type II adversary CB-AII , it is sufficient to define only two
types of adversaries, namely Normal-CB-AII and Super-CB-AII . The definition of
those two types of adversaries is described as follows.
Initial: The challenger runs the algorithm CB-Setup and returns the system parameters CB-params, master secret key CB-msk and master public key CB-mpk to
AII .
Queries: AII can adaptively make requests to OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PKReplace ,
OCB−Corruption and OCB−Sign , where OCB−Sign ∈ {OCB−NormalSign , OCB−SuperSign }.
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Output: After all queries, AII outputs a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ).
Restrictions: We say AII wins the game if the forgery satisfies the requirements
as following:
1. true ← CB−Verify(m, CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ , CB-mpk). Here
CB-P KID∗ is the original public key in L1P K ;
2. (ID∗ , m∗ ) 9 OCB−Sign ; and
3. ID∗ 9 OCB−Corruption .
The success probability that an adaptive chosen message and chosen identity
adversary CB-AII wins the above game is denoted as Succcma,cida
AII ,type , where type ∈
{normal, super}. We say a certificate-based signature scheme is secure against a
CB−Sign
(t, qU C , qP KR , qC , qS ) CB-AII if Succcma,cida
will be
AII ,type is negligible. Here, O

OCB−NormalSign if type = normal. Otherwise, OCB−Sign is OCB−SuperSign .

4.4.5

Security Against Malicious-but-Passive Type II Adversary

We now define a more powerful type II adversary, who is allowed to generate the system parameter and the master secret/public key. This assumes that the third party
certifier have already been malicious at the very beginning of the setup stage of the
system, rather than being only given the parameter and the master secret/public
key honestly generated by the challenger. Such attacks are first introduced to certificateless cryptosystems in [ACL+ 07]. In addition to this, even though we say
that the certifier is malicious, we also assume (as in [ACL+ 07]) that the certifier is
passive, in the sense that the certifier would not actively replace the user’s public
key or corrupt the user’s secret key. It is shown in [ACL+ 07] that the maliciousbut-passive third party KGC in certificateless cryptosystems like [ARP03] can have
its master key pair specifically generated so that all the encrypted messages for the
target victim can also be decrypted by the KGC. The security model of certificatebased encryption in [Gen03] also captures the essence of those attacks. The security
of certificate-based signatures against a malicious-but-passive Type II adversary is
defined by the following game:
Initial: The challenger executes AII on the security parameter 1k . AII returns
the system parameters CB-params and master public key CB-mpk.
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Queries: A malicious-but-passive AII can make queries to all oracles except
OCB−CertGen . Since CB-params and CB-mpk are generated by the adversary
AII , OCB−UserCreate and OCB−PKReplace have to be modified as following:
OCB−UserCreate : As defined in Section 4.3, this oracle receives an input ID ∈
Γ and outputs the public key CB-P KID . After obtaining CB-P KID ,
a malicious-but-passive Type II adversary must provide ID’s certificate
CertID for (ID, CB-P KID ). This oracle then adds (ID, CB-SKID , CBP KID , CertID ) to L1P K , and (ID, CB-P KID , CertID ) to L2P K .
OCB−PKReplace : For a malicious-but-passive Type II adversary, the input to
this oracle should be (ID, CB-PK, Cert) where Cert is the corresponding
certificate of CB-PK under the identity ID. This oracle searches L2P K ,
finds a record related to ID and sets CB-P K ID ← CB-PK and CertID ←
Cert. It then updates the related tuple with (ID, CB-P K ID , CertID ).
Output and Restrictions: As those defined in Sec. 4.4.4.
The success probability that an adaptive chosen message and chosen identity maliciousbut-passive Type II adversary wins the above game is denoted as Succcma,cida
M P −AII ,type ,
where type ∈ {normal, super}. We say a certificate-based signature scheme is secure against a (t, qU C , qP KR , qC , qS ) malicious-but-passive CB-AII if Succcma,cida
M P −AII ,type
is negligible. Here, OCB−Sign will be OCB−NormalSign if type = normal. Otherwise,
OCB−Sign is OCB−SuperSign .

4.5

Generic Construction of Certificate-based Signatures

In this section, we will introduce a generic method to construct certificate-based
signatures. Our construction is based on certificateless signatures whose description
is as below.

4.5.1

Syntax of Certificateless Signatures

A certificateless signature (CLS) scheme is defined by six algorithms: CL-Setup (generates KGC’s key pair (CL-msk, CL-mpk) and system’s parameter), CL-PPKExtract
(generates a user ID’s partial private key CL-P P K ID ), CL-SSValue (generates a
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user ID’s secret value CL-SVID ), CL-SPKey (generates a user ID’s public key CLP KID ), CL-Sign (generates a certificateless signature CL-σ using CL-P P K ID and
CL-SVID ) and CL-Verify (outputs true if a given signature is valid, or f alse otherwise). As one can see, to distinguish from the identity information in the certificatebased system (which is denoted as ID), we use the notion ID to denote the identity
information in the certificateless system. For other notations, we put the prefix
“CL-” to indicate that they are in the certificateless cryptosystem. Please refer
to [HMS+ 07] for the formal definition of each algorithm.

4.5.2

Generic Construction: CLS-2-CBS

In this section, we show how to convert a certificateless signature scheme into a
certificate-based signature scheme. In our construction, we need a hash function
H : Γ × PKCB → IDCL . Here, Γ is the identity information space in the certificatebased system, PKCB is the public key space in certificate-based system and IDCL
denotes the space of identities in the certificateless cryptosystem2 .
Let CLS be the certificateless signature scheme described in Section 4.5.1. We
now describe the generic construction CLS-2-CBS.
1. CB-Setup(1k ) → (CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params).
(a) Run algorithm CL-Setup(1k ) of CLS to obtain CL-params, CL-msk and
CL-mpk. For the security parameter k, we assume that the public key
size in a certificateless cryptosystem is at least 2k ;
(b) Set CB-params by extending CL-params to include the description of
Γ;
(c) (CB-msk, CB-mpk) ← (CL-msk, CL-mpk).
2. CB-UserCreate(CB-mpk, CB-params, ID ∈ Γ) → (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ).
(a) CL-mpk ← CB-mpk;
(b) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
2

Here, we use the hash function H to “connect” two identities in certificate-based signatures
and certificateless signatures. This is different from the technique in the generic construction of
certificate-based encryption proposed in [ARP05]. A recent work [KP05] pointed out a flaw of
security proof in [ARP05]. That flaw does not exist in our construction, the details of which will
be shown in the security proof later.
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(c) CB-SKID ← CL-SSValue(CL-mpk, CL-params);
(d) CB-P KID ← CL-SPKey(CL-mpk, CL-params, CB-SKID ).
3. CB-CertGen(CB-msk, CB-mpk, CB-params, ID ∈ Γ, CB-P KID ) → CertID .
(a) (CL-msk, CL-mpk)←(CB-msk, CB-mpk);
(b) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(c) H(ID, CB-P KID )→ ID ∈ IDCL ;
(d) CertID ← CL-PPKExtract(CL-msk, CL-mpk, CL-params, ID).
4. CB-Sign(m, CB-params, CB-mpk, ID, CertID , CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) →CB-σ.
(a) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(b) CL-mpk← CB-mpk;
(c) H(ID, CB-P KID )→ ID ∈ IDCL ;
(d) (CL-SV ID , CL-P K ID )←(CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) and CL-P P K ID ← CertID ;
(e) CB-σ ←CL-Sign(m, CL-params, CL-mpk, ID, CL-SV ID , CL-P KID ,
CL-P P K ID ). One can see that the signature size of CB-σ is the same
as that in the underlying certificateless signature scheme.
5. CB-Verify(CB-params, CB-mpk, ID, CB-P KID , (m, CB-σ)) → {true, f alse}.
(a) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(b) CL-mpk ← CB-mpk;
(c) H(ID, CB-P KID )→ ID ∈ IDCL ;
(d) CL-P K ID ← CB-P KID ;
(e) CL-σ ← CB-σ.
(f) Output CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID, CL-P K ID , (m, CL-σ)).
Correctness. We show that any certificate-based signature produced by CB-Sign
will pass through the verification in CB-Verify.
In our construction, a certificate-based signature is the output of the algorithm
CL-Sign in the certificateless system, and algorithm CB-Verify also employs the verification algorithm CL-Verify in the certificateless system. To show the correctness of
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our construction, it suffices to show that under the same CL-params and CL-mpk,
a certificateless signature produced by using the secret value CL-SV ID and the
partial private key CL-P P K ID will pass through the check using the corresponding identity ID and its public key CL-P KID . This is ensured by the correctness
of the underlying certificateless signature scheme, that is, for any signature CL-σ
produced by CL-Sign(m, CL-params, CL-mpk, ID, CL-SV ID , CL-P KID , CLP P K ID ), CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID, CL-P K ID , (m, CL-σ)) will output
true. Therefore, for any signature output by CB-Sign defined in our construction,
the algorithm CB-Verify will always output true.
Security Analysis
Theorem 4.1 [Security of CLS-2-CBS] CLS-2-CBS is secure (in the random oracle
model) against adversaries defined in Section 4.4, assuming the underlying certificateless signature scheme CLS satisfying certain security requirements.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 consists of several lemmas, which demonstrate the security
relationship between our generic construction CLS-2-CBS and its underlying certificateless signature scheme CLS. Please refer to [HMS+ 07] for security definitions of
CLS.
Lemma 4.2 (Security against Normal-CB-AI ) CLS-2-CBS is secure (in the
random oracle model) against Normal-CB-AI defined in Section 4.4.1, if CLS is
secure against Normal-CL-AI defined in [HMS+ 07].
Proof: In the proof, we will regard hash function H as the random oracle and show
that if there is a Normal-CB-AI who can forge a valid certificate-based signature of
CLS-2-CBS with non-negligible probability, then there exists a Normal-CL-AI who
can use Normal-CB-AI to forge a valid certificateless signature of CLS with almost
the same probability.
In our proof, the challenger of a Normal-CB-AI is the Normal-CL-AI against
the underlying CLS, who can make requests to its own challenger CL-Challenger.
CL-Challenger is made up of several oracles as follows: OCL−UserCreate (creates users
in the certificateless cryptosystem), OCL−Corruption (returns secret values of created
users), OCL−PPKExtract (returns partial private keys of created users), OCL−PKReplace
(replaces public keys of created users with the value provided by the adversary)
and OCL−NormalSign (returns certificateless signatures on messages chosen by the adversary). Please refer to [HMS+ 07] for the formal definition of each oracle. The
description of our proof is as follows.
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Initial: The CL-Challenger runs the algorithm CL-Setup of CLS and feeds the NormalCL-AI with CL-mpk and CL-params. Normal-CL-AI then returns CB-mpk and
CB-params to Normal-CB-AI where CB-mpk is defined to be CL-mpk and CBparams is defined by extending CL-params to include the description of Γ. Before
Normal-CB-AI submits any queries, Normal-CL-AI asks CL-Challenger to create quc
users in the certificateless cryptosystem. Here quc is the number of queries NormalCB-AI issues to OCB−UserCreate . Normal-CL-AI then records the information as (IDi ,
CL-P KIDi ), i = 1, 2, · · · , quc in the list CLP K . Here IDi ∈ IDCL , CL-P KIDi is the
original public key of IDi in certificateless system.
Queries: As defined in Section 4.4.1, Normal-CB-AI can issue queries to following
oracles. We now show how Normal-CL-AI can answer these queries.
• RO: In the proof, the hash function H is viewed as the random oracle RO.
For a fresh input (ID,CB-PK) ∈ Γ × PKCB , the output of RO is a random element ID in IDCL . Normal-CL-AI maintains a list LRO consisting of (ID,CBPK,ID).
• OCB−UserCreate : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can request to create the user
IDi ∈ Γ and expect to obtain IDi ’s public key CB-P KIDi . In response to such
queries:
1. For the ith fresh query IDi , Normal-CL-AI first checks the list CLP K
and finds the ith pair (IDi , CL-P KIDi ). Normal-CL-AI then sets CBP KIDi ← CL-P KIDi , H(IDi , CB-P KIDi ) = IDi and adds (IDi , CBP KIDi , IDi ) into LRO . If (IDi , CB-P KIDi ) already appears in LRO , then
the simulation fails and Normal-CL-AI aborts. This, however, happens
only with negligible probability as |PKCL | is assumed to be greater than
2k and k is the security parameter. Otherwise, it adds (IDi , ⊥, CBP KIDi ) into the list L1P K . Meanwhile, it sets CB-P K IDi ← CB-P KIDi
and adds (IDi , CB-P K IDi ) into list L2P K . Here, the notation ⊥ means
that Normal-CL-AI does not know the corresponding secret key CBSKIDi .
2. In addition to maintain L1P K , L2P K , Normal-CL-AI will keep two additional lists L1ID and L2ID which will help it answer queries from NormalCB-AI . L1ID consists of pairs with the form (IDi , IDi ) where IDi ∈ Γ and
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IDi ∈ IDCL . This list will help Normal-CL-AI to respond Normal-CBAI ’s corruption queries and NormalSign queries. L2ID consists of pairs
with the form (IDi , IDi ) where IDi ∈ Γ and IDi ∈ IDCL . In different
phases, IDi could be the identity IDi in the list L1P K , or the identity
IDi0 ∈ IDCL created at some time later.
For a user IDi created in this oracle, Normal-CL-AI will add (IDi , IDi )
into list L1ID , where IDi ∈ IDCL is IDi ’s corresponding identity in the list
CLP K . Meanwhile, Normal-CL-AI sets IDi ← IDi and adds (IDi , IDi )
into list L2ID .
• OCB−PKReplace : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can replace a public key of a cre0
chosen by himself. In response,
ated user ID with the public key CB-P KID
$

0
Normal-CL-AI first sets CB-P K ID ← CB-P KID
, then

1. Normal-CL-AI browses the list L2P K and rewrites the related pair as (ID,
CB-P K ID ). It then browses LRO .
2. If (ID, CB-P K ID ) appears in LRO in the tuple (ID, CB-P K ID , ID),
Normal-CL-AI will make a user-create query ID to CL-Challenger if ID
has not been created in the certificateless system. After that, Normal-CLAI replaces ID’s certificateless public key with CB-P K ID and updates
the corresponding pair in CLP K with (ID, CB-P K ID ). Finally, NormalCL-AI browses the list L2ID and updates the related pair with (ID, ID).
3. Otherwise, Normal-CL-AI sets H(ID,CB-P K ID )=ID, which is randomly
chosen in IDCL . It then adds (ID, CB-P K ID , ID) into LRO . After that,
Normal-CL-AI asks CL-Challenger to create the user ID. After creating
the identity ID, Normal-CL-AI replaces ID’s public key with CB-P K ID .
Normal-CL-AI then updates CLP K by adding (ID, CB-P K ID ). Finally,
Normal-CL-AI browses the list L2ID and updates the related pair with
(ID, ID).
• OCB−Corruption : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can request the secret key of a
created user IDi . In response, Normal-CL-AI checks the list L1ID and finds
(IDi , IDi ). Then, it issues a corruption request IDi to CL-Challenger who will
return CL-SVIDi to Normal-CL-AI , where CL-SVIDi is the secret value of
IDi when it was created in the certificateless system. At last, Normal-CL-AI
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sets CB-SKIDi ← CL-SVIDi , returns it to Normal-CB-AI and updates the
information in the list L1P K as (IDi , CB-SKIDi , CB-P KIDi ).
Correctness: This oracle should return the user IDi ’s original secret key CBSKIDi when the user was created. Recall that L1ID contains pairs (IDi , IDi )
i = 1, 2, · · · , quc , where IDi ∈ IDCL is the IDi ’s initial corresponding identity
in certificateless system. IDi is set as H(IDi ,CB-P KIDi ) and CL-P KIDi =CBP KIDi which is the original public key of IDi . Thus the secret value CL-SVIDi
of IDi in certificateless system is the same as the secret key CB-SKIDi of IDi
in certificate-based system.
• OCB−CertGen : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can request the certificate of (ID,
CB-PK) where CB-PK is chosen by the adversary itself. Normal-CL-AI will
try to find an identity ID ∈ IDCL , whose partial private key is ID’s certificate
under the public key CB-PK. To do that, Normal-CL-AI will check LRO :
1. If (ID, CB-PK) appears in LRO in the tuple (ID, CB-PK, ID), NormalCL-AI will make a user-create query ID to CL-Challenger if ID has not
been created in certificateless system.
2. Otherwise, Normal-CL-AI sets H(ID,CB-PK)=ID, which is randomly
chosen in IDCL . It then adds (ID, CB-PK, ID) into LRO . After that,
Normal-CL-AI asks CL-Challenger to create the user ID.
For either case, Normal-CL-AI issues the partial private key query ID to
CL-Challenger who will return the partial private key CL-P P KID . At last,
Normal-CL-AI sets CertID ← CL-P P KID and returns it to Normal-CB-AI .
• OCB−NormalSign : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can request the signature of (mi ,
IDi ). The Normal-CL-AI first finds the pair (IDi , IDi ) in the list L1ID . Then,
Normal-CL-AI issues a certificateless signing query (IDi , mi ). As defined,
Normal-CL-AI will obtain the signature CL-σi such that true = CL-Verify(CLmpk, CL-params, IDi , CL-P KIDi , (mi , CL-σi )). Normal-CB-AI will set CBσi ← CL-σi , and return CB-σi as the answer.
Correctness: Recall that for the pair (IDi , IDi ) in L1ID , IDi is set as
H(IDi ,CB-P KIDi ) and CB-P KIDi = CL-P KIDi . Here, CB-P KIDi is IDi ’s original public key in the list L1P K . Therefore, true =CB-Verify(CB-params,
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CB-mpk, IDi , CB-P KIDi , (mi , CB-σi )). That is, CB-σi is IDi ’s valid signature for mi under the original public key returned from OCB−UserCreate .
Output: After all queries, CB-AI will output a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ). If
Normal-CB-AI wins game, then:
1. true = CB−Verify(m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ , CB-mpk), where
(ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) is in the list L2P K . Here, CB-P K ID∗ is ID∗ ’s current public
key.
That is, if CL-σ ∗ ← CB-σ ∗ , true = CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID∗ ,
CL-P K ID∗ , (m∗ , CL-σ ∗ )). Here, (ID∗ , ID∗ ) ∈ L2ID which indicates that CLP K ID∗ =CB-P K ID∗ .
2. (ID∗ , m∗ ) 9 OCB−NormalSign .
That is, (ID∗ , m∗ ) has never been asked to OCL−NormalSign of CLS.
3. (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen .
That is, ID∗ has never been asked to OCL−PPKExtract of CLS.
4. ID∗ 9 OCB−Corruption .
That is, ID∗ has never been asked to OCL−Corruption of CLS.
If Normal-CL-AI does not fail in the simulation, then it can output a valid forgery
(m∗ , CL-σ ∗ , ID∗ ) of the underlying certificateless signature scheme with the same
success probability as Normal-CB-AI . Considering that Normal-CL-AI could only
fail in simulating H as the random oracle, which only happens with negligible probability qU C /2k (qU C is the number of user-create queries). Thus, Normal-CL-AI wins
the game with almost the same probability as Normal-CB-AI . This completes the
proof of Lemma 4.10.
Lemma 4.3 (Security against Strong-CB-AI ) CLS-2-CBS is secure (in the random oracle model) against Strong-CB-AI defined in Section 4.4, if CLS is secure
against Strong-CL-AI .
Proof: In the proof, we will regard the hash function H as random oracle and show
that if there is a Strong-CB-AI who can forge a valid certificate-based signature of
CLS-2-CBS with non-negligible probability, then there exists a Strong-CL-AI who
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can use Strong-CB-AI to forge a valid certificateless signature of CLS with the same
probability.
In our proof, Strong-CL-AI will act as the challenger of Strong-CB-AI . StrongCL-AI has its own challenger CL-Challenger, which can answer Strong-CL-AI ’s
queries.
Initial: Same as the proof of Lemma 4.10.
Queries: As defined in Section 4.4.2, Strong-CB-AI can issue queries to following
oracles. We show how Strong-CL-AI can answer these queries.
• OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PKReplace , OCB−Corruption , OCB−CertGen : These oracles are simulated by Strong-CL-AI in the same way as described in the proof of Lemma 4.10.
• OCB−StrongSign : At any time, Strong-CB-AI can request the signature of (mi , IDi ,
coin) where coin ∈ {1, 2}.
– If coin = 1, this oracle works as OCB−NormalSign , which is simulated in the
same way as described in the proof of Lemma 4.10.
– Otherwise coin = 2, this oracle first checks the list L1P K and L2P K
to obtain IDi ’s original public key CB-P KIDi and IDi ’s current public
key CB-P K IDi . If CB-P K IDi =CB-P KID , this oracle works the same
as OCB−NormalSign . Otherwise, OCB−StrongSign asks Strong-CB-AI to supply
the secret key CB-SK IDi ∈ SKCB corresponding to the current public
key CB-P K IDi . Then, Strong-CL-AI browses the list L2ID to find the
pair (IDi , IDi ) and makes a certificateless signing query (IDi , mi , CLSVIDi ) where CL-SVIDi ← CB-SK IDi . As defined, Strong-CL-AI will
obtain a certificateless signature CL-σi such that true = CL-Verify(CLmpk, CL-params, IDi , CL-P K IDi , (mi , CL-σi )), where CL-P K IDi is
IDi ’s current public key. Strong-CB-AI will set CB-σi ← CL-σi , and
return CB-σi as the answer.
Output: After all queries, Strong-CB-AI will output a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ).
If Strong-CB-AI wins game, then:
1. true = CB−Verify(m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ , CB-mpk), where
(ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) is in the list L2P K . Here, CB-P K ID∗ is ID∗ ’s current public
key.
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That is, if CL-σ ∗ ← CB-σ ∗ , true = CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID∗ ,
CL-P K ID∗ , (m∗ , CL-σ ∗ )), where (ID∗ , ID∗ ) ∈ L2ID .
2. (ID∗ , m∗ ) 9 OCB−StrongSign .
That is, (ID∗ , m∗ ) has never been asked to OCL−StrongSign of CLS.
3. (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen .
That is, ID∗ has never been asked to OCL−PPKExtract of CLS.
If Strong-CL-AI does not fail in the simulation, then it can output a valid forgery
(m∗ , CL-σ ∗ , ID∗ ) of the underlying certificateless signature scheme with the same
success probability as Strong-CB-AI . As in the proof of Lemma 4.10, Strong-CL-AI
could only fail in simulating H as RO, which only happens with negligible probability 1/2k . Thus, Strong-CL-AI wins the game with almost the same probability
as Strong-CB-AI . This completes the proof of Lemma 4.3.
Lemma 4.4 (Security against Super-CB-AI ) CLS-2-CBS is secure (in the random oracle model) against type I adversary Super-CB-AI defined in Section 4.4,
if CLS is secure against Super-CL-AI .
Proof: In the proof, we will regard the hash function H as random oracle and show
that if there is a Super-CB-AI who can forge a valid certificate-based signature of
CLS-2-CBS with non-negligible probability, then there exists a Super-CL-AI who
can use Super-CB-AI to forge a valid certificateless signature of CLS with almost
the same probability.
In our proof, Super-CL-AI will act as the challenger of Super-CB-AI . Super-CLAI has his own challenger CL-Challenger, which can answer Super-CL-AI ’s queries.
Initial: Same as the proof of Lemma 4.10.
Queries: As defined in Section 4.4.2, Super-CB-AI can issue queries to following
oracles. We show how Super-CL-AI can answer these queries.
• OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PKReplace , OCB−Corruption , OCB−CertGen : These oracles are simulated by Super-CL-AI in the same way as described in the proof of Lemma 4.10.
• OCB−SuperSign : At any time, Super-CB-AI can request the signature of (IDi , mi ).
Super-CL-AI first finds the pair (IDi , IDi ) in the list L2ID . Then, Super-CLAI issues a certificateless signing query (IDi , mi ). As defined, Super-CL-AI
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will obtain the signature CL-σi such that true = CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CLparams, IDi , CL-P K IDi , (mi , CL-σi )), where CL-P K IDi is IDi ’s current
public key. Super-CB-AI will set CB-σi ← CL-σi , and return CB-σi as the
answer.
Correctness: Recall that for the pair (IDi , IDi ) in L2ID , IDi is set as
H(IDi ,CB-P K IDi ) where CB-P K IDi is IDi ’s current public key in the list L2P K ,
and IDi ’s current public key CL-P K IDi has been set as CB-P K IDi . Therefore, true ← CB-Verify(CB-params, CB-mpk, IDi , CB-P K IDi , (mi , CB-σi )).
That is, CB-σi is IDi ’s valid signature for mi under the current public key in
the list L2P K .
Output: After all queries, Super-CB-AI will output a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ). If
Super-CB-AI wins game, then:
1. true = CB−Verify(m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ , CB-mpk), where
(ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) is in the list L2P K . Here, CB-P K ID∗ is ID∗ ’s current public
key.
That is, if CL-σ ∗ ← CB-σ ∗ , true = CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID∗ ,
CL-P K ID∗ , (m∗ , CL-σ ∗ )), where (ID∗ , ID∗ ) ∈ L2ID .
2. (ID∗ , m∗ ) 9 OCB−SuperSign .
That is, (ID∗ , m∗ ) has never been asked to OCL−SuperSign of CLS.
3. (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen .
That is, ID∗ has never been asked to the OCL−PPKExtract of CLS.
If Super-CL-AI does not fail in the simulation, then it can output a valid forgery
(m∗ , CL-σ ∗ , ID∗ ) of the underlying certificateless signature scheme with the same
success probability as Super-CB-AI . As in the proof of Lemma 4.10, Super-CL-AI
could only fail in simulating H as RO, which only happens with negligible probability 1/2k . Thus, Super-CL-AI wins the game with almost the same probability as
Super-CB-AI . This completes the proof of Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 4.5 (Security against CB-AII ) CLS-2-CBS is secure (in the random oracle model) against type II adversary CB-AII defined in Section 4.4.4, if CLS is
secure against CL-AII .

4.5. Generic Construction of Certificate-based Signatures

76

Proof: In the proof, we will regard the hash function H as the random oracle and
show that if there is a CB-AII (either Normal-CB-AII or Super-CB-AII ) who can
forge a valid certificate-based signature of CLS-2-CBS with non-negligible probability, then there exists a CL-AII (correspondingly, Normal-CL-AII , or Super-CL-AII )
who can use CB-AII to forge a valid certificateless signature of CLS with almost the
same probability.
In our proof, the challenger of a CB-AII is the CL-AII against the underlying
certificateless signature scheme, who can make requests to its own challenger CLChallenger. The description of our proof is as follows.
Initial: The CL-Challenger runs the algorithm CL-Setup of CLS and feeds the CLAII with CL-msk, CL-mpk and CL-params. CL-AII then returns (CB-msk, CBmpk) and CB-params to CB-AII where (CB-msk, CB-mpk) is defined to be (CLmsk, CL-mpk) and CB-params is defined by extending CL-params to include the
description of Γ. Before CB-AII submits any queries, CL-AII asks CL-Challenger to
create quc users in the certificateless cryptosystem. Here quc is the number of queries
CB-AII issues to OCB−UserCreate . CL-AII then records the information as (IDi , CLP KIDi ), i = 1, 2, · · · , quc in the list CLP K . Here IDi ∈ IDCL , CL-P KIDi is the
original public key of IDi in certificateless system.
Queries: As defined in Section 4.4.4, CB-AII can issue queries to OCB−UserCreate ,
OCB−PKReplace , OCB−Corruption , OCB−NormalSign (or, OCB−SuperSign ). These oracles are simulated by CL-AII in the same way as described in the proof of the security against
Type I adversary in Lemma 4.10.
Output: After all queries, CB-AII will output a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , ID∗ ). If
CB-AII wins, then:
1. true = CB−Verify(m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ , CB-mpk),
where (ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ ) is in the list L1P K , that is, CB-P KID∗ is ID∗ ’s original
public key.
That is, if CL-σ ∗ ← CB-σ ∗ , true = CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID∗ ,
CL-P KID∗ , (m∗ , CL-σ ∗ )), where (ID∗ , ID∗ ) ∈ L1ID .
2. (ID∗ , m∗ ) 9 OCB−Sign .
That is, (ID∗ , m∗ ) has never been asked to OCL−Sign of CLS.
3. ID∗ 9 OCB−Corruption .
That is, ID∗ has never been asked to OCL−Corruption of CLS.
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If CL-AII does not fail in the simulation, then it can output a valid forgery (m∗ ,
CL-σ ∗ , ID∗ ) of the underlying certificateless signature scheme with the same success
probability as CB-AII . As in the proof of Lemma 4.10, CL-AII could only fail in
simulating H as the random oracle, which only happens with negligible probability
qU C /2k (qU C is the number of user-create queries). Thus, CL-AII wins the game with
almost the same probability as CB-AII . This completes the proof of Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.6 (Security against Malicious-CB-AII ) CLS-2-CBS is secure (in the
random oracle model) against Malicious-CB-AII defined in Section 4.6, if CLS is
secure against Malicious-CL-AII .
Proof: In the proof, we will regard the hash function H as random oracle and show
that if there is a Malicious-CB-AII who can forge a valid certificate-based signature
of CLS-2-CBS with non-negligible probability, then there exists a Malicious-CL-AII
who can use Malicious-CB-AII to forge a valid certificateless signature of CLS with
almost the same probability.
In our proof, Malicious-CL-AII will act as the challenger of Malicious-CB-AII , at
the meantime Malicious-CL-AII has his own challenger CL-Challenger (which consists
of OCL−UserCreate , OCL−SSValue , OCL−SPKey , OCL−PKReplace , OCL−Corruption , OCL−Sign ).
Initial: Given the security parameter 1k , Malicious-CB-AII will sends its challenger,
that is, Malicious-CL-AII , the system parameters CB-params and master public
key CB-mpk. Malicious-CL-AII then extracts CL-params from CB-params, sets
CL-mpk as CB-mpk and sends them to its own challenger CL-Challenger.
Queries: As defined in Section 4.4.1, Malicious-CB-AII can issue queries to following oracles. We show how Malicious-CL-AII can answer these queries:
• RO: In the proof, the hash function H is viewed as the random oracle RO.
For a fresh input (ID,CB-PK) ∈ Γ × PKCB , the output of RO is a random
element ID in IDCL . Malicious-CL-AII maintains a list LRO consisting of
(ID,CB-PK,ID).
• OCB−UserCreate : At any time Malicious-CB-AII can request to create the user
IDi ∈ Γ and expect to obtain IDi ’s public key CB-P KIDi . In response to such
queries:
1. For the ith fresh query IDi , Malicious-CL-AII will choose a random identity IDi ∈ IDCL and ask CL-Challenger to create IDi in the certificateless system. After obtaining IDi ’s certificateless public key CL-P KIDi ,
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Malicious-CL-AII will set CB-P KIDi ← CL-P KIDi , H(IDi , CB-P KIDi )
= IDi and adds (IDi , CB-P KIDi , IDi ) into LRO . If (IDi , CB-P KIDi )
already appears in LRO , then the simulation fails and Malicious-CLAII aborts. This, however, happens only with negligible probability as
|PKCL | is assumed to be greater than 2k and k is the security parameter.
Malicious-CL-AII then sends CB-P KIDi to Malicious-CB-AII .
2. After obtaining CB-P KIDi , Malicious-CB-AII must calculate the corresponding certificate CertIDi and return it to Malicious-CL-AII , who will
forward CertIDi to CL-Challenger as the partial private key of IDi in
certificateless system. Malicious-CL-AII then adds (IDi , ⊥, CB-P KIDi ,
CertIDi ) into the list L1P K . Here, the notation ⊥ means that MaliciousCL-AII does not know the corresponding secret key CB-SKIDi . Meanwhile, Malicious-CL-AII sets CB-P K IDi ← CB-P KIDi and adds (IDi ,
CB-P K IDi , CertIDi ) into list L2P K .
3. In addition to maintain L1P K , L2P K , Malicious-CL-AII will keep two
additional lists L1ID and L2ID , which are the same as those in the proof
of Lemma 4.10.
For a user IDi created in this oracle, Malicious-CL-AII will add (IDi , IDi )
into list L1ID , where IDi ∈ IDCL is the IDi ’s corresponding identity in
the list CLP K . Meanwhile, Malicious-CL-AII sets IDi ← IDi and adds
(IDi , IDi ) into list L2ID .
• OCB−PKReplace : At any time Malicious-CB-AII can replace a public key of a
0
created user ID with the public key CB-P KID
chosen by himself. Meanwhile

Malicious-CB-AII must provide the corresponding certificate Cert0ID of CB0
0
P KID
. In response, Malicious-CL-AII first sets CB-P K ID ← CB-P KID
, then

1. Malicious-CL-AII browses the list L2P K and rewrites the related tuple
as (ID,CB-P K ID , Cert0ID ).
2. If (ID, CB-P K ID ) appears in LRO in the tuple (ID, CB-P K ID , ID),
Malicious-CL-AII will make a user-create query ID to CL-Challenger if ID
has not been created in the certificateless system. After that, MaliciousCL-AII replaces ID’s certificateless public key with CB-P K ID and updates the related pair in L2ID with (ID, ID).
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3. Otherwise, Malicious-CL-AII sets H(ID,CB-P K ID )=ID, which is randomly chosen in IDCL . It then adds (ID, CB-P K ID , ID) into LRO and
asks CL-Challenger to create the user ID. After creating ID, MaliciousCL-AII replaces ID’s public key with CB-P K ID and updates the related
pair in L2ID with (ID, ID).
• OCB−Corruption and OCB−NormalSign : These two are simulated by Malicious-CLAII as same as described in the proof of Lemma 4.10.
• OCB−SuperSign : This is simulated by Malicious-CL-AII as same as described in
the proof of Lemma 4.4.
Output: After all queries, Malicious-CB-AII will output a forgery (m∗ , CB-σ ∗ ,
ID∗ ). If Malicious-CB-AII wins, then:
1. true = CB−Verify(m∗ , CB-σ ∗ , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ , CB-mpk), where
(ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ ) is in the list L1P K , that is, CB-P KID∗ is ID∗ ’s original public
key.
That is, if CL-σ ∗ ← CB-σ ∗ , true = CL-Verify(CL-mpk, CL-params, ID∗ ,
CL-P KID∗ , (m∗ , CL-σ ∗ )), where (ID∗ , ID∗ ) ∈ L1ID .
2. (ID∗ , m∗ ) 9 OCB−Sign .
That is, (ID∗ , m∗ ) has never been asked to OCL−Sign of CLS.
3. ID∗ 9 OCB−Corruption .
That is, ID∗ has never been asked to OCL−Corruption of CLS.
If Malicious-CL-AII does not fail in the simulation, then it can output a valid forgery
(m∗ , CL-σ ∗ , ID∗ ) of the underlying certificateless signature scheme with the same
success probability as Malicious-CB-AII . As in the proof of Lemma 4.10, MaliciousCL-AII could only fail in simulating H as RO, which only happens with negligible
probability 1/2k . Thus, Malicious-CL-AII wins the game with almost the same
probability as Malicious-CB-AII . This completes the proof of Lemma 4.6.
The above lemmas complete the proof of Theorem 4.1.
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Concrete Examples of CLS-2-CBS

By applying CLS-2-CBS to concrete certificateless signature schemes, we can obtain
several new constructions of certificate-based signatures. This section will describe
two of them, which are constructed from certificateless signature schemes proposed
in [HMS+ 07]. Please refer to Section 2.1 for the bilinear groups and the complexity
assumptions we use in the scheme.

4.6.1

Scheme I

The scheme described in this section is based on the certificateless signature scheme
in Section 4.2 of [HMS+ 07]. It consists of following algorithms.
• CB-Setup: Let (G1 , GT ) be bilinear groups as described in Section 2.1 where
|G1 | = |GT | = p, for some prime number p ≥ 2k , where k is the system security
number. e denotes the bilinear mapping G1 ×G1 → GT . Let H0 , H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
G∗1 and H2 : Γ×G∗1 → ID be three secure cryptographic hash functions, where
Γ is the set of identity information in the certificate-based system and ID is the
identity space defined in [HMS+ 07]. The certifier chooses a random number
s ∈ ZZ∗p and a generator g1 of G∗1 . The certifier then calculates system’s master
public key CB-mpk= g1s , where s is the master secret key CB-msk. The
system’s parameter CB-params is {G1 , GT , p, e, g1 , H0 , H1 , H2 , CB-mpk, Γ}.
• CB-UserCreate: The user ID chooses a random number xID ∈ ZZ∗p and sets xID
as the secret key. Here the valid secret key value space is SKCB = ZZ∗p . User ID
can also calculate the public key CB-P KID = g1xID . Here the valid public key
space is PKCB = G∗1 .
• CB-CertGen: Given a user’s identity information ID, the certifier first sets
ˆ = H2 (IDkCB-P KID ), then computes CertID = (H0 (ID))
ˆ s.
ID
ˆ = H2 (IDkCB-P KID ) and com• CB-Sign: For a message m, the user ID sets ID
ˆ
putes the signature CB-σ = CertID + (H1 (mkIDkCB-P
KID ))xID .
• CB-Verify: Given a pair (m, σ) and user ID’s public key CB-P KID , after
?
ˆ = H2 (IDkCB-P KID ), anyone can check whether e(CB-σ, g1 ) =
setting ID
ˆ
ˆ
e(H0 (ID),CB-mpk)e(H
1 (mkIDkCB-P KID ), CB-P KID ). If the equality holds,
this algorithm outputs true. Otherwise, this algorithm outputs f alse.
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Theorem 4.7 (Security of Concrete Scheme I) Scheme I is secure (in the random oracle model) against Normal-CB-AI and Super-CB-AII adaptive chosen message and chosen identity attacks, assuming that CDH problem is hard in G1 .
Proof: The correctness of this theorem is due to Theorem 4.1 and the underlying
certificateless signature scheme is provably secure (in the random oracle model)
against Normal-CL-AI and Super-CL-AII if CDH problem is hard in G1 [HMS+ 07].

4.6.2

Scheme II

The scheme described in this section is based on the certificateless signature scheme
in Section 4.3 of [HMS+ 07]. The first four algorithms are the same as those defined
in Section 4.6.1, with the only difference that H1 is defined as {0, 1}∗ → ZZp . The
CB-Sign and CB-Verify algorithms are described as follows:
ˆ = H2 (IDkCB-P KID ) and com• CB-Sign: For a message m, the user ID sets ID
putes the signature σ = (u, v, W ) where
ˆ
– u = H1 (mkIDkCB-P
KID kg1r1 ke(g1 , g1 )r2 ) for random numbers r1 , r2 ∈ ZZp
chosen by user ID; and
– v = r1 − uxID (mod p), W = g1r2 − (CertID )u .
• CB-Verify: Given a message/signature pair (m, σ = (u, v, W )), ID’s public key
?
ˆ = H2 (IDkCB-P KID ) anyone can check whether u =
CB−P KID , by setting ID
ˆ CB-P KID kg v +(CB-P KID )u ke(W, g1 )e(CB−mpk, H0 (ID))
ˆ u ). If the
H1 (mkIDk
1
equality holds, this algorithm outputs true. Otherwise, this algorithm outputs
f alse.
Theorem 4.8 (Security of Concrete Scheme II) Scheme II is secure (in the
random oracle model) against Super-CB-AI and Super-CB-AII adaptive chosen message and chosen identity attacks, assuming that CDH problem is hard in G1 .
Proof: The correctness of this theorem is due to Theorem 4.1 and the underlying
certificateless signature scheme is provably secure (in the random oracle model)
against Super-CL-AI and Super-CL-AII if CDH problem is hard in G1 [HMS+ 07].

Remark 4.5 Scheme II is the first certificate-based signature scheme which is provably secure against Super Type I and Type II adversary.
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Table 4.3: Efficiency Comparison
Scheme
CBS in [LHM+ 07]
Scheme I
CBSa in [KPH04]
Scheme II

Length
2|G1 |
|G1 |
3|G1 |
|G1 | + 2|ZZp |

Signing Cost
3E+2P A
E+P A
3E
4E+BM +P A

Verification Cost
4BM
3BM
2E+3BM +2P A
3E+2BM +P A

Table 4.4: Security Level Comparison
Scheme
CBS in [LHM+ 07]
Scheme I
CBSa in [KPH04]
Scheme II

4.6.3

Security
Normal AI and AII
Normal AI and Super AII
Strong AI and AII
Super AI and AII

Efficiency Comparison

We now make a comparison among existing certificate-based signature schemes,
which are proposed in [LBSZ08, LHM+ 07, KPH04]3 .
When compared to schemes (e.g. the first scheme in [LBSZ08]) without bilinear
mapping, our Scheme I and Scheme II require more computational cost but they
have a shorter signature length. When compared to schemes (e.g. the second scheme
in [LBSZ08]) whose security is proven without random oracles, Scheme I and Scheme
II have advantages of shorter system parameter, less computational cost and shorter
signature length. The comparison among other schemes with similar constructions
to ours is shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. The notations in Table 4.3 are as
follows: |G1 | and |ZZp | denote the bit length of an element in G1 and ZZp , respectively;
E denotes the exponentiation in G1 ; BM and P A denote the bilinear mapping
operation and point addition in G1 , respectively.
As shown in Table 4.4, Scheme I and CBS in [LHM+ 07] have the similar security level (To be more precisely, our Scheme I is provably secure against Normal AI and Super AII , and CBS in [LHM+ 07] is provably secure against Normal
AI and AII ), while Scheme I has less computational operation and shorter signature length. The certificate-based signature scheme CBSa in [KPH04] is secure
3

As the notion of certificate-based signatures is relatively new, those are the only known
certificate-based signature schemes with formal security analysis.
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against the adversary similar to the strong adversary defined in this chapter, while
Scheme II is secure against the super adversary with comparable computational
cost and signature length. In addition, the two pairing operations (e(g1 , g1 ) and
ˆ
e(CB−mpk, H0 (ID)))
in Scheme II can be computed in an off-line manner, which
can further improve the efficiency of Scheme II. The comparison shows that by
applying our generic construction to efficient certificateless signature schemes, one
can obtain new certificate-based signature schemes with better performance than
existing ones.

4.7

Certificate-based Encryption

This section reviews the definitions of certificate-based encryption and the oracles
used in our security model of certificate-based encryption.

4.7.1

Syntax of Certificate-Based Encryption

A certificate-based encryption (CBE) scheme consists of the following algorithms:
1. CB-Setup(1k ) → (CB-masterkey, CB-params).
By taking as input a security parameter 1k , the certifier runs the algorithm
CB-Setup to generate the certifier’s master key CB-masterkey and the system
parameter CB-params. CB-params includes the description of a string space
Γ, which can be any subset of {0, 1}∗ . CB-params are publicly accessible by
all users in the system.
For the convenience of using the expression, in the remainder of this chapter,
we still use ID ∈ Γ to denote a user with the identity information ID. But
actually, ID contains more information than the identity information.
2. CB-SetKeyPair(CB-params) → (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ).
The user with the identity ID runs the algorithm CB-SetKeyPair to generate
its secret/public key pair (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) ∈ SKCB × PKCB , by taking
as input CB-params. Here, SKCB denotes the set of valid private key values
and PKCB denotes the set of valid public key values. The descriptions of SKCB
and PKCB are included in CB-params.
3. CB-CertGen(CB-masterkey, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID ) → CertID .
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The certifier runs the algorithm CB-CertGen to generate the certificate CertID ,
by taking as input CB-masterkey, CB-params, ID and its public key CBP KID .
4. CB-Encrypt(m, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID ) → CB-cipher.
The sender runs the algorithm CB-Encrypt to generate the ciphertext CBcipher, by taking as input a message m to be encrypted, CB-params, the
receiver’s identity ID and its public key CB-P KID .
5. CB-Decrypt(CB-params, CB-SKID , CertID , CB-cipher) → {m, ⊥}.
The receiver runs the algorithm CB-Decrypt to decrypt the ciphertext. By
taking as input CB-params, a secret key CB-SKID , a certificate CertID and
the ciphertext CB-cipher, this algorithm returns either a message m or the
symbol ⊥ indicating a decryption failure.
Correctness. Ciphertexts generated by the algorithm CB-Encrypt can be successfully decrypted by CB-Decrypt. That is,
CB-Decrypt(CB-params, CB-SKID , CertID , CB-Encrypt(m, CB-params, ID, CBP KID )) =m.
Remark 4.6 Our definition is essentially the same as the one given in [ARP05]
and does not include the Certificate Consolidate algorithm defined in [Gen03], which
has the same output as CB-CertGen [ARP05].

4.7.2

Adversaries and Oracles

In a certificate-based encryption scheme, the user ID can decrypt the ciphertext if
and only if it has the knowledge of both certificate CertID and secret key CB-SKID .
In other words, one cannot perform a correct decryption with only one secret, either
CertID or CB-SKID . Thus, two types of adversaries have been considered in [Gen03]:
Type I adversary CB-AI and Type II adversary CB-AII . CB-AI can freely replace
the public key of any user but is not allowed to query the target user’s certificate.
On the other hand, CB-AII simulates the certifier with the ability of producing
certificates, but not allowed to replace the target user’s public key.
The security of CBE is defined by the game between the adversary and the
challenger, who maintains the following two lists.
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L1P K ={(ID, CB-SKID , CB-P KID )}: List of original key pairs of created users.
L2P K ={(ID, CB-P K ID )}: List of current public keys of created users.
The following oracles are used in the security definition. We use α ← β to denote
the algorithmic action of assigning the value β to α.
1. OCB−UserCreate : For a fresh input ID ∈ Γ, the oracle runs the algorithm CBSetKeyPair to generate a secret/public key pair (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ) ∈ SKCB ×
PKCB . It returns CB-P KID as the output. It sets CB-P K ID = CB-P KID , then
adds {(ID, CB-SKID , CB-P KID )} and {(ID, CB-P K ID )} to L1P K and L2P K ,
respectively. Otherwise, ID has already been created. The oracle browses ID
in L1P K and returns CB-P KID as the output. W.l.o.g., we assume that other
oracles defined later only respond to the identity which has been created.
2. OCB−PubKeyReplace : For a query (ID, CB-PK) ∈ Γ × PKCB , the challenger finds
the user ID in the list L2P K , sets CB-P K ID ← CB-PK and updates the corresponding pair with (ID, CB-P K ID ).
3. OCB−CertGen : For a query (ID, CB-PK), the challenger responds with an output
of CB-CertGen(CB-masterkey, CB-params, ID, CB-PK).
4. OCorruption : For a query ID, the challenger browses the list L1P K and outputs
the secret key CB-SKID . Note that the output of this oracle is always the
original secret key of the user ID.
5. OCB−Decrypt :
(a) OCB−NormalDecrypt : This oracle performs the decryption using ID’s original
secret key and the certificate of ID’s original public key.
For a query (ID, CB-cipher), the challenger browses the list L1P K to
obtain the corresponding secret/public key pair (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ).
Then, it runs CB-CertGen to obtain the certificate CertID of CB-P KID and
responds with the output of CB-Decrypt(CB-SKID , CertID , CB-cipher).
(b) OCB−StrongDecrypt : This oracle performs the decryption using the secret key
(provided by the adversary) and the certificate of a public key.
For a query (ID, CB-SKID , CB-cipher), the challenger first generates the
public key CB-P KID based on the secret key CB-SKID provided by the
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adversary. The challenger then runs the certificate generation algorithm
CB-CertGen to obtain the certificate CertID of CB-P KID and responds
with the output of CB-Decrypt(CB-SKID , CertID , CB-cipher).
(c) OCB−SuperDecrypt : This oracle performs the decryption using the secret key
and the certificate of a public key, where the public key is chosen by the
adversary.
For a query (ID, CB-PK, CB-cipher), the challenger runs the certificate
generation algorithm CB-CertGen to obtain the certificate CertID of CB-PK
and responds with the output of CB-Decrypt by taking (CB-SKID , CertID ,
CB-cipher) as the input. Here, CB-SKID is the secret key extracted by
the challenger from CB-PK.
In the random oracle model, adversaries are allowed to make requests to random
oracles. We will use the following two notations in the security definition.
(t, q)-adversary: A probabilistic adversary who can make up to q queries in polynomial time t.
Q 9 {O1 , O2 , · · · , On }: The query Q cannot appear as a request to any oracle
O ∈ {O1 , O2 , · · · , On }.

4.8

Security Models of Certificate-based Encryption

This section defines the potential adversaries on certificate-based encryption, which
are classified into Normal Adversary, Strong Adversary and Super Adversary. The
classification is inspired by the adversaries on certificate-based signature defined
in [WMSH09].

4.8.1

Security against Normal Type I Adversary

The essential attacking scenario of Normal Type I adversary (Normal-CB-AI ) is
that the adversary can obtain the decryptions of ciphertexts which are generated
using the target user’s original private key. This is formally defined as follows.
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Initial: The challenger runs the algorithm CB-Setup to generate CB-params and
CB-masterkey. A normal type I adversary CB-AI is given CB-params, and
CB-masterkey is kept secret by the challenger.
Queries-I: CB-AI can make queries to OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PubKeyReplace , OCB−CertGen ,
OCorruption and OCB−NormalDecrypt .
Challenge: CB-AI outputs an identity ID∗ and two messages m0 , m1 ∈ M. Here,
M is the valid message space specified in CB-params. Let CB-P K ID∗ be the
current public key of ID∗ on the list L2P K . (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ , m0 , m1 ) must
satisfy the following restrictions:
1. ID∗ 9 OCB−Corruption ;
2. (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen ; and
3. m0 and m1 are of equal length.
In response, the challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and outputs a cipher
text CB-cipher∗ =CB-Encrypt (mb , CB-params, ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ).
Queries-II: CB-AI continues making queries to the same oracles in Queries-I,
with restrictions that:
1. ID∗ 9 OCB−Corruption ;
2. (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen ; and
3. (ID∗ , CB-cipher∗ ) 9 OCB−NormalDecrypt if CB-P K ID∗ is the original public
key of ID∗ (i.e., the public key generated by OCB−CreateUser ).
Output: After all queries, the adversary CB-AI outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1} and
wins the game if b = b0 .
The success probability that a normal type I adaptive chosen ciphertext attacker
Normal-CB-AI has in the above game is Pr[b = b0 ].
Definition 4.1 (Security against Normal-CB-AI ) A certificate-based encryption scheme is (t, q, )-secure against a normal type I adversary if no (t, q)-adversary
can have success probability at least  + 1/2 in the above game.
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Security against Strong Type I Adversary

This subsection defines Strong-CB-AI who has the access to the oracle OCB−StrongEncrypt .
At the same time, Strong-CB-AI is allowed to corrupt the target user’s original secret
key. Apparently, Strong-CB-AI is more powerful than Normal-CB-AI . The security
of a certificate-based encryption scheme against Strong-CB-AI can be defined by
almost the same game in Section 4.8.1, with the differences that:
1. During Queries-I and Queries-II, the decryption oracle is changed to
OCB−StrongDecrypt .
2. The restrictions in Challenge are:
(a) (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen , and
(b) m0 and m1 are of equal length.
3. The restrictions in Queries-II are:
(a) (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen , and
(b) (ID∗ , ·, CB-cipher∗ ) 9 OCB−StrongDecrypt .
Similarly, the success probability that a strong type I adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacker Strong-CB-AI has in the above game is Pr[b = b0 ].
Definition 4.2 (Security against Strong-CB-AI ) A certificate-based encryption
scheme is (t, q, )-secure against a strong type I adversary if no (t, q)-adversary can
have success probability at least  + 1/2 in the above game.

4.8.3

Security against Super Type I Adversary

In this subsection, we boost the attack power of the adversary again and define the Super Type I adversary Super-CB-AI , who has the access to the oracle
OCB−SuperEncrypt . In other words, the adversary can issue decryption queries under
the public key of the adversary’s choice without providing the corresponding secret key. Obviously, Super-CB-AI is more powerful than Strong-CB-AI (and hence,
more powerful than Normal-CB-AI ). The security of a certificate-based encryption
scheme against a super type I adversary can be defined by almost the same game in
Section 4.8.1, with the differences that:
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1. During Queries-I and Queries-II, the decryption oracle is changed to
OCB−SuperDecrypt .
2. The restrictions in Challenge are:
(a) (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen , and
(b) m0 and m1 are of equal length.
3. The restrictions in Queries-II are:
(a) (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ ) 9 OCB−CertGen , and
(b) (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ , CB-cipher∗ ) 9 OCB−SuperDecrypt .
Similarly, the success probability that a super type I adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacker Strong-CB-AI has in the above game is Pr[b = b0 ].
Definition 4.3 (Security against Super-CB-AI ) A certificate-based encryption
scheme is (t, q, )-secure against a super type I adversary if no (t, q)-adversary can
have success probability at least  + 1/2 in the above game.

4.8.4

Security Against Type II Adversary

In certificate-based encryption, a type II adversary CB-AII simulates the certifier with the master secret key, and thus can produce certificates. As the type
I adversary, the type II adversary CB-AII can be classified into Normal-CB-AII ,
Strong-CB-AII and Super-CB-AII . Notice that CB-AII can decrypt any ciphertexts if it has the user’s secret key, and thus OCB−StrongSign becomes meaningless in
this case. Therefore, for a type II adversary CB-AII , it is sufficient to define two
types of adversaries, namely Normal-CB-AII and Super-CB-AII . Their definitions
are described as follows.
Initial: The challenger runs the algorithm CB-Setup and sends CB-AII the system
parameters CB-params and the master secret key CB-masterkey.
Queries-I: CB-AII can adaptively make requests to OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PubKeyReplace ,
OCB−Corruption and OCB−Decrypt ∈ {OCB−NormalDecrypt , OCB−SuperDecrypt }.
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Challenge: CB-AII outputs an identity ID∗ and two message m0 , m1 ∈ M of
equal length. Here, M denotes the message space. Let CB-P KID∗ be the
original public key of ID∗ on the list L1P K . The challenger chooses a random
b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with a cipher text CB-cipher∗ =CB-Encrypt (mb , CBparams, ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ ). The restriction is that ID∗ 9 OCB−Corruption .
Queries-II: CB-AII continues making queries to the same oracles in Queries-I,
with restrictions that:
1. ID∗ 9 OCB−Corruption ;
2. If OCB−Decrypt = OCB−NormalDecrypt , then (ID∗ , CB-cipher∗ ) 9 OCB−Decrypt ;
and
3. If OCB−Decrypt = OCB−SuperDecrypt , then (ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ , CB-cipher∗ ) 9
OCB−Decrypt , where CB-P KID∗ is ID∗ ’s original public key.
Output: After all queries, CB-AII outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game
if b = b0 .
The success probability that an adaptive chosen ciphertext attacker CB-Atype
II has in
the above game is Pr[b = b0 ], where type ∈ {normal, super}.
Definition 4.4 (Security against CB-AII ) A certificate-based encryption scheme
is (t, q, )-secure against a type II adversary if no (t, q)-adversary can have success
probability at least  + 1/2 in the above game.

4.8.5

Security Against Malicious−but−Passive Type II Adversary

This section defines a more powerful type II adversary, known as malicious-butpassive Type II adversary, who is allowed to generate the system parameter and
the master secret key. In other words, at the very beginning of the setup phase,
the third party certifier has already been malicious by generating the master secret
key, instead of being given the key pair by the challenger who actually generates the
key pair honestly. Such attacks were first introduced to certificateless cryptosystems
in [ACL+ 07]. However, as in [ACL+ 07], we assume that the certifier is passive, in
the sense that the certifier would not actively replace the target user’s public key
or corrupt the target user’s secret key, even though the certifier is malicious. The
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security model of certificate-based encryption in [Gen03] also captures the essence
of those attacks. The malicious-but-passive Type II adversary is defined as follows:
Initial: The challenger executes CB-AII on the security parameter 1k . AII returns
the system parameters CB-params.
Queries-I: CB-AII can adaptively make requests to OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PubKeyReplace ,
OCB−Corruption and OCB−Decrypt ∈ {OCB−NormalDecrypt , OCB−SuperDecrypt }. Since CBparams and CB-mpk are generated by AII , we need to modify the following
oracles:
• OCB−UserCreate : As defined in Section 4.8, this oracle receives an input
ID ∈ Γ and outputs the public key CB-P KID . After obtaining CB-P KID ,
a malicious-but-passive Type II adversary must provide ID’s certificate
CertID for (ID, CB-P KID ). This oracle then adds (ID, CB-SKID , CBP KID , CertID ) to L1P K and (ID, CB-P KID , CertID ) to L2P K respectively.
• OCB−PKReplace : For a malicious-but-passive Type II adversary, the input to
this oracle should be (ID, CB-PK, CertID ) where CertID is the corresponding
certificate of CB-PK under the identity ID. This oracle searches L2P K ,
finds a tuple containing ID and replaces that tuple with (ID, CB-PK,
CertID ).
• OCB−SuperDecrypt : For a malicious-but-passive Type II adversary, the input
to this oracle should be (ID, CB-PK, CertID , CB-cipher) where CertID is
the corresponding certificate of CB-PK under the identity ID.
Challenge, Queries-II and Output: Same as those defined in Sec. 4.8.4.
The success probability that a malicious but passive CB-Atype
II has in the above game
is Pr[b = b0 ], where type ∈ {normal, super}.
Definition 4.5 (Security against Malicious but Passive CB-AII ) A certificatebased encryption scheme is (t, q, )-secure against a malicious but passive type II
adversary if no (t, q)-adversary can have success probability at least  + 1/2 in the
above game.
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Generic Construction of Certificate-based Encryption

In this section, we show how to convert a certificateless encryption scheme (CLE)
into a certificate-based encryption scheme CBE. In our construction, we employ a
hash function H : Γ × PKCB → IDCL , where Γ is the identity information space
in the certificate-based system, PKCB is the public key space in certificate-based
system and IDCL denotes the space of identities in the certificateless cryptosystem.

4.9.1

Syntax of Certificateless Encryption

First we will briefly review the algorithms used in the certificateless encryption. A
certificateless encryption (CLE) scheme is defined by following algorithms. In order
to distinguish from the identity information in the certificate-based system (which
is denoted as ID), we use the notion ID to denote the identity information in the
certificateless system. For other information, we put the prefix “CL-” to specify
that this is in the certificateless system. The description of each algorithm is as
follows, which are slimilar as those described in [Den08].
1. CL-Setup(1k ) →(CL-masterkey, CL-params).
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1k and returns the master
key CL-masterkey and a parameter CL-params. Here, CL-params is shared
in the system, and includes the identity information space IDCL , the set of
valid secret values S CL and the set of valid public key values PKCL , etc.
2. CL-PartialPrivateKeyExtract(CL-masterkey, CL-params, ID) → CL-P P K ID .
This algorithm takes as input the master key CL-masterkey, the system parameter CL-params and the user’s identity information ID ∈ IDCL . The
output is the partial private key CL-P P K ID , which will be secretly sent to
the user.
3. CL-SetSecretValue(CL-params) → CL-SVID .
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter CL-params. It outputs
a secret value CL-SVID ∈ S CL .
4. CL-SetPrivateKey(CL-params, CL-P P K ID , CL-SVID ) → CL-SKID .
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This algorithm takes as input the system parameter CL-params, user’s partial
private key CL-P P K and secret value CL-SVID . It outputs the private key
CL-SKID of the user.
5. CL-SetPublicKey(CL-params, CL-SVID ) → CL-P KID .
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter CL-params and the user
ID’s secret value CL-SVID ∈ S CL . It outputs the public key CL-P KID ∈
PKCL .
6. CL-Encrypt(m, CL-params, ID, CL-P KID ) → CL-cipher.
This algorithm takes as input the message m to be encrypted, system parameter CL-params, an identity ID and its public key CL-P KID ∈ PKCL . It
outputs a ciphertext CL-cipher.
7. CL-Decrypt(CL-params, CL-SKID , CL-cipher) → {m, ⊥}.
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter CL-params, a private key
CL-SKID and a ciphertext CL-cipher. It outputs a message m or a symbol
⊥ indicating a decryption failure.
Correctness. Ciphertexts generated by the algorithm CL-Encrypt can be correctly
decrypted using CL-Decrypt: For any CL-cipher=CL-Encrypt(m, CL-params, ID,
CL-P KID ), Pr[CL-Decrypt(CL-params, CL-SKID , CL-cipher)=m]=1.
Remark 4.7 It is suggested in [ARP05] that a Set-User-Keys algorithm can be defined to replace both CL-SetSecretValue and CL-SetPublicKey algorithms together.
Clearly a certificateless encryption scheme proposed in the original way can also be
proposed in that new form.

4.9.2

Generic Construction: CLE-2-CBE

Our generic construction can be described as follows:
1. CB-Setup(1k ) → (CB-masterkey, CB-params).
(a) Run algorithm CL-Setup(1k ) of CLE to obtain CL-params and CL-masterkey;
(b) Set CB-params by extending CL-params to include the description of
Γ;
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(c) CB-masterkey← CL-masterkey.
2. CB-SetKeyPair(CB-params) → (CB-SKID , CB-P KID ).
(a) CL-masterkey ← CB-masterkey;
(b) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(c) CB-SKID ← CL-SetSecretValue(CL-params);
(d) CB-P KID ← CL-SetPublicKey(CL-params, CL-SVID ).
3. CB-CertGen(CB-masterkey, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID )→ CertID .
(a) CL-masterkey← CB-masterkey;
(b) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(c) H(ID, CB-P KID )→ ID ∈ IDCL ;
(d) CertID ← CL-PartialPrivateKeyExtract(CL-masterkey, CL-params, ID).
4. CB-Encrypt(m, CB-params, ID, CB-P KID ) → CB-cipher.
(a) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(b) H(ID, CB-P KID )→ ID ∈ IDCL ;
(c) CL-P K ID ← CB-P KID ;
(d) CB-cipher ←CL-Encrypt(m, CL-params, ID, CL-P KID ).
5. CB-Decrypt(CB-params, CB-SKID , CertID , CB-C) → {m, ⊥}.
(a) Extract CL-params from CB-params;
(b) CL-SVID ← CB-SKID ; CL-P P K ID ← CertID ;
(c) CL-SKID ← CL-SetPrivateKey(CL-params, CL-P P K ID , CL-SVID );
(d) CL-cipher ← CB-C;
(e) Output CL-Decrypt(CL-params, CL-SKID , CL-cipher).
The correctness of the proposed scheme CLE-2-CBE is ensured by the underlying
CLE.
Security Analysis

4.9. Generic Construction of Certificate-based Encryption

95

Theorem 4.9 [Security of CLE-2-CBE] CLE-2-CBE is secure (in the random oracle
model) against adversaries defined in Section 4.8, assuming the underlying certificateless encryption scheme CLS satisfying certain security requirements.
The proof of Theorem 4.9 consists of several lemmas, which demonstrate the security relationship between our generic construction CLE-2-CBE and its underlying
certificateless encryption scheme CLE. Please refer to [Den08] for security definitions
of CLE.
Lemma 4.10 (Security against Normal-CB-AI ) CLE-2-CBE is secure (in the
random oracle model) against Normal-CB-AI defined in Section 4.8.1, if CLE is
secure against Normal-CL-AI defined in [Den08].
Proof: In the proof, we will regard hash function H as the random oracle and show
that if there is a Normal-CB-AI who can distinguish a ciphertext of CLE-2-CBE with
non-negligible probability greater than 1/2, then there exists a CL-AI who can use
Normal-CB-AI to distinguish a ciphertext of CLE with almost the same probability
in the game of Weak Type Ib security defined in [Den08].
During the simulation, CL-AI acts as the challenger of Normal-CB-AI . Let CLChallenger be the challenger of CL-AI , who can adaptively make queries to several
oracles defined in [Den08]. Please refer to [Den08] for the formal definition of those
oracles.
• OCL−UserCreate : create users in the scenario of certificateless encryption.
• OCL−PKReplace : replace public keys of created users with the value chosen by
the adversary.
• OSV−Extract : return secret values of created users.
• OCL−PPKExtract : return partial private keys of created users.
• OCL−NormalDecrypt : return the decryption of a ciphertext using the original private key of a created user.
Please refer to [Den08] for the formal definition of each oracle.
Initial: The CL-Challenger runs the algorithm CL-Setup of CLE and feeds the CL-AI
with CL-params. CL-AI then returns CB-params to Normal-CB-AI where CBparams is defined by extending CL-params to include the description of Γ. Before
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Normal-CB-AI makes any queries, CL-AI asks CL-Challenger to create quc users in
the certificateless cryptosystem. Here quc is the number of queries Normal-CB-AI
issues to OCB−UserCreate . CL-AI then records the information as (IDi , CL-P KIDi ),
i = 1, 2, · · · , quc in the list CLP K . Here IDi ∈ IDCL and CL-P KIDi is the original
public key of IDi in certificateless encryption.
Queries-I: As defined in Section 4.8.1, Normal-CB-AI can issue queries to different
oracles. Below we show how Normal-CL-AI can answer these queries.
• RO: In the proof, the hash function H is viewed as the random oracle RO. For
a fresh input (ID,CB-PK) ∈ Γ × PKCB , the output of RO is a random element
ID in IDCL . Normal-CL-AI maintains a list LRO consisting of (ID,CB-PK,ID).
• OCB−UserCreate : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can request to create the user IDi ∈
Γ and expect to obtain IDi ’s public key CB-P KIDi . In response to such queries:
1. For the ith fresh query IDi , Normal-CL-AI first checks the list CLP K
and finds the ith pair (IDi , CL-P KIDi ). Normal-CL-AI then sets CBP KIDi ← CL-P KIDi , H(IDi , CB-P KIDi ) = IDi and adds (IDi , CBP KIDi , IDi ) into LRO . If (IDi , CB-P KIDi ) already appears in LRO , then
the simulation fails and Normal-CL-AI aborts. This, however, occurs only
with negligible probability as |PKCL | is assumed to be greater than 2k
and k is the security parameter. Otherwise, it adds (IDi , ⊥, CB-P KIDi )
into the list L1P K . Meanwhile, it sets CB-P K IDi ← CB-P KIDi and
adds (IDi , CB-P K IDi ) into list L2P K . Here, the notation ⊥ means that
Normal-CL-AI does not know the corresponding secret key CB-SKIDi .
2. In addition to maintain L1P K , L2P K , Normal-CL-AI will keep two additional lists L1ID and L2ID which will help it answer queries from NormalCB-AI . L1ID consists of pairs with the form (IDi , IDi ) where IDi ∈ Γ and
IDi ∈ IDCL . This list will help Normal-CL-AI answer Normal-CB-AI ’s
corruption queries and simulate OCB−NormalDecrypt . L2ID consists of pairs
with the form (IDi , IDi ) where IDi ∈ Γ and IDi ∈ IDCL . In different
phases, IDi could be the identity IDi in the list L1P K , or the identity
IDi0 ∈ IDCL created at some time later.
For a user IDi created in this oracle, Normal-CL-AI will add (IDi , IDi ) into
list L1ID , where IDi ∈ IDCL is IDi ’s corresponding identity in the list
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CLP K . Meanwhile, Normal-CL-AI sets IDi ← IDi and adds (IDi , IDi )
into list L2ID .
• OCB−PKReplace : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can replace a public key of a created
user ID with the public key CB-PK chosen by himself. In response, Normal$

CL-AI first sets CB-P K ID ← CB-PK, then
1. Normal-CL-AI browses the list L2P K and rewrites the related pair as (ID,
CB-P K ID ). It then browses LRO .
2. If (ID, CB-P K ID ) appears in LRO in the tuple (ID, CB-P K ID , ID),
Normal-CL-AI will make a user-create query ID to CL-Challenger if ID
has not been created in the certificateless system. After that, Normal-CLAI replaces ID’s certificateless public key with CB-P K ID and updates
the corresponding pair in CLP K with (ID, CB-P K ID ). Finally, NormalCL-AI browses the list L2ID and updates the related pair with (ID, ID).
3. Otherwise, Normal-CL-AI sets H(ID, CB-P K ID )=ID, which is randomly
chosen in IDCL . It then adds (ID, CB-P K ID , ID) into LRO . After that,
Normal-CL-AI asks CL-Challenger to create the user ID. After creating
the identity ID, Normal-CL-AI replaces ID’s public key with CB-P K ID .
Normal-CL-AI then updates CLP K by adding (ID, CB-P K ID ). Finally,
Normal-CL-AI browses the list L2ID and updates the related pair with
(ID, ID).
• OCB−Corruption : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can request the secret key of a
created user IDi . Normal-CL-AI responds as follows:
1. Check the list L1ID and finds (IDi , IDi );
2. Make a SV-Extract request IDi to CL-Challenger who will return CLSVIDi to Normal-CL-AI . Here, CL-SVIDi is the secret value of IDi when
it was created in the certificateless system.
3. Set CB-SKIDi ← CL-SVIDi , return it to Normal-CB-AI and update the
information in the list L1P K as (IDi , CB-SKIDi , CB-P KIDi ).
Correctness: This oracle should return the user IDi ’s original secret key CBSKIDi when the user was created. Recall that L1ID contains pairs (IDi , IDi )
i = 1, 2, · · · , quc , where IDi ∈ IDCL is the IDi ’s initial corresponding identity
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in certificateless system. Meanwhile IDi has been set as H(IDi ,CB-P KIDi )
and CL-P KIDi =CB-P KIDi which is the original public key of IDi . Thus the
secret value CL-SVIDi of IDi in certificateless system is the same as the secret
key CB-SKIDi of IDi in certificate-based system.
• OCB−CertGen : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can request the certificate of (ID,
CB-PK) where CB-PK is chosen by the adversary itself. Normal-CL-AI will try
to find an identity ID ∈ IDCL , whose partial private key is ID’s certificate
under the public key CB-PK. To achieve that, Normal-CL-AI will check LRO :
1. If (ID, CB-PK) appears in LRO in the tuple (ID, CB-PK, ID), Normal-CLAI will make a user-create query ID to CL-Challenger if ID has not been
created in certificateless system.
2. Otherwise, Normal-CL-AI sets H(ID,CB-PK)=ID, which is randomly chosen in IDCL . It then adds (ID, CB-PK, ID) into LRO . After that, NormalCL-AI asks CL-Challenger to create the user ID.
For either case, Normal-CL-AI issues the partial private key query ID to CLChallenger who will return the partial private key CL-P P KID . At last, NormalCL-AI sets CertID ← CL-P P KID and returns it to Normal-CB-AI .
• OCB−NormalDecrypt : At any time, Normal-CB-AI can request the decryption of
(IDi , CB-cipher). The Normal-CL-AI first finds the pair (IDi , IDi ) in the list
L1ID and sets CL-cipher ← CB-cipher. Then, Normal-CL-AI issues a certificateless decryption query to CL-Challenger (IDi , CL-cipher). As defined,
Normal-CL-AI will obtain the message mi such that mi = CL-Decrypt(CLparams, CL-SKIDi , CL-cipher). Normal-CB-AI will return mi as its answer.
Correctness: Note that for the pair (IDi , IDi ) in L1ID , IDi is set as H(IDi ,
CB-P KIDi ) and CB-P KIDi = CL-P KIDi . Here, CB-P KIDi is IDi ’s original
public key in the list L1P K , and the corresponding secret key is CB-SKIDi ,
which is the same as the secret value CL-SVIDi in the certificateless system.
In addition, CertIDi equals the partial private key CL-P P KIDi in the certificateless system. Therefore, mi =CB-Decrypt(CB-params, CB-SKIDi , CertIDi ,
CB-cipher).
Challenge: Normal-CB-AI outputs an identity ID∗ and two messages m0 , m1 ∈ M.
Here, M is the valid message space specified in CB-params. Let CB-P K ID∗ be the
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current public key of ID∗ on the list L2P K . In response, CL-AI finds ID∗ on L2ID
and sets (ID∗ , m0 , m1 ) as a challenge to CL-Challenger, who will return a ciphertext
CL-cipher∗ . CL-AI sets CB-cipher∗ ← CL-cipher∗ and sends it to Normal-CB-AI .
Queries-II: CB-AI continues making queries to the same oracles in Queries-I, with
restrictions described in Section 4.8.1.
Output: After all queries, the adversary Normal-CB-AI outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}
and wins the game if b = b0 .
If Normal-CL-AI does not fail in the simulation, it can output b0 as its own output
and wins the game with the same success probability as Normal-CB-AI . Considering
that Normal-CL-AI could only fail in simulating H as the random oracle, which only
occurs with negligible probability qU C /2k (qU C is the number of user-create queries).
Thus, Normal-CL-AI wins the game with almost the same probability as Normal-CBAI . This completes the proof of Lemma 4.10.
Lemma 4.11 (Security against Strong-CB-AI ) CLE-2-CBE is secure (in the random oracle model) against Strong-CB-AI defined in Section 4.8.2, if CLE is secure
against Strong-CL-AI defined in [Den08].
Proof: In the proof, we will regard hash function H as the random oracle and show
that if there is a Strong-CB-AI who can distinguish a ciphertext of CLE-2-CBE with
non-negligible probability greater than 1/2, then there exists a Strong-CL-AI who
can use Strong-CB-AI to distinguish a ciphertext of CLE with almost the same
probability.
In the following proof, Strong-CL-AI acts as the challenger of Strong-CB-AI ,
and can issue requests to its own challenger CL-Challenger.
Initial: Same as the proof of Lemma 4.10.
Queries-I: As defined in Section 4.8.2, Strong-CB-AI can issue queries to following
oracles. We show how Strong-CL-AI can answer these queries.
• RO, OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PKReplace , OCB−Corruption , OCB−CertGen : These oracles
are simulated by Strong-CL-AI in the same way as described in the proof of
Lemma 4.10.
• OCB−StrongDecrypt : At any time, Strong-CB-AI can request the decryption of
(IDi , CB-SKIDi , CB-cipher). Strong-CL-AI first generates CB-P KIDi from
CB-SKIDi , and lets IDi = H(IDi , CB-P KIDi ). Strong-CL-AI then asks CLChallenger to create the user IDi in certificateless cryptosystem. After that,
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Strong-CL-AI sets CL-SVIDi ← CB-SKIDi and CL-cipher ← CB-cipher,
and issues a certificateless decryption query (IDi , CL-SVIDi , CL-cipher) to
CL-Challenger. Strong-CL-AI will return CL-Challenger’s response to StrongCB-AI .
Challenge: Strong-CB-AI outputs an identity ID∗ and two messages m0 , m1 ∈ M.
Here, M is the valid message space specified in CB-params. Let CB-P K ID∗ be the
current public key of ID∗ on the list L2P K . (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ , m0 , m1 ) satisfies the
restrictions described in Section 4.8.2. Strong-CL-AI browses L2ID and finds ID∗ ,
then sets (ID∗ , m0 , m1 ) as a challenge to CL-Challenger, who picks b ∈ {0, 1} and
returns CL-cipher∗ = CL-Encrypt(ID∗ , CL − P K ID∗ )(Mb ). At last, Strong-CL-AI
sets CB-cipher∗ ← CL-Cipher∗ , and returns it to Strong-CB-AI .
Queries-II: CB-AI continues making queries to the same oracles in Queries-I, with
restrictions described in Section 4.8.2.
Output: After all queries, the adversary Strong-CB-AI outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}
and wins the game if b = b0 .
If Strong-CL-AI does not fail in the simulation, it can output the b0 as its own
output and wins the game with the same success probability as Strong-CB-AI .
Considering that Strong-CL-AI could only fail in simulating H as the random oracle, which only occurs with negligible probability qU C /2k (qU C is the number of
user-create queries). Thus, Strong-CL-AI wins the game with almost the same
probability as Strong-CB-AI . This completes the proof of Lemma 4.11.
Lemma 4.12 (Security against Super-CB-AI ) CLE-2-CBE is secure (in the random oracle model) against Super-CB-AI defined in Section 4.8.3, if CLE is secure
against Super-CL-AI defined in [Den08].
Proof:

In the proof, we will regard hash function H as the random oracle and

show that if there is a Super-CB-AI who can distinguish a ciphertext of CLE-2-CBE
with non-negligible probability greater than 1/2, then there exists a Super-CL-AI
who can use Super-CB-AI to distinguish a ciphertext of CLE with almost the same
probability.
In the following proof, Super-CL-AI acts as the challenger of Super-CB-AI , and
can issue requests to its own challenger CL-Challenger.
Initial: Same as the proof of Lemma 4.10.
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Queries-I: As defined in Section 4.8.3, Super-CB-AI can issue queries to following
oracles. We show how Super-CL-AI can answer these queries.
• RO, OCB−UserCreate , OCB−PKReplace , OCB−Corruption , OCB−CertGen : These oracles
are simulated by Super-CL-AI in the same way as described in the proof of
Lemma 4.10.
• OCB−SuperDecrypt : At any time, Super-CB-AI can request the signature of (IDi ,
CB-P KIDi ), CB-cipher). Super-CL-AI first lets IDi = H(IDi , CB-P KIDi ).
Super-CL-AI and sets CL-P KIDi ← CB-P KIDi then asks CL-Challenger to
create the user IDi in certificateless cryptosystem. After that, Super-CL-AI
issues a certificateless decryption query (IDi , CL-cipher) to CL-Challenger.
Super-CL-AI will return CL-Challenger’s response to Super-CB-AI .
Challenge: Super-CB-AI outputs an identity ID∗ and two messages m0 , m1 ∈ M.
Here, M is the valid message space specified in CB-params. Let CB-P K ID∗ be the
current public key of ID∗ on the list L2P K . (ID∗ , CB-P K ID∗ , m0 , m1 ) satisfies the
restrictions described in Section 4.8.3.
Super-CL-AI browses L2ID and finds ID∗ , then sets (ID∗ , m0 , m1 ) as a challenge
to CL-Challenger, who picks b ∈ {0, 1} and returns CL-cipher∗ . After that, SuperCL-AI sets CB-cipher∗ ← CL-cipher∗ , and returns it to Super-CB-AI .
Queries-II: Super-CB-AI continues making queries to the same oracles in QueriesI, with restrictions described in Section 4.8.3.
Output: After all queries, the adversary Super-CB-AI outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}
and wins the game if b = b0 .
If Super-CL-AI does not fail in the simulation, it can output the b0 as its own
output and wins the game with the same success probability as Super-CB-AI . Considering that Super-CL-AI could only fail in simulating H as the random oracle,
which only occurs with negligible probability qU C /2k (qU C is the number of usercreate queries). Thus, Super-CL-AI wins the game with almost the same probability
as Super-CB-AI . This completes the proof of Lemma 4.12.
Lemma 4.13 (Security against CB-AII ) CLE-2-CBE is secure (in the random
oracle model) against type II adversary CB-AII defined in Section 4.8.4, if CLE is
secure against CL-AII .
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In the proof, we will regard hash function H as the random oracle and

show that if there is a CB-AII who can distinguish a ciphertext of CLE-2-CBE with
non-negligible probability greater than 1/2, then there exists a CL-AII who can use
CB-AII to distinguish a ciphertext of CLE with almost the same probability.
In the following proof, CB-AII against the underlying CLE acts as the challenger
of a CB-AII , and can issue requests to its own challenger CL-Challenger.
Initial: The CL-Challenger runs the algorithm CL-Setup of CLE and feeds the CLAII with CL-msk and CL-params. CL-AII then return CB-masterkey and CBparams to CB-AII where CB-masterkey is defined to be CL-msk and CB-params
is defined by extending CL-params to include the description of Γ. Before CB-AII
submits any queries, CL-AII asks CL-Challenger to create quc users in the certificateless cryptosystem. Here quc is the number of queries CB-AII issues to OCB−UserCreate .
CL-AII then records the information as (IDi , CL-P KIDi ), i = 1, 2, · · · , quc in the
list CLP K . Here IDi ∈ IDCL , CL-P KIDi is the original public key of IDi in certificateless system.
Queries-I: As defined in Section 4.8.4, CB-AII can issue queries to RO, OCB−UserCreate ,
OCB−PKReplace , OCB−Corruption , OCB−NormalDecrypt (or, OCB−SuperDecrypt ). These oracles are
simulated by CL-AII in the same way as described in the proof of the security against
Type I adversary in Lemma 4.10.
Challenge: CB-AII outputs an identity ID∗ and two messages m0 , m1 ∈ M. Here,
M is the valid message space specified in CB-params. Let CB-P KID∗ be the
original public key of ID∗ on the list L1P K . (ID∗ , CB-P KID∗ , m0 , m1 ) satisfies the
restrictions described in Section 4.8.4. CL-AII browses L1ID and finds ID∗ , then
sets (ID∗ , m0 , m1 ) as a challenge to CL-Challenger, who picks b ∈ {0, 1} and returns
CL-cipher∗ = CL − Encrypt(ID∗ ,CL−P KID∗ ) (Mb ). At last, CL-AII sets CB-cipher∗ ←
CL-cipher∗ , and returns it to CB-AII .
Queries-II: CB-AII continues making queries to the same oracles in Queries-I,
with restrictions described in Section 4.8.4.
Output: After all queries, the adversary CB-AII outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1} and
wins the game if b = b0 .
If CL-AII does not fail in the simulation, it can output the b0 as its own output
and wins the game with the same success probability as CB-AII . Considering that
CL-AII could only fail in simulating H as the random oracle, which only happens
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with negligible probability qU C /2k (qU C is the number of user-create queries). Thus,
CL-AII wins the game with almost the same probability as CB-AII . This completes
the proof of Lemma 4.13.
Lemma 4.14 (Security against Malicious-but-passive CB-AII ) CLE-2-CBE
is secure (in the random oracle model) against type II adversary CB-AII defined in
Section 4.8.5, if CLE is secure against CL-AII .
Proof: In the proof, we will regard hash function H as the random oracle and show
that if there is a Malicious-but-passive-CB-AII who can distinguish a ciphertext
of CLE-2-CBE with non-negligible probability, then there exists a Malicious-butpassive-CL-AII who can use Malicious-but-passive-CB-AII to distinguish a ciphertext of CLE with almost the same probability.
In the following proof, Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII against the underlying CLE
will act as the challenger of a Malicious-but-passive-CB-AII , and can issue requests
to its own challenger CL-Challenger.
Initial: Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII executes Malicious-but-passive-CB-AII on
the security parameter 1k , who returns CB-params to Malicious-but-passive-CLAII . Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII then extracts CL-params from CB-params and
sends it to its own challenger CL-Challenger.
Queries: As defined in Section 4.8.5, CB-AII can issue queries to following oracles.
We show how Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII can answer these queries:
• RO: In the proof, the hash function H is viewed as the random oracle RO. For
a fresh input (ID,CB-PK) ∈ Γ × PKCB , the output of RO is a random element
ID in IDCL . Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII maintains a list LRO consisting
of (ID,CB-PK,ID).
• OCB−UserCreate : At any time Malicious-but-passive-CB-AII can request to create
the user IDi ∈ Γ and expect to obtain IDi ’s public key CB-P KIDi . To response:
1. For the ith fresh query IDi , Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII will choose a
random identity IDi ∈ IDCL and ask CL-Challenger to create IDi in the
certificateless system. After obtaining IDi ’s certificateless public key CLP KIDi , Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII will set CB-P KIDi ← CL-P KIDi ,
H(IDi , CB-P KIDi ) = IDi and adds (IDi , CB-P KIDi , IDi ) into LRO . If
(IDi , CB-P KIDi ) already appears in LRO , then the simulation fails and

4.9. Generic Construction of Certificate-based Encryption

104

Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII aborts. This, however, happens only with
negligible probability as |PKCL | is assumed to be greater than 2k . (Recall
that k is system security parameter.) Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII then
sends CB-P KIDi to Malicious-but-passive-CB-AII .
2. After obtaining CB-P KIDi , Malicious-but-passive-CB-AII must calculate the corresponding certificate CertIDi and return it to Malicious-butpassive-CL-AII , who will forward CertIDi to CL-Challenger as the partial
private key of IDi in certificateless system. Malicious-but-passive-CLAII then adds (IDi , ⊥, CB-P KIDi , CertIDi ) into the list L1P K . Here, the
notation ⊥ means that Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII does not know the
corresponding secret key CB-SKIDi . Meanwhile, Malicious-but-passiveCL-AII sets CB-P K IDi ← CB-P KIDi and adds (IDi , CB-P K IDi , CertIDi )
into list L2P K .
3. In addition to maintain L1P K , L2P K , Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII will
keep two additional lists L1ID and L2ID , which are the same as those in
the proof of Lemma 4.10.
For a user IDi created in this oracle, Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII will
add (IDi , IDi ) into list L1ID , where IDi ∈ IDCL is the IDi ’s corresponding
identity in the list CLP K . Meanwhile, Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII sets
IDi ← IDi and adds (IDi , IDi ) into list L2ID .
• OCB−PKReplace : At any time Malicious-but-passive-CB-AII can replace a public
0
key of a created user ID with the public key CB-P KID
chosen by himself. At

the same time, Malicious-but-passive-CB-AII must provide the corresponding
0
certificate Cert0ID of CB-P KID
. In response, Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII
0
first sets CB-P K ID ← CB-P KID
, then

1. Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII browses the list L2P K and rewrites the related tuple as (ID,CB-P K ID , Cert0ID ).
2. If (ID, CB-P K ID ) appears in LRO in the tuple (ID, CB-P K ID , ID),
Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII will make a user-create query ID to CLChallenger if ID has not been created in the certificateless system. After
that, Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII replaces ID’s certificateless public
key with CB-P K ID and updates the related pair in L2ID with (ID, ID).
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3. Otherwise, Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII sets H(ID,CB-P K ID )=ID, which
is randomly chosen in IDCL . It then adds (ID, CB-P K ID , ID) into
LRO and asks CL-Challenger to create the user ID. After creating ID,
Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII replaces ID’s public key with CB-P K ID
and updates the related pair in L2ID with (ID, ID).
• OCB−Corruption and OCB−NormalDecrypt : These two are simulated by Malicious-butpassive-CL-AII as same as described in the proof of Lemma 4.10.
• OCB−SuperDecrypt : This is simulated by Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII as same
as described in the proof of Lemma 4.12.
Challenge, Queries-II, Output: Same as those described in the proof of
Lemma 4.13.
If Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII does not fail in the simulation, it can output b0
as its own output and wins the game with the same success probability as Maliciousbut-passive-CB-AII . Considering that Malicious-but-passive-CL-AII could only fail
in simulating H as the random oracle, which only occurs with negligible probability
qU C /2k (qU C is the number of user-create queries). Thus, Malicious-but-passive-CLAII wins the game with almost the same probability as Malicious-but-passive-CBAII . This completes the proof of Lemma 4.14.

4.10

A Concrete Example of CLE-2-CBE

To demonstrate the application of the generic construction, this section describes a
concrete certificate-based encryption scheme from a certificateless encryption scheme
proposed in [DLP08]. Please refer to Section 2.1 for the bilinear groups and the
complexity assumptions we use in the scheme.

4.10.1

A Concrete Scheme

The scheme described in this section is based on the certificateless encryption scheme
in Section 4.2 of [DLP08]. It consists of following algorithms.
• CB-Setup: Let (G1 , GT ) be bilinear groups where |G1 | = |GT | = p, for some
prime number p ≥ 2k , where k is the system security number. Let g be a
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generator for G1 . Set g1 = g γ , for a random γ ∈ ZZ∗p , and pick a group element
g2 ∈ G1 and vectors (u0 , u1 , · · · , un ), (v 0 , v1 , · · · , vn ) from Gn+1
. Define two
1
functions:

Fu (ID) = u

0

n
Y

i
ujj

and Fv (w) = v

i=1

0

n
Y

w

vj j ,

i=1

where ID = i1 i2 · · · in and w = w1 w2 · · · wn . Let H0 : Γ × G1 × G → ID,
where Γ is the set of identity information in the certificate-based system and
ID = {0, 1}∗ is the identity space in the certificateless cryptosystem. Select a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n . The system
paramteter CB-params = (G1 , GT , g, e, p, g1 , g2 , u0 , u1 , · · · , un , v 0 , v1 , · · · , vn )
and the master secret key CB-masterkey is g2γ .
• CB-SetKeyPair: The user ID chooses a random number xID ∈ ZZ∗p , sets xID as the
private key CB-SKID and calculates the public key CB-P KID = (XID , YID ) =
(g xID , g1xID ). Here the valid secret key and public key value spaces are SKCB =
ZZ∗p and PKCB = {(X, Y ) ∈ G1 × G1 : e(X, g1 ) = e(g, Y )}, respectively.
• CB-CertGen: Given a user’s identity information ID and the public key CBˆ = H0 (ID, XID , YID ) and computes CertID =
P KID = (XID , YID ), the certifier sets ID
ˆ g r ).
(cert1 , cert2 ) = (g2γ · Fu (ID),
• CB-Encrypt: To encrypt a message m ∈ M for an entity ID and the public key
CB-P KID = (XID , YID ), perform the following steps:
– Check e(XID , g1 ) = e(g, YID ) holds.
ˆ = H0 (ID, XID , YID ).
– Set ID
– Choose s ∈ ZZ∗p and compute CB-cipher = (c0 , c1 , c2 , c3 ) = (m·e(YID , g2 )s , g s ,
ˆ CB-P KID ).
Fu (ID)s , Fv (w)s ), where w = H(c0 , c1 , c2 , ID,
• CB-Decrypt: For a ciphertext CB-cipher = (c0 , c1 , c2 , c3 ) ∈ C where C is the
ciphertext space, perform the following steps:
ˆ = H0 (ID, XID , YID ).
– Set ID
0

ˆ r , certxID ·
– Choose r0 ∈ ZZ∗p and compute SID = (S1 , S2 ) = (certx1 ID · Fu (ID)
2
γxID
r0
t t
0
ˆ
g ) = (g
· Fu (ID) , g ), where t = rxID + r .
2
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ˆ · Fv (w)) = e(g, c2 · c3 ), where w = H(c0 , c1 , c2 , ID,CBˆ
– Check e(c1 , Fu (ID)
P KID ). Reject if the equation does not hold. Otherwise, return
m = c0 ·

e(c2 , S2 )
.
e(c1 , S1 )

Theorem 4.15 (Security of the Concrete Scheme) The above scheme is secure (in the random oracle model) against Super-CB-AI and Super-CB-AII adaptive
chosen message and chosen identity attacks, assuming that 3-DDH problem is hard
in G.
Proof: The correctness of this theorem is due to Theorem 4.9 and that the underlying certificateless encryption scheme is provably secure (in the standard model)
against Super-CB-AI and Super-CB-AII if 3-DDH problem is hard in G1 [Gen03].
Remark 4.8 Notice that the underlying CLE scheme [DLP08] is secure under the
standard model, but after the conversion the CBE scheme is secure in the random
oracle model. This is because the proposed generic construction is only proven secure
in the random oracle model. Nevertheless, the resulting CBE scheme retains the
merits of the underlying CLE scheme, namely secure against Super Type I and Type
II adversaries.

4.11

Conclusion

Certificateless public key cryptography and certificate-based public key cryptography are two newly proposed public key cryptogysytems, both of which have a
third party. This chapter described how to convert certificateless signature schemes
(resp. certificateless encryption schemes) to certificate-based signature schemes
(resp. certificate-based encryption schemes). We defined several new types of adversaries, and gave new security models of certificate-based signatures and certificatebased encryption. Our generic constructions of certificate-based signatures and
certificate-based encryption are provably secure (in the random oracle model) under the security models defined in this chapter, if the underlying building blocks
satisfy certain security requirements. We also showed that one can obtain efficient
certificate-based signature/encryption schemes from certificateless signature/encryption
schemes, by giving several concrete instances of our generic constructions. This
would save the effort on the design of those schemes in certificate-based public key
cryptography.

Chapter 5
Optimistic Fair Exchange with Strong
Resolution-Ambiguity
Optimistic fair exchange makes use of a third party called arbitrator to ensure
fairness in the exchange. The arbitrator does not need to be always online; instead, it
only gets involved if something goes wrong (e.g., one party attempts to cheat or other
faults occur). Recent research has shown that an optimistic fair exchange protocol
secure in the single-user setting may be insecure in the multi-user setting. This
chapter gives a sufficient condition for single-user secure optimistic fair exchange
protocols remaining secure in the multi-user setting. The result of this chapter was
presented at PKC 2010 [HMS+ 10].

5.1

Introduction

In a fair exchange protocol, two parties can exchange their items in a fair way so
that no one can gain any advantage in the process. A simple way to realize fair
exchange is to introduce an online trusted third party who acts as a mediator: each
party sends the item to the trusted third party, who upon verifying the correctness
of both items, forwards each item to the other party. A drawback of this approach is
that the trusted third party is always involved in the exchange even if both parties
are honest and no fault occurs. In practice, the trusted third party could become a
bottleneck of the system and is vulnerable to the denial-of-service attack.
OFE (also known as off-line fair exchange) was introduced by Asokan, Schunter
and Waidner in [ASW97]. An OFE protocol also needs a third party called “arbitrator”, who is not required to be online all the time. Instead, the arbitrator only
gets invoked when something goes wrong (e.g., one party attempts to cheat or other
faults occur). An OFE protocol involves three participants, namely the signer, the
verifier and the arbitrator. The signer (say, Alice) first issues a verifiable “partial
108

5.1. Introduction

109

signature” σ 0 to the verifier (say, Bob). Bob verifies the validity of σ 0 and fulfills his
obligation if σ 0 is valid. After that, Alice sends Bob a “full signature” σ to complete
the transaction. Thus, if no problem occurs, the arbitrator does not participate in
the exchange. However, if Bob does not receive the full signature σ from Alice, Bob
can send σ 0 (and the proof of fulfilling his obligation) to the arbitrator, who will
convert σ 0 to σ for Bob.
An OFE protocol can be setup-driven or setup-free [ZB06b]. An OFE protocol
is called setup-driven if an initial-key-setup procedure between a signer and the
arbitrator is involved. On the other hand, an OFE protocol is called setup-free
if the signer does not need to contact the arbitrator, except that the signer can
obtain and verify the arbitrator’s public key certificate and vice versa. As shown
in [DLY07], setup-free is more desirable for the realization of OFE in the multi-user
setting. Another notion of OFE is stand-alone [ZB06b], which requires that the full
signature be an ordinary signature.

5.1.1

Previous Work

As one of the fundamental problems in secure electronic transactions and digital rights management, fair exchange has been studied intensively since its introduction. It is known that optimistic fair exchange can be constructed (in a
generic way) using “two signatures” construction [DR03], verifiably encrypted signature [ASW98, ASW00, BGLS03, CD00, LOS+ 06, ZM07, RS09], the sequential
two-party multisignature (first introduced by Park, Chong and Siegel [PCS03], and
then broken and repaired by Dodis and Reyzin [DR03]), the OR-proof [DLY07], and
conventional signature and ring signature [HYWS08b]. In the following, we only
review some results which are most relevant to this chapter.
OFE in the Single-user Setting
There are three parties involved in an OFE protocol, which are signer(s), verifier(s)
and arbitrator(s). Most OFE schemes consider only the single-user setting; namely
there is only one signer. The first formal security model of OFE was proposed
in [ASW98, ASW00]. Dodis and Reyzin [DR03] defined a more generalized and unified model for non-interactive OFE, by introducing a new cryptographic primitive
called verifiably committed signature. In [DR03], the security of a verifiably committed signature scheme (equivalently, an OFE protocol) in the single-user setting
consists of three aspects: security against the signer, security against the verifier and
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security against the arbitrator. While the arbitrator is not fully trusted, it is still
assumed to be semi-trusted in the sense that the arbitrator will not collude with the
signer or the verifier. In the remainder of this chapter, an OFE protocol is single-user
secure (or, secure in the single-user setting) means that it is secure in the single-user
setting defined in [DR03]. Notice that their definition does not include all security
notions of OFE (e.g., abuse-free [GJM99], non-repudiation [MK01, ZG96], timelytermination [ASW98, ASW00] and signer-ambiguity [HYWS08a]), but it does not
affect the point we want to make in this chapter. Dodis and Reyzin [DR03] proposed a stand-alone but setup-driven verifiably committed signature scheme from
Gap Diffie-Hellman problem. Constructions of stand-alone and setup-free verifiably
committed signature were proposed in [ZB06a, ZB06b].
OFE in the Multi-user Setting
The security of non-interactive OFE in the multi-user setting was independently
studied in [DLY07] and [ZSM07]. Optimistic fair exchange in the multi-user setting
refers to the scenario where there are two or more signers in the system, but items are
still exchanged between two parties. This is different from the multi-party exchange
which considers the exchange among three or more parties.
In [DLY07], Dodis, Lee and Yum pointed out that the single-user security of OFE
cannot guarantee the multi-user security. They presented a simple counterexample
which is secure in the single-user setting but is insecure in a multi-user setting.
(In the counterexample, a dishonest verifier in the multi-user setting can obtain a
full signature without fulfilling the obligation.) Dodis, Lee and Yum defined the
multi-user security model of OFE and provided a generic setup-free construction
of optimistic fair exchange secure in the multi-user setting [DLY07]. The security
of their construction relies on one-way functions in the random oracle model and
trapdoor one-way permutations in the standard model. The analysis in [DLY07]
shows that two well-known techniques of OFE (namely, constructions based on verifiably encrypted signatures and sequential two-party signatures) remain secure in
the multi-user setting if the underlying primitives satisfy some security notions. Independently, Zhu, Susilo and Mu [ZSM07] also demonstrated a verifiably committed
signature scheme which is secure in the model defined in [DR03] but is insecure in
the multi-user setting. They defined the security notions of verifiably committed
signature in the multi-user setting and proposed a concrete construction of multiuser secure stand-alone and setup-free verifiably committed signature [ZSM07]. The
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non-interactive version of their scheme uses the Fiat-Shamir technique and requires
a hash function, which is viewed as the random oracle in security analysis. Due
to [DLY07], multi-user secure stand-alone and setup-free OFE protocols without random oracles can be constructed from verifiably encrypted signature schemes without
random oracles [LOS+ 06, ZM07, RS09].
Certified-Key Model and Chosen-Key Model
Most OFE protocols are considered in the certified-key model where the user must
prove the knowledge of the private key at the key registration phase. Therefore,
the adversary is only allowed to make queries about certified public keys. Huang,
Yang, Wong and Susilo [HYWS08b, HYWS08a] considered the multi-user security
of OFE in the chosen-key model, where the adversary can make queries about public
keys arbitrarily without requiring to show its knowledge of the corresponding private
keys. Optimistic fair exchange protocols secure in the certified-key model may not
be secure in the chosen-key model [HYWS08b].
Huang et al. [HYWS08b] proposed another generic construction for OFE. Their
construction can lead to efficient setup-free OFE protocols that is secure in the
standard model and the chosen-key model. Recently, the first efficient ambiguous
OFE protocol was proposed in [HYWS08a]. The new protocol is proven secure in
the multi-user setting and chosen-key model without relying on the random oracle
assumption. Without any doubt, it is more desirable if cryptographic protocols can
be proven secure in the chosen-key model. However, in this chapter, the security of
OFE is considered in the certified-key model (as defined in [DLY07]), since certifiedkey model is reasonable and has been widely used in the research of public key
cryptography. In the remainder of this chapter, when we say an OFE protocol is
multi-user secure (or, secure in the multi-user setting), it refers that the protocol
is secure in the multi-user setting defined in [DLY07] (which is in the certified-key
model).

5.1.2

Motivation

The research on OFE has shown that:
• The single-user security of OFE does not guarantee the multi-user security [DLY07,
ZSM07].
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• Not all single-user secure OFE protocols are insecure in the multi-user setting [DLY07]. Several single-user secure protocols can be proven secure in the
multi-user setting [DLY07].
However, it remains unknown under which conditions single-user secure OFE protocols will be secure in the multi-user setting? We believe the investigation of this
question not only will provide a further understanding on the security of OFE in
the multi-user setting, but also can introduce new constructions of multi-user secure
optimistic fair exchange.

5.1.3

Our Contributions

In this chapter, we present a theoretical study of OFE and a new construction of
OFE in the multi-user setting.
1. In Section 5.3, we introduce and define a new property: Strong ResolutionAmbiguity. Briefly speaking, an OFE protocol has the property of strong
resolution-ambiguity if one can transform a partial signature σ 0 into a full
signature σ using signer’s private key or arbitrator’s private key, and given
such a pair (σ 0 , σ), it is infeasible to tell which key is used in the conversion.
While there are some OFE protocols satisfying strong resolution-ambiguity, it
is the first time this notion is addressed and formally defined.
2. For an OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity, we prove that its security in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user setting. More
precisely, we show that: (1) the security against the signer and the security
against the verifier in the single-user setting are preserved in the multi-user setting for OFE protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity, and (2) the security
against the arbitrator in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user
setting (for OFE protocols either with or without strong resolution-ambiguity).
While there is no evidence showing that strong resolution-ambiguity is a necessary property for (multi-user secure) OFE protocols, our result provides a
new approach for the security analysis of OFE protocols in the multi-user setting: One only needs to analyze the security in the single-user setting (rather
than the more complex multi-user setting) for OFE protocols with strong
resolution-ambiguity.
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3. In Section 5.4, we provide a new construction of OFE with strong resolutionambiguity. Our construction is a variant of the OFE protocol from the verifiably encrypted signature scheme proposed in [LOS+ 06]. The protocol presented in [LOS+ 06] has several desirable properties, e.g., setup-free, standalone and multi-user secure without random oracles under computational DiffieHellman assumption. Our protocol retains all these properties and is more
efficient in generating, transmitting and verifying partial signatures. This
however is achieved at the cost of larger key size.

5.2

Definitions of OFE in the Multi-user Setting

In this section, we describe the syntax and security definitions of OFE in the multiuser setting [DLY07].

5.2.1

Syntax of OFE

A setup-free non-interactive OFE protocol involves three parties: signer, verifier and
arbitrator. It is defined by the following efficient algorithms. An algorithm is called
efficient if it is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine.
• SetupTTP . The arbitrator setup algorithm takes as input a parameter Param,
and gives as output a secret arbitration key ASK and a public partial verification key APK.
• SetupUser . The user setup algorithm takes as input Param and (optionally)
APK, and gives as output a private signing key SKUi and a public verification
key PKUi for the user Ui .
• Sig and Ver. These are similar to signing and verification algorithms in an
ordinary digital signature scheme.
– The signing algorithm Sig, run by a signer Ui , takes as input (m, SKUi ,
APK) and gives as output a signature σUi on the message m. In fair exchange protocols, signatures generated by Sig are called as full signatures.
– The verification algorithm Ver, run by a verifier, takes as input (m, σUi ,
PKUi , APK) and returns valid or invalid. A signature σUi is said to be
a valid full signature of m under PKUi if Ver(m, σUi , PKUi , APK) = valid.
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• PSig and PVer. These are partial signing and verification algorithms, where
PSig together with Res (which will be defined soon) are functionally equivalent
to Sig.
– The partial signing algorithm PSig, run by a signer Ui , takes as input
(m, SKUi , APK) and gives as output a signature σU0 i on m. To distinguish
from those produced by Sig, signatures generated by PSig are called as
partial signatures.
– The partial verification algorithm PVer, run by a verifier, takes as input
(m, σU0 i , PKUi , APK) and returns valid or invalid. A signature σU0 i is
said to be a valid partial signature of m under PKUi if PVer(m, σU0 i , PKUi ,
APK) = valid.
• Res. The resolution algorithm Res takes as input a valid partial signature σU0 i
of m under PKUi and the secret arbitration key ASK, and gives as output a
signature σUi . This algorithm is run by the arbitrator for a party Uj , who does
not receive the full signature from Ui , but possesses a valid partial signature
of Ui and a proof that he/she has fulfilled the obligation to Ui .
Correctness. If each signature is generated according to the protocol specification,
then it should pass the corresponding verification algorithms. Namely,
1. Ver(m, Sig(m, SKUi , APK), PKUi , APK) = valid.
2. PVer(m, PSig(m, SKUi , APK), PKUi , APK) = valid.
3. Ver(m, Res(m, PSig(m, SKUi , APK), ASK, PKUi ), PKUi , APK) = valid.
Resolution-Ambiguity [DLY07, DR03, HYWS08b, MK01, ZSM07]. Any “resolved signature” Res(m, PSig (m, SKUi , APK), ASK, PKUi ) is (at least computationally) indistinguishable from the “actual signature” Sig(m, SKUi , APK).
Security of OFE. Intuitively, the fairness of an exchange requires that two parties
exchange their items in a fair way so that either each party obtains the other’s item
or neither party does. This requirement consists of the security against signer(s),
the security against verifier(s) and the security against the arbitrator, which will be
defined by the game between the adversary and the challenger. During the game, the
challenger will maintain three initially empty lists: (1) P K-List contains the public
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keys of created users; (2) P artialSign-List contains the partial signing queries made
by the adversary; and (3) Resolve-List contains the resolution queries made by the
adversary.
The definitions in the following sections are inspired by those in [DLY07], with
modifications which we believe can demonstrate the difference between the singleuser security and the multi-user security of OFE.

5.2.2

Security against Signer(s)

In an OFE protocol, the signer should not be able to generate a valid partial signature which cannot be converted into a valid full signature by the arbitrator. This
property is defined by the following game.
• Setup. The challenger generates the parameter Param and the arbitrator’s
key pair (APK, ASK) by running SetupTTP . The adversary A is given Param
and APK.
• Queries. Proceeding adaptively, A can make following queries.
Creating-User-Queries. A can create a user Ui by making a creating-user query
(Ui , PKUi ). In order to convince the challenger to accept PKUi (i.e., add PKUi
to the P K-List), A must prove its knowledge of the legitimate private key
SKUi . This can be realized by requiring the adversary to hand over the private
key as suggested in [LOS+ 06], or generate a proof of knowledge [BG92] of the
private key1 .
Resolution-Queries. For a resolution-query (m, σ 0 , PK) satisfying PVer(m, σ 0 ,
PK, APK) = valid, the challenger first browses P K-List. If PK ∈
/ P KList, an error symbol “>” will be returned to the adversary. Otherwise, the
challenger adds (m, PK) to the Resolve-List (if the pair (m, PK) is not there)
and responds with an output of Res(m, σ 0 , ASK, PK).
• Output. Eventually, A outputs a triple (mf , σf0 , PK∗ ) and wins the game if
PK∗ ∈ P K-List, PVer(mf , σf0 , PK∗ , APK) = valid, and Ver(mf , Res(mf , σf0 ,
ASK, PK∗ ), PK∗ , APK) = invalid.
1

We will use the latter approach in the proof. Section 2.4 briefly reviews the definition of proof
of knowledge.
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Let Adv OFEA be the probability that A wins in the above game, taken over the coin
tosses made by A and the challenger. An adversary A is said to (t, qCU , qR , )-break
the security against signer(s) if in time t, A makes at most qCU Creating-UserQueries, qR Resolution-Queries and Adv OFEA is at least .
Definition 5.1 (Security against Signer(s)) An OFE protocol is (t, qCU , qR , )secure against signer(s) if no adversary (t, qCU , qR , )-breaks it.
By setting qCU = 1, we can define the security against the signer in the singleuser setting, namely an OFE protocol is (t, qR , )-secure against the signer in the
single-user setting if no adversary (t, 1, qR , )-breaks it.

5.2.3

Security against Verifier(s)

Briefly speaking, the security against verifier(s) requires that the verifier should not
be able to generate a valid partial signature of a new message or generate a valid
full signature without the assistance from the signer or the arbitrator.
The first requirement is ensured by the security against the arbitrator, namely
even the arbitrator (knowing more than the verifier) cannot succeed in that attack.
This will be defined shortly in Section 5.2.4. The second requirement is defined as
below.
• Setup. The challenger generates the parameter Param and the arbitrator’s
key pair (APK, ASK) by running SetupTTP . The challenger also generates a
key pair (PK∗ , SK∗ ) by running SetupUser , and adds PK∗ to P K-List. The
adversary B is given Param, APK and PK∗ .
• Queries.

Proceeding adaptively, B can make all queries defined in Sec-

tion 5.2.2 and Partial-Signing-Queries defined as follows.
Partial-Signing-Queries. For a partial-signing query (m, PK∗ ), the challenger
responds with an output of PSig(m, SK∗ , APK). After that, (m, PK∗ ) is added
to the P artialSign-List. (B is allowed to make Partial-Signing-Queries only
about PK∗ as other public keys are created by B.)
• Output. Eventually, B outputs a pair (mf , σf ) and wins the game if (mf ,
PK∗ ) ∈
/ Resolve-List and Ver(mf , σf , PK∗ , APK) = valid.
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Let Adv OFEB be the probability that B wins in the above game, taken over the
coin tosses made by B and the challenger. An adversary B is said to (t, qCU , qP S ,
qR , )-break the security against verifier(s) if in time t, B makes at most qCU CreatingUser-Queries, qP S Partial-Signing-Queries, qR Resolution-Queries and Adv OFEB is
at least .
Definition 5.2 (Security against Verifier(s)) An OFE protocol is (t, qCU , qP S ,
qR , )-secure against verifier(s) if no adversary (t, qCU , qP S , qR , )-breaks it.
Similarly, we can obtain the definition of the security against the verifier in the singleuser setting, namely an OFE protocol is (t, qP S , qR , )-secure against the verifier in
the single-user setting if no adversary (t, 0, qP S , qR , )-breaks it.

5.2.4

Security against the Arbitrator

In this section, we will define the security against the arbitrator and prove that the
security against the arbitrator in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user
setting.
The security against the arbitrator requires that the arbitrator, without the
partial signature on a message m, should not be able to produce a valid full signature
on m2 . This notion is defined as follows.
• Setup. The challenger generates the parameter Param, which is given to the
adversary C.
• Output-I. C generates the arbitrator’s public key APK and sends it to the
challenger. (C is required to prove the knowledge of the legitimate private key
ASK.) In response, the challenger generates a key pair (PK∗ , SK∗ ) by running
SetupUser and adds PK∗ to P K-List. The adversary C is given PK∗ .
• Queries. Proceeding adaptively, C can make Creating-User-Queries (defined
in Section 5.2.2) and Partial-Signing-Queries (defined in Section 5.2.3).
• Output-II. Eventually, C outputs a pair (mf , σf ) and wins the game if (mf ,
PK∗ ) ∈
/ P artialSign-List and Ver(mf , σf , PK∗ , APK) = valid.
2

As almost all previous work about OFE, we assume that signer-arbitrator collusion or verifierarbitrator collusion will not occur. Please refer to [ASW00, DR03] for discussions of those attacks.
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Let Adv OFEC be the probability that C wins in the above game, taken over the coin
tosses made by C and the challenger. An adversary C is said to (t, qCU , qP S , )-break
the security against the arbitrator if in time t, C makes at most qCU Creating-UserQueries, qP S Partial-Signing-Queries and Adv OFEC is at least .
Remark 5.1 In the game, the adversary must first generate the arbitrator’s public
key APK before obtaining PK∗ or making other queries. This reflects the definition
of optimistic fair exchange as APK could be an input of algorithms SetupUser and
PSig. For concrete protocols where these algorithms do not require APK as the
input, the adversary can obtain PK∗ and/or make partial-signing-queries of PK∗
before generating APK.
Definition 5.3 (Security against the Arbitrator) An optimistic fair exchange
protocol is (t, qCU , qP S , )-secure against the arbitrator in the multi-user setting if no
adversary (t, qCU , qP S , )-breaks it.
We can obtain the definition of the security against the arbitrator in the singleuser setting, namely an OFE protocol is (t, qP S , )-secure against the arbitrator in
the single-user setting if no adversary (t, 0, qP S , )-breaks it. The following theorem
shows that the security against the arbitrator in the single-user setting is preserved
in the multi-user setting.
Theorem 5.1 An OFE protocol is (t, qCU , qP S , )-secure against the arbitrator in
the multi-user setting if it is (t + t1 qCU , qP S , )-secure against the arbitrator in the
single-user setting. Here, t1 denotes the time unit to respond to one creating-user
query.
Proof. We denote by CS the adversary in the single-user setting and CM in the
multi-user setting. We will show how to convert a successful CM to a successful CS .
At the beginning, CS obtains Param from its challenger in the single-user setting.
• Setup. Param is given to CM .
• Output-I. Let APK be the arbitrator’s public key created by CM in the multiuser setting. APK will be sent to CS ’s challenger in the single-user setting. CS
will make use of CM to generate a proof of knowledge, namely CS will act as
a relay in the proof by forwarding all messages from its challenger to CM (or,
from CM to its challenger). At the end of this phase, CS will be given a public
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key PK∗ , which will be forwarded to CM as its challenging public key in the
multi-user setting.
• Queries. We show how CS can correctly answer CM ’s queries.
Creating-User-Queries. For a creating-user query (Ui , PKUi ), CS will add PKUi
to P K-List if CM can generate a proof of knowledge of the legitimate private
key.
Partial-Signing-Queries. For a partial-signing query (m, PK∗ ), CS forwards it
to its own challenger and sends the response to CM .
• Output-II. Eventually, CM will output a pair (mf , σf ). CS will set (mf , σf )
as its own output in the single-user setting.
CS will win the game in the single-user setting if CM wins the game in the multi-user
setting. It follows that the success probability of CS will be  if CM can (t, qCU , qP S , )break the security against the arbitrator in the multi-user setting.
It remains to show the time consumption in the proof. CS ’s running time is the
same as CM ’s running time plus the time it takes to answer creating-user-queries,
which we assume each query takes time at most t1 . Therefore, the total time consumption is t + t1 qCU .
We have shown that for an OFE protocol, if there is an adversary (t, qCU , qP S , )breaks the security against the arbitrator in the multi-user setting, then there is an
adversary (t + t1 qCU , qP S , )-breaks the security against the arbitrator in the singleuser setting. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.



Section 5.3 will investigate the conditions under which the security against the signer
and the security against the verifier in the single-user setting will remain in the
multi-user setting.

5.3

Strong Resolution-Ambiguity

This section investigates a new property in optimistic fair exchange, which we call
“Strong Resolution-Ambiguity”. We will give the definition of strong resolutionambiguity and prove that for OFE protocols with that property, the security against
the signer and the security against the verifier in the single-user setting are preserved
in the multi-user setting. Before giving the formal definition, we first review a generic
construction of OFE [DR03].
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OFE from Sequential Two-Party Multisignatures
A multisignature scheme allows any subgroup of users to jointly sign a document
such that a verifier is convinced that each user of the subgroup participated in the
signing. To construct an OFE protocol, one can use a simple type of multisignature,
which is called sequential two-party multisignature. In this construction, the signer
first generates two key pairs (pk, sk) and (APK, ASK), where (pk, APK, ASK) are
sent to the arbitrator through a secured channel. The signer’s private key SK is the
pair (sk, ASK) and the arbitrator’s private key is ASK. The partial signature σ 0 of a
message m is an ordinary signature generated using sk, and the full signature σ is
the multisignature generated using σ 0 and ASK. Given a valid partial signature, both
the arbitrator and the signer can convert it to a full signature using ASK. (Recall
that ASK is the arbitrator’s private key and part of the signer’s private key.) It is
thus virtually infeasible to distinguish who (the signer or the arbitrator) converts
the partial signature to the full signature. This is the essential requirement of OFE
with strong resolution-ambiguity, which is formally defined as follows.

5.3.1

Definition of Strong Resolution-Ambiguity

We first introduce a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Convert which allows
the signer to convert a partial signature to a full one. The definition of Convert is
given as below.
• Convert. This algorithm takes as input the signer’s private key SKUi , (optionally) arbitrator’s public key APK, a message m and its valid partial signature
σ 0 . The output is the signer’s full signature σ on m.
In a trivial case, each OFE protocol has an algorithm Convert = Sig. (In this case
the full signature generated by Convert could be totally independent of the partial
signature.) Our interest here is to investigate non-trivial Convert and compare it
with the resolution algorithm Res. Recall that, with the knowledge of ASK, one can
also convert a partial signature to a full one using Res. This makes the following
question interesting: Given a valid partial signature σ 0 , what are the differences
between full signatures produced by Convert and those produced by Res? The answer
to this question inspires the definition of strong resolution-ambiguity.
To formally define the strong resolution-ambiguity, we assume the arbitrator’s
key pair satisfies an NP-relation RTTP , and users’ key pairs satisfy another NPrelation RU . An NP-relation R is a subset of {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ for which there
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exists a polynomial f such that |y| ≤ f (|x|) for all (x, y) ∈ R, and there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm for deciding membership in R.
In an OFE protocol defined in Section 5.2, let (APK, ASK) be any pair in RTTP ,
and let (PKUi , SKUi ) be any pair in RU . For any pair (m, σ 0 ) satisfying PVer(m, σ 0 , PKUi ,
APK) = valid, we define
(m,σ 0 )

• DConvert : probability distribution of full signatures produced by Convert(m, σ 0 ,
SKUi , APK).
(m,σ 0 )

• DRes

: probability distribution of full signatures produced by Res(m, σ 0 , PKUi ,

ASK).
Definition 5.4 (Strong Resolution-Ambiguity) An OFE protocol is said to satisfy strong resolution-ambiguity if there exists an algorithm Convert as defined above
(m,σ 0 )

(m,σ 0 ) 3

such that DConvert is identical to DRes

.

Strong Resolution-Ambiguity and Resolution-Ambiguity: A Brief Comparison
An OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity will satisfy resolution-ambiguity
if Sig is defined as (PSig + Convert), namely the signer first generates a partial signature and then converts it to a full one using Convert. In this case, actual signatures
(generated by Sig) are indistinguishable from resolved signatures (generated by Res).
However, resolution-ambiguity cannot ensure strong resolution-ambiguity which requires that one can use the signer’s private key to convert a partial signature to
a full one and the conversion is indistinguishable from that using the arbitrator’s
private key.

5.3.2

Strong Resolution-Ambiguity in Concrete OFE Protocols

It is evident that the generic construction of OFE from sequential two-party multisignature [DR03] (reviewed at the beginning of Section 5.3) has the strong resolutionambiguity property by defining Convert = Res. Below are some other concrete
examples of OFE with/without strong resolution-ambiguity.
3

As we shall show shortly, strong resolution-ambiguity will make adversaries in the single-user
setting have almost the same information as the adversaries in the multi-user setting, but “identical
distribution” is a very strong requirement.
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OFE from Verifiably Encrypted Signatures
Let OFE-VES be OFE protocols constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures.
If the algorithm Sig is deterministic (e.g., the verifiably encrypted signature scheme
in [BGLS03]), then OFE-VES will have the strong resolution-ambiguity property.
For any valid partial signature of m, there is only one output of the algorithm Res,
(m,σ 0 )

(m,σ 0 )

namely the unique full signature of m. By defining Convert = Sig, DConvert and DRes

will be identical and the protocols satisfy strong resolution-ambiguity. OFE-VES
with probabilistic Sig algorithms could also have the strong resolution-ambiguity
property. One example is the OFE protocol from the verifiably encrypted signature
scheme proposed in [LOS+ 06]. In [LOS+ 06], the Sig algorithm is the signing algorithm in Waters signature [Wat05], and the partial signature σ 0 is the encryption
of the full signature σ using APK. After extracting σ from σ 0 , the arbitrator will
randomize σ such that the output of Res is a full signature uniformly distributed in
the full signature space. This makes the distribution of full signatures produced by
Res the same as that of full signatures generated by Convert = Sig.
A Concrete Instance of the Generic Construction in [HYWS08b]
The generic construction of OFE in [HYWS08b] is based on a conventional signature
scheme and a ring signature scheme, both of which can be constructed efficiently
without random oracles. In the protocol, the signer and the arbitrator first generate
their own key pairs. The full signature of a message m is a pair (s1 , s2 ), where s1 is
the signer’s conventional signature on the message m, and s2 is a ring-signature on m
and s1 . Either the signer or the arbitrator is able to generate s2 . This construction
will satisfy strong resolution-ambiguity if the distribution of ring signatures generated by the signer is the same as that of ring signatures generated by the arbitrator
(e.g., 2-User ring signature scheme without random oracles [BKM06]).
A Concrete Protocol without Strong Resolution-Ambiguity
One example of OFE protocols without strong resolution-ambiguity is the single-user
secure but multi-user insecure OFE protocol proposed in [DLY07]. In this protocol,
the full signature of a message m is σ = (r, δ), where δ is the signer’s conventional
signature on “mky”, y = f (r), and f is a trapdoor one-way permutation. The
partial signature is defined as σ 0 = (y, δ). To convert (y, δ) to a full signature, the
arbitrator uses his/her private key f −1 to compute r = f −1 (y) and obtain the full
signature (r, δ). Given a message m and its full signature (r, δ), it is hard to tell if
(r, δ) is produced by Sig directly, or first generated by PSig and then by Res. Thus,
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as shown in [DLY07], the property “resolution-ambiguity” is satisfied. On the other
hand, this protocol does not have strong resolution-ambiguity as f is a trapdoor oneway permutation. Suppose, otherwise, there is an algorithm Convert such that for a
partial signature σ 0 , the outputs of Convert(m, σ 0 , SKUi , f ) have the same probability
distribution as those of Res(m, σ 0 , PKUi , f −1 ). Note that for σ 0 = (y, δ), Res will
output a pair (r, δ) such that y = f (r). It follows that Convert(m, σ 0 , SKUi , f ) must
also output (r, δ) satisfying y = f (r) if the protocol has strong resolution-ambiguity.
This breaks the one-wayness of f , namely given y, there is an efficient algorithm
Convert which can find r such that f (r) = y without the trapdoor f −1 .
Notice that given a partial signature σ 0 , the signer can generate a full signature
σ such that σ is indistinguishable from the one converted by the arbitrator. To do
that, the signer needs to maintain a list {(r, y) : y = f (r)} when he/she produces
the partial signature σ 0 = (y, δ). Later on, for a partial signature (y, δ), the signer
can search the list and find the matching pair (r, y). In this case, the signer can
generate a full signature (r, δ) which is indistinguishable from the one converted by
the resolution algorithm Res. However, this approach does not satisfy the definition
of Convert since it requires an additional input r. (Recall that the inputs of Convert
are only SKUi , (m, σ 0 ) and APK.)

5.3.3

Security of OFE with Strong Resolution-Ambiguity

Theorem 5.1 has shown that the security against the arbitrator in the single-user
setting is preserved in the multi-user setting. This section considers the other two
security notions, and we will prove that:
1. For OFE protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity, the security against the
signer in the single-user setting remains in the multi-user setting (Theorem 5.2).
2. For OFE protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity, the security against the
verifier in the single-user setting remains in the multi-user setting (Theorem 5.3).

Theorem 5.2 An OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity is (t, qCU , qR , )secure against signers in the multi-user setting, if it is (t + t1 qCU + t2 qR , qR , /qCU )secure against the singer in the single-user setting. Here, t1 is the time unit depends
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on the validity of the proof of knowledge and t2 is the time unit depends on the
algorithm Convert in the protocol.
Proof. We denote by AS the adversary in the single-user setting and AM in the
multi-user setting. In the proof, we use the standard method by showing that for an
OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity, a successful AM can be converted
into a successful AS . We first give a high-level description of the proof.
AS will act as the challenger of AM in the proof and answer all queries from
the latter. AS will set the challenging public key PK∗ of AM as its own challenging
public key, and set AM ’s output as its own output. The most difficult part in the
proof is how AS can correctly answer resolution queries from AM . For resolution
queries related to PK∗ , AS can use its own challenger to generate correct responses.
However, this is not feasible for resolution queries about other public keys (since
AS ’s challenger only responds to queries about PK∗ ). Fortunately, such queries can
be correctly answered by AS if the OFE protocol has strong resolution-ambiguity.
For a resolution query (m, σ 0 , PKUi ), AS can convert σ 0 to a full signature σ using
the algorithm Convert and the private key SKUi . Due to Def. 5.4, this perfectly
simulates the real game between AM and the challenger in the multi-user setting.
The private key SKUi can be extracted by AS due to the validity of the proof of
knowledge required in the creating-user phase. The details of the proof are given as
follows.
At the beginning, AS obtains the Param and APK from its challenger.
• Setup. In this phase, AS gives Param and APK to AM .
• Queries. We show how AS can correctly answer AM ’s queries.
Creating-User-Queries. For a creating-user query (Ui , PKUi ), AS will ask AM
to generate a proof of knowledge of the legitimate private key. If AM can
successfully convince AS with probability at least %, then AS can extract the
1
private key SKUi (i.e., (PKUi , SKUi ) ∈ RU ) in time O( %−κ
), where κ is the

knowledge error associated with the proof of knowledge. After that, AS will
add PKUi to the P K-List and (PKUi , SKUi ) to the SK-List, respectively. SKList is an initially empty list and consists of key pairs of created users.
During this phase, AS randomly picks a public key PKUj ∈ P K-List and
sends (Uj , PKj ) to its own challenger in the single-user setting as a creatinguser query. With SKUj , AS is able to generate a proof of knowledge and
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convince the challenger to accept PKUj .
Resolution-Queries. For a resolution query (m, σ 0 , PK) where PK ∈ P K-List,
1. If PK = PKUj , AS forwards (m, σ 0 , PK) to its own challenger and sends
the response to AM .
2. Otherwise, AS generates the full signature by running the algorithm
Convert with the private key SK (which is extracted during the creatinguser-queries phase). This perfectly simulates the real attacking scenario
(i.e., full signatures generated by the arbitrator) if the protocol has strong
resolution-ambiguity.
• Output. AM outputs a triple (mf , σf0 , PK∗ ), which will be set as AS ’s output.
AS will win the game in the single-user setting if AM wins the game in the multi-user
setting and PK∗ = PKUj . Therefore, the success probability of AS will be /qCU if
AM (t, qCU , qR , )-breaks the security against signers in the multi-user setting.
It remains to show the time consumption in the proof. AS ’s running time is the
same as AM ’s running time plus the time it takes to answer creating-user-queries
and resolution-queries. We assume each creating-user-query takes time t1 (which
depends on the validity of the proof of knowledge), and each resolution-query takes
time t2 (which is the time unit to generate a full signature using the algorithm
Convert). Therefore, the total time consumption is t + t1 qCU + t2 qR .
We have shown that for an OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity, if
there is an adversary (t, qCU , qR , )-breaks its security against signers in the multiuser setting, then there is an adversary (t+t1 qCU +t2 qR , qR , /qCU )-breaks its security
against the signer in the single-user setting. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.

Theorem 5.3 An OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity is (t, qCU , qP S , qR ,
)-secure against verifiers in the multi-user setting, if it is (t+t1 qCU +t2 qR , qP S , qR , )secure against the verifier in the single-user setting. Here, t1 is the time unit depends
on the validity of the proof of knowledge and t2 is the time unit depends on the
algorithm Convert in the protocol.
Proof. We denote by BS the adversary in the single-user setting and BM in the
multi-user setting. At the beginning, BS obtains Param, APK and PK∗ from its
challenger.
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• Setup. In this phase, BS adds PK∗ to the P K-List and sends (Param, APK,
PK∗ ) to BM .
• Queries. We show how BS can correctly answer BM ’s queries.
Creating-User-Queries. For a creating-user query (Ui , PKUi ), BS will ask BM
to generate a proof of knowledge of the legitimate private key. If BM can
successfully convince BS with probability at least %, then BS can extract the
1
private key SKUi (i.e., (PKUi , SKUi ) ∈ RU ) in time O( %−κ
), where κ is the

knowledge error associated with the proof of knowledge. After that, BS will
add PKUi to the P K-List and (PKUi , SKUi ) to the SK-List, respectively.
Partial-Signing-Queries. For a partial-signing query (m, PK∗ ), BS forwards it
to its own challenger and sends the response to BM .
Resolution-Queries. For a resolution query (m, σ 0 , PK) where PK ∈ P K-List,
1. If PK = PK∗ , BS forwards (m, σ 0 , PK∗ ) to its own challenger and sends
the response to BM .
2. Otherwise, BS generates the response by running the algorithm Convert
with the corresponding private key SK on the SK-List. This perfectly
simulates the real attacking scenario (i.e., full signatures generated by
the arbitrator) if the protocol has strong resolution-ambiguity.
• Output. BM outputs a pair (mf , σf ), which will be set as the output of BS
in the single-user setting.
BS will win the game in the single-user setting if BM wins the game in the multi-user
setting. Therefore, the success probability of BS will be  if BM can (t, qCU , qP S , qR , )break the security against verifiers in the multi-user setting.
It remains to show the time consumption in the proof. BS ’s running time is the
same as BM ’s running time plus the time it takes to answer creating-user-queries
and qR resolution-queries. We assume each creating-user query takes time t1 (which
depends on the validity of the proof of knowledge), and each resolution-query takes
time t2 (which depends on the algorithm Convert in the protocol). Therefore, the
total time consumption is t + t1 qCU + t2 qR .
We have shown that for an OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity, if
there is an adversary (t, qCU , qP S , qR , )-breaks its security against verifiers in the
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multi-user setting, then there is an adversary (t + t1 qCU + t2 qR , qP S , qR , )-breaks its
security against the verifier in the single-user setting. This completes the proof of
Theorem 5.3.



Remark 5.2 Our analysis only shows that strong resolution-ambiguity is a sufficient condition for single-user secure OFE protocols remaining secure in the multiuser setting. There is no evidence showing that it is also a necessary property for
multi-user secure OFE protocols.

5.4

New OFE Protocol with Strong ResolutionAmbiguity

This section describes a new OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity. The
protocol is based on Waters signature [Wat05].

5.4.1

The Proposed Protocol

Let (G1 , GT ) be bilinear groups of prime order p and let g be a generator of G1 .
e denotes the bilinear map G1 × G1 → GT defined in Section 2.1. Let n be the
bit-string length of the message to be signed. For an element m in {0, 1}n , let
M ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of all i for which the ith bit mi is 1. The parameter
Param is (G1 , GT , p, g, e, n).
• SetupTTP . Given Param, the arbitrator chooses a random number w ∈ ZZp and
calculates W = g w . The arbitrator’s public key APK is W , and the private
key ASK is w.
• SetupUser . Given Param, this algorithm outputs a private signing key SKUi =
(xUi , yUi ) and a public verification key PKUi = (XUi , YUi , ~vUi ), where
1. xUi and yUi are randomly chosen in ZZp .
2. XUi = e(g, g)xUi and YUi = g yUi .
3. ~vUi is a vector consisting of n + 1 elements V0 , V1 , V2 , · · · , Vn . All these
elements are randomly selected in G1 .
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• Sig. Given a message m, the signer Ui uses the private key xUi to generate a
Q
Waters signature σ = (σ1 , σ2 ), where σ1 = g xUi · (V0 i∈M Vi )r , σ2 = g r and r
is a random number in ZZp .
• Ver.

Given a message-signature pair (m, σ) and Ui ’s public key PKUi =
Q
(XUi , YUi , ~vUi ), this algorithm outputs valid if e(σ1 , g) = XUi · e(V0 i∈M Vi ,

σ2 ). Otherwise, this algorithm outputs invalid.
• PSig. Given a message m and the arbitrator’s public key W , the signer Ui
first runs Sig to obtain a full signature (σ1 , σ2 ). After that, Ui calculates
σ10 = σ1 · W yUi and σ20 = σ2 . The partial signature σ 0 is (σ10 , σ20 ).
• PVer. Given a pair (m, σ 0 ), Ui ’s public key PKUi and arbitrator’s public key
APK (which is W ), one parses σ 0 as (σ10 , σ20 ). This algorithm outputs valid if
Q
e(σ10 , g) = XUi · e(YUi , W ) · e(V0 i∈M Vi , σ20 ). Otherwise, it outputs invalid.
• Res. Given a valid partial signature σ 0 of the message m under a public key
PKUi = (XUi , YUi , ~vUi ), the arbitrator first parses σ 0 as (σ10 , σ20 ). After that,
the arbitrator uses his/her private key w to calculate σ1 = σ10 · (YUi )−w and
σ2 = σ20 . The arbitrator then chooses a random number r0 ∈ ZZp and calculates
Q
0
0
σ1R = σ1 · (V0 i∈M Vi )r and σ2R = σ2 · g r . The output of the algorithm Res is
(σ1R , σ2R ).

5.4.2

Scheme Analysis

It is evident that our protocol is setup-free (no interaction between the user and
the arbitrator at key generation phase) and stand-alone (the full signature is Waters signature). We now show that it also satisfies resolution-ambiguity and strong
resolution-ambiguity.
Resolution-Ambiguity: Due to the random number r0 , the resolved signature
produced by Res is uniformly distributed in the valid signature space of Waters
signature. Thus, resolved signatures are indistinguishable from actual signatures
produced by Sig and the protocol satisfies resolution-ambiguity.
Strong Resolution-Ambiguity: One can find an algorithm Convert, which is the
same as Sig, such that given any partial signature σ 0 , the outputs of Convert are indistinguishable from those produced by Res, both of which are uniformly distributed
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in the valid signature space of Waters signature. Thus, the proposed protocol also
satisfies strong resolution-ambiguity.
Multi-user Security. We now show that the proposed protocol is secure in the
multi-user setting.
Theorem 5.4 The proposed protocol is multi-user secure under computational DiffieHellman assumption.
As the protocol has strong resolution-ambiguity, we only need to prove it is secure
in the single-user setting (due to the analysis in Section 5.3.3). We will show that
the security of the proposed protocol is based on the existential unforgeability of
Waters signature. The proof consists of the following Lemmas.
Lemma 5.5 (Security against the Signer) The proposed protocol is secure against
the signer.
Proof. We show that any valid partial signature can be converted to a valid full
signature by the arbitrator.
If σ 0 = (σ10 , σ20 ) is a valid partial signature of a message m under the public key
Q
PKUi = (XUi , YUi , ~vUi ), then e(σ10 , g) = XUi · e(YUi , W ) · e(V0 i∈M Vi , σ20 ). Note that
XUi = e(g, g)xUi (for some xUi ∈ ZZp ), W = g w and σ20 = g r (for some r ∈ ZZp ), we
have
e(σ10 , g) = e(g xUi , g) · e(YUi , g w ) · e(V0

Y

Vi , g r ).

i∈M

Therefore, σ10 = g xUi · YUwi · (V0

Q

i∈M

Vi )r , for some xUi , r ∈ ZZp .

In the algorithm Res, σ1 is computed as σ10 · YU−w
, and σ2 is set as σ20 . Thus,
i
Q
σ1 = g xUi · (V0 i∈M Vi )r . Note that XUi = e(g, g)xUi and σ2 = g r . Therefore,
Q
e(σ1 , g) = XUi · e(V0 i∈M Vi , σ2 ), which means (σ1 , σ2 ) is a valid full signature in
Q
0
our protocol. This also holds true for (σ1R , σ2R ), where σ1R = σ1 · (V0 i∈M Vi )r ,
0

σ2R = σ2 · g r and r0 is a random number in ZZp . Therefore, the output of Res will be
a valid full signature if the partial signature is valid.
This completes the analysis of the security against the signer.



Lemma 5.6 (Security against the Verifier) Our protocol is (t, qP S , qR , )-secure
against the verifier in the single-user setting if Waters signature is (t+t1 ·qP S , qR , )existentially unforgeable, where t1 is the time cost to generate one partial signature
in the proposed protocol.
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Proof. We will prove that if there is an adversary B can (t, 0, qP S , qR , )-break the
security against the verifier, then there is an algorithm F can (t+t1 ·qP S , qR , )-break
the existential unforgeability of Waters signature.
At the beginning, F is given the parameter (G1 , GT , p, g, e, n) and a public key
(g1 , g2 , ~v ) of Waters signature, where ~v = (V0 , V1 , · · · , Vn ).
• Setup. F first chooses two random elements s, t ∈ ZZp , and computes X ∗ =
e(g1 , g2 ), Y ∗ = (g1 )−1 ·g s and W = g2 ·g t . Then, F sets Param = (G1 , GT , p, g, e,
n), the challenge public key PK∗ = (X ∗ , Y ∗ , ~v ), and the arbitrator’s public key
APK = W . F also calculates (g1 )−t · (g2 )s · g st for future use. B is given
(Param, APK, PK∗ ).
• Partial-Signing-Queries. For a partial signing query (m, PK∗ ), F first chooses
a random number r ∈ ZZp , and then computes σ10 = (g1 )−t · (g2 )s · g st · (V0 ·
Q
r
0
r
0
0
i∈M Vi ) and σ2 = g . (σ1 , σ2 ) is a valid partial signature on m as
e(σ10 , g)
Y

= e((g1 )−t · (g2 )s · g st · (V0 ·

Vi )r , g)

i∈M

= e((g1 )−t · (g2 )s · g st , g) · e((V0 ·

Y

Vi )r , g)

i∈M

= X ∗ · e(Y ∗ , W ) · e(V0 ·

Y

Vi , σ20 ).

i∈M

• Resolution-Queries. For a resolution query (m, σ 0 , PK∗ ) satisfying PVer(m, σ 0 ,
PK∗ , APK) = valid, F sends m∗ to its challenger as a signing query of Waters
signature. Let the response be (σ1 , σ2 ), which will be sent to B as the answer.
• Output. Eventually, B will output a pair (mf , σf ). F will set (mf , σf ) as its
own forgery of Waters signature.
If B wins the game, then (mf , PK∗ ) ∈
/ Resolve-List and Ver(mf , σf , PK∗ , APK) =
valid. In this case, F has obtained a valid Waters signature σf of a new message
mf . (Notice that mf is not one of signing queries of Waters signature if (mf , PK∗ ) ∈
/
Resolve-List.) It remains to show the time consumption in the proof. F’s running
time is the same as B’s running time plus the time it takes to answer partial-signing
queries, where each query takes the time cost to generate one partial signature in
our protocol and is denoted by t1 . Thus, the total time consumption is t + t1 qP S .

5.4. New OFE Protocol with Strong Resolution-Ambiguity

131

We have shown that there is an algorithm F can (t + t1 qP S , qR , )-break the existential unforgeability of Waters signature, if there is an adversary B can (t, 0, qP S , qR ,
)-break the security against the verifier of the proposed scheme. This completes
the proof of Lemma 5.6.



Due to Lemma 5.6 and Theorem 5.3, our protocol is secure against verifiers in the
multi-user setting.
Lemma 5.7 (Security against the Arbitrator) Our protocol is (t, qP S , )-secure
against the arbitrator if Waters signature is (t + t1 · qP S , qP S , )-existentially unforgeable, where t1 is the time cost to generate one partial signature in the proposed
protocol.
Proof. We will prove that if there is an adversary C can (t, 0, qP S , )-break the
security against the arbitrator, then there is an algorithm F can (t + t1 · qP S , qP S , )break the existential unforgeability of Waters signature.
At the beginning, F is given the parameter (G1 , GT , p, g, e, n) and a public key
(g1 , g2 , ~v ) of Waters signature, where ~v = (V0 , V1 , · · · , Vn ).
• Setup. F first sends the parameter Param = (G1 , GT , p, g, e, n) to C. As the
algorithm SetupUser in our protocol does not require the arbitrator’s public key
as input, F also needs to send the target public key PK∗ to C. To generate
PK∗ , F chooses a random element s ∈ ZZp , and computes X ∗ = e(g1 , g2 ) and
Y ∗ = g s . C is given the challenge public key PK∗ = (X ∗ , Y ∗ , ~v ).
• Output-I. After obtaining Param and PK∗ , C will generate the arbitrator’s
public key APK and a proof of knowledge of the corresponding secret key
ASK.
• Partial-Signing-Queries. For a partial-signing query (m, PK∗ ), F sends m∗
to its challenger as a signing query of Waters signature. Let the response be
(σ1 , σ2 ). After that, F calculates the partial signature σ10 = σ1 · (APK)s and
σ20 = σ2 . Notice that the generation of (σ10 , σ20 ) is the same as that defined in
PSig. C is given (σ10 , σ20 ).
• Output-II. Eventually, C will output a pair (mf , σf ). F will set (mf , σf ) as
its own forgery of Waters signature.
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C wins the game if (mf , PK∗ ) ∈
/ P artialSign-List and Ver(mf , σf , PK∗ , APK) =
valid. In this case, F has obtained a valid Waters signature σf of a new message
mf . (Notice that mf is not one of signing queries of Waters signature if (mf , PK∗ ) ∈
/
P artialSign-List.) It remains to show the time consumption in the proof. F’s
running time is the same as C’s running time plus the time it takes to answer
partial-signing queries, where each query takes (at most) the time cost to generate
one partial signature in our protocol and is denoted by t1 . Thus, the total time
consumption is t + t1 qP S .
We have shown that there is an algorithm F can (t+t1 qP S , qP S , )-break the existential unforgeability of Waters signature, if there is an adversary C can (t, 0, qP S , )break the security against the arbitrator of the proposed protocol. This completes
the proof of Lemma 5.7.



Due to Lemma 5.7 and Theorem 5.1, our protocol is secure against the arbitrator
in the multi-user setting.

5.4.3

Comparison to Previous Protocols

Table. 5.1 compares the known OFE protocols which have the same properties as the
newly proposed one (namely, non-interactive, setup-free, stand-alone and multi-user
secure without random oracles). The comparison is made from the following aspects:
(1) underlying complexity assumption, (2) partial signature size and full signature
size, and (3) the computational cost of signing and verifying partial signatures and
full signatures. We consider the cost of signing and verifying partial signatures since
the signer must generate a partial signature in each exchange, which will be verified
by the verifier and could also be checked again by the arbitrator. Therefore, the
efficiency of signing and verifying partial signatures is at least as important as that
of full signatures.
We use the following notations in the comparison.
• CDH: Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
• CT-CDH: Chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman assumption [Bol03].
• SDH: Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
• |G1 |: bit length of an element in G1 .
• |ZZp |: bit length of an element in ZZp .
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Table 5.1: Multi-user Secure Stand-Alone and Setup-Free OFE Protocols without
Random Oracles

Assumption
Full Signature
Signature SizePSig
Signing CostPSig
Verification CostPVer

Our Protocol
CDH
[Wat05]
2|G1 |
CW + 1ExpG1
2BM +1BM

[LOS+ 06]
CDH
[Wat05]
3|G1 |
CW + 2ExpG1
3BM

[ZM07]
CT-CDH
[Wat05]
2|G1 |
CW
2BM +1BM

[RS09]
SDH
[BB04]
2|G1 | + |ZZp |
CBB +2ExpG1
2BM +4BM

• CW : Computational cost of generating one Waters signature [Wat05].
• CBB : Computational cost of generating one BB signature [BB04].
• ExpG1 : Exponentiation in G1 .
• ExpG1 : Pre-computable exponentiation in G1 .
• BM : Bilinear mapping.
• BM: Pre-computable bilinear mapping.
In Table. 5.1, the most efficient one is the protocol constructed from the verifiably
encrypted signature scheme in [RS09], whose security assumption is strong DiffieHellman assumption (SDH). The other three protocols are all based on Waters
signature, but the security of the protocol in [ZM07] can only be reduced to a
stronger assumption: chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CTCDH). Our protocol and the one proposed in [LOS+ 06] are designed in a similar
manner. When compared with [LOS+ 06], our protocol has a shorter partial signature
size and is more efficient in signing and verifying partial signatures. This is achieved
at the cost of larger key size (one more pair (yUi , YUi ) in ZZp × G1 ).

5.5

Conclusion

This chapter shows several new results about OFE in the multi-user setting. We
formally defined the Strong Resolution-Ambiguity in OFE and demonstrated several
concrete OFE protocols with that property. In the certified-key model, we prove that
for OFE protocols with strong resolution-ambiguity, the security in the single-user
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setting can guarantee the security in the multi-user setting. In addition to theoretical
investigations, a new construction of OFE with strong resolution-ambiguity was
proposed. The new protocol is setup-free, stand-alone, and provably secure in the
multi-user setting without random oracles.

Chapter 6
Conclusions
Cryptographic protocols introduce extra computational cost to computer systems,
which is a significant burden for power-constrained devices. A promising solution
is to employ a powerful server to carry out the expensive computations. A serveraided verification signature scheme SAV-Σ consists of a digital signature scheme and
a server-aided verification protocol. The purpose of SAV-Σ is to enable signature
verifier to perform signature verification with less computational cost, by executing
the server-aided verification protocol with the server.
In Chapter 3, we defined the existential unforgeability of server-aided verification
signatures, and proved that it includes the existential unforgeability of signature
schemes and the soundness of server-aided verification protocols under the same
assumption in [GL05]. We also provided the first constructions of existentially unforgeable SAV-BLS and SAV-Waters. The existential unforgeability of SAV-BLS
can be reduced to the hardness of BDH problem in the random oracle model. SAVWaters inherits the desirable property of Waters signature, which can be proven
to be existentially unforgeable without random oracles under GBDH assumption.
After that, we investigated the collusion between the signer and the server, and
defined the security models to capture the collusion attack and its stronger version
on server-aided verification signatures. Concrete server-aided verification signature
schemes secure against collusion attacks are also provided.
Certificate-based public key cryptography and certificateless public key cryptography are proposed to ease the certificate management problem in traditional public
key infrastructure. Although they are two different notions, CB-PKC and CL-PKC
are closely related and possess several common features. The encryption (or, signature verification) does not require public key authenticity verification, and the
decryption (or, message signing) in both notions requires two pieces of information:
one is generated by the third party, and the other one is generated by the public
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key owner.
We provided the generic construction of certificate-based signatures from certificateless signatures, and the generic construction of certificate-based encryption
from certificateless encryption. We refined the security definitions of those two notions and proved the security of the generic constructions in the random oracle
model. Several concrete instances are also given to demonstrate the application of
our generic constructions.
Fair exchange allows two parties to exchange their items in a fair way so that no
one can gain any advantage in the process. A trivial way to realize fair exchange
is to introduce an online trusted third party who acts as a mediator. A more
practical method is optimistic fair exchange (OFE). An OFE protocol involves three
participants: signer, verifier and a third party called arbitrator (who does not need
to be fully trusted). Most OFE protocols are designed only in the single-user setting,
namely there is only one signer. However, OFE protocols are most likely used in the
multi-user setting where there are two or more signers in the system (but items are
still exchanged between two parties). Recent research has shown that the single-user
security of OFE cannot guarantee the multi-user security [DLY07, ZSM07].
We demonstrated several new results on optimistic fair exchange in the multiuser setting. We first introduced and defined a new property of OFE called Strong
Resolution-Ambiguity. For an OFE protocol with strong resolution-ambiguity, we
proved that its security in the single-user setting is preserved in the multi-user
setting, which provides a further understanding on the security of OFE in the multiuser setting. Additionally, we provided a new construction of OFE with strong
resolution-ambiguity, which possesses several desirable properties and is multi-user
secure without the random oracle assumption.
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